



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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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Central Eurasia

Military Affairs

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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Manilov Clarifies Remarks From Yeltsin Press Conference

92UM1110A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 16 May 92 p 2

[Article by Yuliya Panyushkina: "The Russian Armed Forces Are Nearly a Reality: The CIS Combined Armed Forces Information Directorate Sheds Light on the Details"]

[Text]

The Army

A working meeting between Commonwealth Combined Armed Forces Information Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General Valeriy Manilov and journalists took place in Moscow on Friday. They discussed the impending creation of the Russian Federation armed forces. A number of recent reports in the press which, in Valeriy Manilov's words, do not correspond to reality and cause "an undesirable reaction in society" served as the primary grounds for the meeting. One of those "distortions of reality" was detected in the ITAR-TASS information about Boris Yeltsin's meeting with defense complex enterprise leaders. According to the correspondent's report, the president allegedly stated that the republic's defense budget will be increased to ensure the future functioning of the sector. "Moreover," Manilov explained to the journalists, "it is not even a question of any increase of budget appropriations whatsoever." The required resources will be obtained by using the defense enterprises' internal resources. Valeriy Manilov also indicated the absolute groundlessness of the information that was found that they are already planning to implement a 700,000 man reduction of the army by the end of this year. In fact, the aforementioned reduction of the army will be conducted gradually during 1992-1994.

Then, the Lieutenant-General turned to the problem of the transfer of strategic troops to Russian jurisdiction. In some publication, this fact, in Manilov's words, was presented as some sort of sensation. It is not a question of creating new strategic forces, but about the fact that Russia is taking it upon itself to guarantee that part of the agreement on the CIS strategic forces which discusses the fact that the CIS strategic forces troops exclusively belong to Russia. However, these troops will as before be part of the CIS Combined Armed Forces and will be subordinate to the CIS Combined Armed Forces commander-in-chief and to the CIS Combined Armed Forces strategic forces commander and will carry out tasks in the interests of the entire Commonwealth.

Problems of War Veterans Facing CIS States

92UM1141A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Jun 92 First edition p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin: "General Concept of War Veteran Legislation Taking Shape, Now Matter for CIS Members' Parliaments"]

[Text] The crew flying our bomber during the war were as one family: two Ukrainians, an Armenian, a Jew, and myself—a Russian. We were protecting our common Motherland, sharing equally in facing adversities and constant dangers. Now we are all pensioners, citizens of various CIS countries. Not only do we now differ by the kinds of benefits and pensions we receive, but—all of a sudden—the acts of visiting each other and exchanging letters have become a problem.

The above words were spoken by one of the participants in the Interstate Conference of Representatives of Supreme Councils and Governments held in the Russian White House.

The problem of social protection for the disabled and veterans of war has recently become exacerbated to an extreme degree. For example, who is to be considered a war veteran? The criterion has been simple: a person who served in the wartime Army in the field or with partisans. But what about those who fought in detachments of the resistance? The ones who were taken prisoners of war and consequently punished? Or persons who saw action in other wars (not only the Afghan War), the mere mention of which was prohibited—the wars in China, Korea, Ethiopia, Angola? There have been several dozen of that kind of war and conflict. This means that there is a need for suitable legislation. Is it fair to offer the same benefits to persons who fought at the front for three weeks to those available to those who saw action from beginning to end in three wars: Khalkhin Gol, Finnish, and Patriotic Wars? And why not single out Heroes of the Soviet Union and holders of all three classes of the Order of Glory, the same way in which, say, those who held the Order of St. George in Russia were honored?

There was a single way of handling the matter in the past, but now there are differences: Each former Union republic—now an independent state—presently sets its own pensions and benefits for veterans of war and the Armed Forces. It can even do away with the pensions and benefits altogether. It is a fact that the Baltic countries are often slow in disbursing pension payments, with veterans made to pay exorbitant amounts for apartment rental and municipal services. And Georgia has not made any pension disbursements at all since January.

Yes, the CIS states are having a difficult time of it. Nevertheless, trying to find a solution at the expense of veterans is blasphemy. Everything that could possibly be taken away from these people has indeed been taken by the state and society. All that, and even more. As a

matter of fact, persons whose health permits are not just sitting idly and doing nothing. And how is it possible to consider people to be nothing but "waste material"? That certainly is detrimental not only to the "retired" and the "reserves," but also to those on "active duty" as well. That is doing something detrimental to those engaged in labor now, persons who are presently protecting and promoting this labor. This means that the situation is detrimental to all of society.

The conference participants considered the report delivered by A. Belashov, who is deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Council Committee on Affairs of the Disabled, Veterans of War and Labor, and Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Dependents, and they arrived at conclusions addressing the existing problems in a constructive and creative manner, while keeping in mind the concrete realities peculiar to their respective country. A spirit of harmony—that is how the nature of the conference discussions may be briefly characterized. The various representatives: former "Afghan" Colonel N. Naumenko of Ukraine; P. Melnikov, a retired officer from Kazakhstan; N. Giyevko of Belarus; A. Radzhabov of Tajikistan; and others submitted constructive and concrete suggestions.

The conference participants arrived at the consensus that any legislative activity should be guided by the following principles:

- continuity of applicability of legislation passed by bodies of the former Union of the SSR related to social protection of veterans of war and the Armed Forces;
- priority in determination of the types and amounts of benefits for veterans of combat actions, with particular attention paid to the disabled, persons who have performed meritorious service for the state, women, and family survivors of the deceased;
- implementation of legislation on additional measures of social protection of veterans, by virtue of creating a state structure that would administer veterans's affairs;
- determination of entitlement to additional rights, privileges, and benefits for veterans of labor, the Armed Forces, and their dependents to be a function of the individual sovereign state, as based on the economic capabilities of that state.

It was decided at the conference to submit a draft of the intergovernmental agreement to the respective governments and present the suggestion that the matter of social protection of veterans be taken up in a meeting of heads of CIS states and parliaments to be held in the near future.

WGF Officers Demand Transfer From Siberian MD

92UM1153A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Captain A. Niklich: "Because of an Allergy..to Snow, Certain Officers Arriving in the Siberian

MD Have Requested a Change in Their Place of Service, and Are Requesting Moscow"]

[Text] Officers from a motorized rifle battalion arriving from the Western Group of Forces [WGF] at one of the Siberian garrisons have refused to continued further service here. Some of them have requested service in the national armies in Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia since they are natives of those states...

"The opportunity will be provided for the transfer of these servicemen. However, we encountered another unprecedented fact," said the Commander of the Siberian MD, Col Gen Viktor Kopylov, in a talk with a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, "with a portion of the officers who served previously chiefly in the Moscow and Leningrad MD stating that they would again like to serve only in Moscow and St. Petersburg. Some of them have explained their reticence to continue service in the Siberian MD by 'an allergy to frosts and snows' as if there was no winter in the capital cities."

Incidentally, the question of providing their families with housing had already been virtually solved in this garrison.

As our correspondent was told by the Representative of the Personnel Directorate of the Siberian MD, Lieutenant-Colonel Anatoliy Chirtsov, as of today, only one officer from the battalion, namely St Lt A. Baranov, has voiced a desire to continue service in the Siberian garrison. The commander of the Siberiazn MD voiced regret and concern over the fact that certain officers coming from the WGF had not brought with them a fresh view of service, of combat training and the educating of subordinates, as had been expected, but rather caprice and a desire to serve only in the large cities.

Internationalist Committee Chairman on Hot Spots, POWs

92UM1160A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jun 92 First edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Commonwealth Member-States Committee for Soldier- Internationalists' Affairs Chairman Major-General Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Zyubin: "To Hear a Man's Pain: Calling Card: Major-General Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev"]

[Text] Major-General Ruslan Sultanovich Aushev was born in 1954 to the family of an office worker in the village of Volodarskiy in the rayon of the same name in Kokchetavskiy Oblast. He is Ingush. He has been in the Soviet Army since 1971. He graduated from Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command School.

He served as part of the limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. He commanded a motorized rifle battalion. The rank of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to Captain Aushev for courage and heroism on 7 May 1982.

In 1985, he graduated from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze.

His last duty assignment was the Far Eastern Military District where he began as a regimental commander and ended as an army combat training department deputy chief.

In 1989, he was elected a USSR people's deputy. Right now—he is chairman of the Commonwealth Member-States Committee for Soldier-Internationalists' Affairs.

[Zyubin] Ruslan Sultanovich, your committee is involved with soldier- internationalists' affairs. And just how do these matters stand today?

[Aushev] Just the same as in the country... More problems are piling up than are being resolved. The collapse of the Union has also had an impact on the committee's affairs. A special program directed at improving the situation of soldier-internationalists should have already been adopted last year. We intensely labored on its development. The Cabinet of Ministers should have been involved with the resolution of the program. Our program also "came to naught" after the well-known August events.

But that does not mean that we, as they say, have had our wings clipped. We have assumed responsibility for that portion of the problems which it is possible for us to resolve on the interstate level. This is the release of prisoners of war, medical-psychological rehabilitation, and a number of others. A draft "Law on Veterans of War and the Armed Forces" has been prepared and submitted for discussion to the republic Supreme Soviets.

Here I would like to direct attention to the fact that the designation of this law does not contain the customary word combination "soldier- internationalist". And that is not by chance. In my view, it is long since time to replace it with something more precise. Say, a participant of war or combat operations. Otherwise, a multitude of errors and confusion arises in terms. And behind them is the fate of people.

[Zyubin] Doesn't it seem to you that the situation in which Russian soldiers, who are serving in the CIS's "hot spots", have found themselves is somewhat similar to the situation of the first years of the Afghan war? At that time they also stubbornly did not want to recognize the very fact of the war. There were killed and wounded but it was as if there was no war...

[Aushev] Of course, this is strange. The people there are actually under fire and their families are suffering. Once this lot has befallen them, the state's attitude toward them should be appropriate.

[Zyubin] I heard this opinion of the officers about you: We know Ruslan Sultanovich as a courageous man and a combat officer, but right now he is obviously tired and has found himself a quieter, soft job. Hence, the question: Is the post of committee chairman such a sinecure?

[Aushev] I will begin with the fact that I did not seek a "soft job" and I have not even begun to be tired. In 1991, they nominated me as one of the candidates for this post. At that time, I was working on the Supreme Soviet Committee on Servicemen's Affairs. Of the three candidates, they stated a preference for me.

The people who think that this is an easy job are profoundly mistaken. I cannot be indifferent or thick-skinned to someone else's misfortune. Each time I have to let other people's grief pass through my heart. And here there is a sea of tears. You look into the eyes of a young disabled lad who is confined to bed and there is that despair and a cry of hopelessness in them... You know it's all the same when you look into a deep well where there is cold and damp. How can you help to ease his fate? And how many of them are there in our great country...

I WILL NOTE: Ruslan Sultanovich, perhaps like no one else, understands the pain of these people. Fate, as they say, has preserved him. But if that Dushmani bullet had been a bit to the left...

It was on 16 October 1986 while repelling an attack against an Afghan- Soviet column. Since he had been wounded, they quickly bandaged him and placed him in the assault compartment of a combat infantry vehicle. Aushev refused to go to the medical battalion: Every man counts in battle. The BMP set off on its journey only after the attackers had retreated.

Then, several hours of a very complicated operation. Quite a bit of courage was demanded from the officer in order to bear all of the suffering and to soon once again be in the army ranks. In Afghanistan...

Unfortunately, there is no good facility for manufacturing prosthetic devices. There is one health resort, the "Rus", and right now it has wildly jacked up its prices. A pass for treatment costs up to 9,000 rubles! That is for a disabled person living on a miserly pension. And is he really capable of raising such a sum. And what will happen with prices tomorrow? Our committee purchases 25 passes per month and gives them free of charge to those who need them. And this month there are 139 passes. We will send some of the lads abroad. The Germans, Italians, and the Cubans are helping us. But this is still not very much. This is what is constantly gnawing at my soul.

And when the mother of that same prisoner of war soldier arrives and requests aid in bitter tears, will you be quiet? I would like to drop everything to help her but that isn't withdrawing a wounded man from battle. Right now, you yourself know that to release just one soldier from a prisoner of war camp requires grueling efforts and subtle diplomatic work. I honestly admit that I frequently cannot fall asleep for a long time due to what I have seen or heard...

It is also difficult because, in contrast to a regimental commander where I felt myself to be the boss and the

one primarily responsible, here I often have to act in the degrading role of supplicant: both from the government and from the local authorities. And if something doesn't turn out, people look at us reproachfully. According to the big picture, expenditures for veterans must be placed in the budget in any normal state. There are participants of war, there is your portion of the budget. Use that to provide housing, to treat... Is there such a thing even in one state in our country? No. There is one budget item for expenditures for all social needs.

And problems have now been added. In what work situation have soldier-internationalists and veterans in the former republics found themselves. Do you think that my heart does not ache for them? Take the Baltic countries. There they look at veterans as outcasts and they do everything to push them outside of their borders and to deprive them of fundamental rights. Agreements on an interstate basis are urgently needed. I think that for the time being people there will turn out to be abandoned.

Of course, in this context, there are successful republics. For example, Kazakhstan. But, God help us, the Commonwealth is disintegrating and that will be reflected first of all on veterans and the disabled. Therefore, we submitted a draft decision to the Council of Heads of Government: We cannot cut off with a single stroke ties to the soldier-internationalists, just like economic ties.

[Zyubin] You were a USSR's people's deputy. What is your attitude toward the collapse of the Union and toward that movement which Sazhi Umalatova heads?

[Aushev] I was always for the Union but for a renewed Union, without those defects that had occurred. For example, as an Ingush, I was annoyed that only one person represented my people in the Supreme Soviet. And there were difficult to explain blunders in cadre policy issues. I heard that a secret directive existed at the General Staff Academy to not accept officers who were Ingush, Germans, or Jews... Is that really just?

As for Sazhi Umalatova's movement, I think that those deputies who are manifesting such enviable activity right now have also "slept through" the Union. Previously, we were required to calculate possible variations of the development of events and to restrain destructive tendencies. But you don't raise your fists after a fight. You need to soberly look at life and not have your head in the clouds. Therefore, I did not participate in their movement.

[Zyubin] Your parents are in Grozny. When were you there last?

[Aushev] I was there on a temporary duty assignment a month ago. Outwardly, everything was calm: people were walking along the streets and transportation and communications were operating... But, naturally, you could feel the tension.

Those same processes encompass Checheno-Ingushetiya (that is what I call it now) that currently encompass the entire former great country. What they accuse Dudayev of here. The Union has disintegrated. Now Russia's centrifugal forces are being set in motion and it has not been excluded that the blind fervor of sovereignization and secession can encompass individual regions. By way of illustration, could you ever have imagined that such sharp disputed issues could have arisen between Ukraine and Russia or that they will soon hurriedly throw together border posts?

[Zyubin] Ruslan Sultanovich, when the conversation turns to the theme of interethnic relations, I always have this visual image: the land, scorched by drought, and fissures and small cracks ominously disperse along it. It seems that each grain of land is attempting to separate from the neighboring grain in the hope of preserving a drop of precious humidity... The land is incapable of begetting in that state.

Doesn't it seem to you that the borders of the former Union now present that same picture? How do we stop that process? We will not be able to deal with the misfortunes without the unity of peoples that populate, as they now say, this "space". The blood and chaos of civil war await us.

[Aushev] There was that high concept of Homeland (we wrote that word in capital letters) within the borders of the USSR. There was one Union for everyone. Whether it was good or bad is another question. A hundred threads united us: the economy, culture, and finally, that same sport. No one, no matter what nationality a man was, was afraid to drive to any point of the country, be it Uzbekistan or the Baltic Region. We knew that there were those same laws and those same procedures there.

But right now so much effort has been directed at the breakup. Some of the leaders are playing nationalist cards. Public opinion is being formed in accordance with what is advantageous to them. Yes and some mass media publications are operating as delayed-action mines. But we cannot, like the galaxy, be scattered throughout the Universe. The path of alienation leads to a dead end. And we need to strengthen the Commonwealth. If it survives and gains momentum, people will once again extend the hand of friendship and assistance to each other. Then I am certain that the territory will appear which we will once again with pride call our Homeland. But to do this, we need to find the composition vector of all the peoples' strengths.

[Zyubin] Right now a process is occurring of the creation of their own Armed Forces in the former union republics...

[Aushev] I was an opponent of republic armies. I do not understand against whom and with whom they intend to fight. If this is a tribute to form, they say, an attribute of statehood, then that is a harmless approach in my view. But is it worthwhile to dump this load on the republic's weak economies due to that? Moreover, it is worthwhile

to recall popular wisdom: fire an unloaded rifle once a year. There are a mass of disputed issues on those same territories. And where is the guarantee that hot heads will not be found to resolve them using an army?

But Russia is in a special position. Once the other republics began to create their own armies, it was compelled to act in the same manner.

[Zyubin] Do you have a goal in life?

[Aushev] In my childhood, I had the goal of becoming a good soccer player but I became an officer. But if I am serious, then right now my goal is to do everything possible and impossible in this post so that no one can rebuke me, say, for not doing anything worthwhile, or that I only occupied the post for no purpose.

INCIDENTALLY. When this issue was being prepared, we learned that an interregional meeting of Afghan vets was concluding in Tbilisi that had been organized at the initiative of the Commonwealth Member-States Committee for Soldier-Internationalists' Affairs. The possibilities were determined for specific participation of former soldier-internationalists in the resolution of the conflict in the Caucasus.

CIS: POLICY

Grachev on Military Tasks, Officer Pay
924C1738A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 22-23, Jun 92 p 5

[Interview with General of the Army P. Grachev, minister of defense of the Russian Federation, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent V. Perushkin: "A Position of Strength Is Better than a Position of Weakness"]

[Text] The position of the Russian Army, both in the Russian Federation and on the territories of the sovereign republics where individual subunits are deployed, resembles a fifth wheel of a wagon that is falling apart while in motion. On the one hand it impedes everything, and on the other, everyone has a faint hope that maybe if it suddenly gets the urge, it will help.

It is this unenviable condition of the Russian Army, and many of its other problems, that was the subject of our correspondent V. Perushkin's interview with General of the Army P. Grachev, who was recently appointed to the post of minister of defense.

[Perushkin] Your wife said at one time that you always appear where there is a smell of scorching. Well, is this smell already starting to get strong in Russia?

[Grachev] Do you not smell the odor of powder smoke in the many places that units of the Armed Forces of Russia are deployed? Take the Dniester region and the Transcaucasus. Reports from these regions have been indistinguishable from combat situation reports for a long time now. Moreover, the Army is trying within all its

powers to maintain neutrality, although it is becoming more and more difficult to do this.

[Perushkin] At a recent press conference you declared that you will protect Russians from any oppression on the entire territory of the CIS. In what way will this protection be expressed?

[Grachev] By the will of history Russian people live and work on the entire territory of the former Union. They are not guilty of anything before the other people who populate the independent states that were formed in place of the USSR, and they have the same rights to life, freedom, and work. I consider it intolerably insulting to tag them with the label "occupiers." I am convinced that an adequate reaction on the part of Russia is necessary in the event that their human rights are infringed, and especially if there is an attempt on their life. The Russian Army must be a reliable guarantor of the freedom and independence of the citizens of our state.

[Perushkin] But a position of strength led at one time to the events in the Baltic region, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and, finally, remember the Yugoslav variant...

[Grachev] In principle I am an opponent of violence, although I do not think that a position of weakness is better than a position of strength. We must never permit illegal armed formations to attack military units and subunits and kill soldiers, officers, and members of their families with impunity. We are against involving the Army in interethnic conflicts, but anyone who makes an attempt on the life of a Russian soldier should know that he will be given a harsh rebuff.

[Perushkin] Does this mean that point five [statement of nationality in passport] will again start to "matter," let us say, in service promotions in the Russian Army? Will persons with the last names, for example, Petrusenko, Ziguya, Tugayev, and Zherinovich now be able to become generals?

[Grachev] I do not see any obstacles for representatives of any of the nations and nationalities that populate Russia. What is more, we will promote the revival of the great historical Russian tradition when Hannibal—"the blackamoor of Peter the Great"—and Barclay de Tolly, and Bagration... served in the ranks of its army faithfully and truthfully.

[Perushkin] Well, but who is our potential enemy now?

[Grachev] The times of the bad memory of the "cold war" have long since passed. Russia has no enemies; however, it is a little early to say that military danger has disappeared forever. Therefore, we need a strong, mobile, and modern army.

[Perushkin] You said in one interview that the Russian Army has to start from zero. Does this imply personnel rearrangements, resolution of social protection of the military, or a new direction in foreign policy?

[Grachev] This was said in the sense that the creation of the Russian Army will require reorganization in literally all spheres, beginning with military doctrine and ending with the attributes of a soldier. To support operational tasks, a new type of troops is being created—rapid reaction troops. New approaches will also be implemented, naturally, in those spheres you are talking about—acquisition of personnel for the troops and naval forces, social protection of servicemen... We will gradually shift to the contract principle of bringing troops up to strength.

[Perushkin] What will be the pay for officers at the junior, senior, and higher levels?

[Grachev] In accordance with the decree of the Government of the Russian Federation, a lieutenant-commander of a platoon—will receive 3,900 rubles [R], starting 1 June, and R5,200, starting 1 August; a captain—commander of a company—R5,200 and R6,900. A lieutenant colonel—commander of a regiment—R7,400 and R9,800; the sum of monetary allowances of a general—commander of a division—will be R8,900 in June, and in August it will amount to R12,000 a month.

[Perushkin] Incidentally, should it be understood that the question of a general's privileges is already settled?

[Grachev] Where "privileges" mean abuse of position, it is necessary to say outright that there are abuses. But we will not draw in the general corps here to no purpose. Everything must be done on a legal basis for everyone.

Russian Defense Committee's Lopatin Interviewed
92UF0467A Moscow KURANTY in Russian
No 100, 23 May 92 p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Lopatin, chairman of the Russian State Defense Committee, by Aleksandr Putko; place and date not given: "The Army Must Be Saved"]

[Text] Vladimir Lopatin assessed his early promotion to colonel as an attempt to "tame" him, to make him more compliant and obedient. He asked to have the order rescinded, and to have his former rank of major reinstated. "After this was done, I felt much better," said Vladimir Lopatin, deputy chairman of the Russian State Defense Committee. Such are the times in which we live: Each one of us faces the problem of a moral choice. In the military realm, this problem is especially acute, because the situation is such that the army must be saved.

[Putko] Vladimir Nikolayevich, we know that you are straight-forward and uncompromising. You have never acted against your conscience in defending your views. But in that case how do we understand this change in your political position? Three years ago the slogan you followed in your campaign platform was "All power to the soviets!" And now you are one of the most active proponents of strengthening presidential power.

[Lopatin] My political position remains the same: We want to live in a law-governed, democratic, civilized state. As with many others, at first I believed that the path to it lay through a parliamentary republic. But gradually life persuaded me more and more that it is impossible to reach the goal in this form and in such a short time. Our country lacks the democratic traditions, the mechanisms and the necessary institutions for this. It became increasingly more obvious that we are moving not toward democracy but more likely toward all-permissiveness, toward anarchy. The chief prerequisite of democracy is a strong state. We became increasingly more persuaded in the need for strengthening executive power. Thus the change occurred not in my political position but in the choice of paths to the goal. But any political choice must be preceded by a moral one.

[Putko] Does this pertain to military development as well?

[Lopatin] Of course! Creation of the Russian Army is not an end unto itself. Having allocated 400 billion rubles for defense this year, we must know the purposes for which this money is being spent. You see, the actual military expenditures in the first quarter of this year twice exceeded the amount approved for these purposes by the parliament—R54 billion. Think about it, that's three times more than was spent on social needs, and 10 times more than on science! The government cannot find the R30 billion it needs in order to adequately increase the wages of teachers, medical personnel and cultural workers in the second quarter. Consequently we need to determine the priorities in research, technology and production of armament and equipment, so that expenditures on these items could be reduced, since otherwise there will be simply no one and nothing to defend.

In order to solve all these problems we need strong executive power. In the realm of defense, the need for it is sensed with special keenness. Recall that a year and a half ago people were trying to persuade B. N. Yeltsin not to involve himself in military issues. All of his attempts as president of Russia, and prior to this as chairman of the Supreme Soviet, immediately evoked fierce resistance on the part of the supreme military leadership. And remember the labels they attached to the Russian leader at that time! But what do we see today? The same advisors in shoulderboards are directly attacking the president, though this time from the opposite side: They demand that he resolve the question of establishing the Ministry of Defense and the Russian Armed Forces as soon as possible. They are trying to persuade him that this can be done in a single month, and they recommend delegating solution of all the problems to the military themselves, as this had been done under Gorbachev's administration.

[Putko] Why did such an abrupt change occur in the moods of the supreme military leadership?

[Lopatin] It's not hard to figure out why: The general corps understood that a real threat had arisen under the

new conditions to its omnipotence and unruffled existence. CIS states began actively proclaiming their lawful rights to resolve defense matters. And so, sensing the menacing vibrations of the ground beneath its feet, the general corps turned its gaze on Russia in the hope that it would defend its interests. This is assuming of course that the former order in the army and the command position of the generals within it would be preserved. What would all of this lead to? All you can do in a month is change the name, leaving everything else as it was. But in such a case would there be any hope for reform, which is still a faint hope in the army? I think not. Perhaps generals might retain their power and their privileges for some time, but the army will disintegrate further, which will ultimately affect the stability of the state as well.

[Putko] Do you think that the present general corps is incapable of leading the armed forces?

[Lopatin] The present military leadership is unfortunately for the most part absorbed in solving not the problems of the army (the job it is getting its money, stars and orders for specifically), but primarily its own personal problems. It is occupied either with the quest for seats in the Russian corridors of power and with lobbying for its own candidates for higher positions, or with the sale of military property. The latter is the focus of those who are preparing for inevitable retirement. They have already made their moral choice. The generals had much to say about privatization in the press, including in KURANTY. An article recently published in your newspaper evoked many responses. I think that this is a topic of separate discussion, but only at the level of the Administration for State Control, court entities and the procuracy.

A recent statement at the congress by a certain people's deputy, a general from the air defense forces, comes to mind. He spoke of the shortage of waist belts for soldiers as a great tragedy. But is this really the main problem, when billions are disappearing into personal accounts, into commercial organizations, and into joint-stock companies, funds and partnerships? When the military department establishes a monthly pay of \$3,500 for one foreign military specialist undergoing training with us? When \$800 is collected for a one-hour interview in the Information Directorate of the Main Commissariat of the CIS? When military equipment and property is sold without any controls, since the army only keeps item-by-item track of such equipment, and does not account for its value? Where does this money go? Who counts it? All of these assets could be used not only to supply belts to soldiers but also to solve one of the most acute social problems of the army—providing housing to all officers and warrant officers needing it. Our generals talk on and on about this problem, but they are doing very little to solve it.

And if the discussion turns to a moral choice, the honorable thing for many of them to do would be to submit their retirement papers. But despite all of the articles in the newspapers and the already documented

cases of abuses, they continue to occupy their posts. These are people without conscience and honor.

[Putko] In the meantime the military reform that we have been talking about in recent years is standing still.

[Lopatin] And it will remain at a standstill until the approaches proposed by the military leadership are done away with. In the same way as under Yazov, and then under Shaposhnikov, the leadership is exhibiting a total lack of interest, as well as an inability to implement any fundamental changes in the army, since in such a case the general corps would have to make concessions in regard to its personal interests.

And heel-dragging is something the reform cannot tolerate. Hopes for change in the army are still associated with establishment of Russian Armed Forces. This is the last hope for the army's rescue from total collapse. I see the following as the succession of actions we need to take.

First of all we need to form the Ministry of Defense as a political administrative organ in which the General Staff would operate with the status of one of its departments, albeit significantly reduced. In the postwar years, you see, the General Staff grew immeasurably, and for practical purposes swallowed up the Ministry of Defense. There are now 30,000 military servicemen in organizations of the General Staff, which exceeds all reasonable limits by many times. The supreme military leadership must be appointed by the president of the Russian Federation on the basis of competitive professional selection of candidates nominated by a certification commission, and with the consent of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Second, the armed forces need to be subjected to state expert evaluation. Had such an evaluation been conducted earlier, in my opinion the conclusion would have been definite: Our army has become incapable of combat. But unfortunately, such an evaluation has never been conducted at the state level since the times of World War II. It stands to reason that this work should be assigned to something other than a departmental commission. Otherwise everything would be as before: The military department would be inspecting itself. What we need is a commission consisting of individuals who are independent, disinterested and are truly concerned for Russia's interests.

Third, we need to determine the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the future Russian Army. In this case we need to base ourselves on world standards: in regard to numerical strength—0.8 percent of the country's population, and in regard to expenditures—3-4 percent of the GNP (gross national product).

Only after this will we be able to begin drafting and implementing a state program for reducing the armed forces and conducting a military reform. Only this sequence of actions, carried out in the glare of public scrutiny, can halt the further disintegration of the army,

and provide the majority of officers with some idea of what their future is to be. And it will not permit repetition of one of the worst mistakes of Gorbachev's administration.

[Putko] Is this sounding like a warning to B. Yeltsin?

[Lopatin] Analyzing the situation, I came to the conclusion that the information Boris Nikolayevich requires for decision making is often one-sided. His trust of the military and his relationship to the supreme military leadership are based on information coming from the military itself. Other information never reaches the president for the most part. I was able to persuade myself of this on several occasions when I sent personal communications regarding the situation in the army and regarding the mood in the supreme military leadership. I sent these materials through unclassified channels, as secret material, and even as top secret material. But it was detained at the aide level, and in the best case it was reported to Volkogonov or, in earlier times, to Kobets. And so it happened that I reported on General Kobets's unlawful actions, and the document ended up on his desk. A closed circle! I can't help being concerned that this is beginning to also have an effect on certain decisions. Evidence of this can be found in the history of establishment of the commission under Colonel General Volkogonov's leadership and of organization of its work, when Kobets and Shaposhnikov drafted an order, unbeknownst to the government, and then submitted it to the president for signature through Volkogonov, together with all of the numerous violations and even the mistakes it contained.

Under these conditions the package of decisions adopted by the Russian president on 7 May of this year may signify a new turn in the domestic policy of the Russian state. Possible reliance upon the military-industrial complex and structures of power is hardly equivalent to making a choice in favor of Russia and the majority of its citizens, because the interests of most generals in the defense establishment are for some reason consistently contrary to the interests of the peoples they are called upon to defend. This manifested itself especially clearly when the republics of the former USSR started becoming aware of their national interests.

[Putko] You became a direct participant of this process after you were appointed one of the leaders of the State Defense Committee of the Russian Federation. If my memory serves me, this happened in late 1990.

[Lopatin] Yes. We began by offering to cooperate with the General Staff. All we got in response was silence. When we attempted to convene military servicemen serving as deputies, we immediately encountered sharp resistance. And in the meantime the republics, which had acquired increasingly greater independence while still within the composition of the former USSR, quite naturally wanted to have a real influence on defense. It seemed as if everything was as clear as can be: The states were investing their assets into defense, and sending

their citizens to serve in the army, but they had absolutely no influence upon the armed forces. Let me note in passing that their demands were so minimal back then in 1990 that we can only wonder in disbelief why they didn't want to satisfy them. Active negotiations were conducted and unilateral attempts to establish contacts with the USSR Ministry of Defense were made prior to May 1990. There was talk of dividing power and levels of responsibility. But all of these ideas were rejected by Yazov immediately. We drafted an agreement, but when it reached the defense minister, the latter uttered a decisive "no." This caused the republics to desire independence even more. They began increasing the level of their demands. In July 1991 the first attempt was made to solve defense problems at an international level. Representatives of Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan convened. We were close to signing an agreement, but the military department once again torpedoed it.

So who is to blame for the fact that the idea of a unified defensive alliance could not be realized? This could have been done back in 1990, and even in mid-1991. The reason for the failure was the incompetent policy pursued by the military department. Gorbachev's administration delegated solution of military problems to the Ministry of Defense, but the latter always acted too late. A little time passed, and the military leadership agreed to what had been proposed to it earlier, but it was already too late—the level of the demands of the republics had risen. This was a manifestation of the total political incompetency of our generals.

Consider that the latest meetings of the heads of states of the Commonwealth, conducted after the August events, showed that defense problems still remained unsolved. And this happened because as before, the military had made the preparations for the negotiations.

[Putko] As far as I know, your committee has submitted its proposals on establishing a system of collective defense.

[Lopatin] We proposed, on one hand, dismantling the military system of the former USSR, and on the other, creating a fundamentally new system. It may be called different things—a defensive union, a military-political union—what is important is not the name, but the essence. The essence is that the new system of collective defense must be established on a state basis by the participants of the CIS. A Council of Defense Ministers must be established to guide this process. Shaposhnikov agreed, and he took up this idea, but he modified it somewhat, wanting the Council of Defense Ministers to become only a consultative organ under the main command. Naturally, the states did not agree to this. This is why the path to the present Tashkent collective security agreement was so long and hard. But the work on this has not been finished.

[Putko] You are participating in the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet. How are they going?

[Lopatin] Thus far, the first round of negotiations was held on 29-30 April in Odessa. The meeting will be continued in Dagomys on 28-29 May. An attempt is being made to solve the problems by political means after talks at the military level reached a dead end. The military are now saying: "We were unable to resolve this issue, so resolve it politically." It's a pity that they didn't say this earlier! I am certain that the tension we sensed at the negotiations would not have existed. As always, even here we are playing catch-up.

It seems to me that the Russian president's latest decision—that talks with all states must be coordinated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs—will put everything in order. This was felt even in the course of our negotiations. The delegations participating in them are headed by Russian Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Yu. F. Yarov and Ukrainian Supreme Soviet First Deputy Chairman V. V. Durdinets. These are serious politicians, capable of reaching compromises and seeking solutions based on national interests and on reinforcing mutual security. The military, meanwhile, are participating in the negotiations only as experts.

[Putko] What is Russia's position in the negotiations?

[Lopatin] Russia is standing on the legal conception of resolving the Black Sea Fleet issue in accordance with attained agreements. I am referring to the protocol dated 16 January 1992, signed by the presidents of the CIS. According to this protocol, the navy is within the composition of the strategic forces of the CIS, with the exception of part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, which are being transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This part of the ships and vessels of the Black Sea Fleet is identified on the basis of a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Such was the decision of the Council of the Heads of State, and it bears the signatures of both Kravchuk and Yeltsin. Such an agreement to transfer part of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet is to be prepared in the course of the negotiations between the two delegations.

[Putko] But Ukraine declares that the Black Sea Fleet is not strategic, and therefore it should be transferred to it in its entirety. All the more so because it contributed 16 percent of all assets to the USSR Navy, and this is much more than the value of the entire Black Sea Fleet.

[Lopatin] But in this case the Ukrainian side forgets that it has already privatized part of the armed forces on its territory. And if we calculate the value of what has transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine, we find that this is much more than its contribution to the Commonwealth's defensive potential. Eighteen percent of the divisions, 12.5 percent of the tanks, 10 percent of the artillery, 18 percent of the ammunition, 18 percent of the warplanes, 32 percent of the helicopter gunships and 15 percent of all other materiel, valued at a total of over R20 billion, were located on Ukrainian territory, after all. And I am not even mentioning the fixed capital, the buildings and structures erected with money from the

military budget. Such that if we accept the conception proposed by the Ukrainian side, the fair thing to do would be to account for investments not into the fleet separately, but into all branches of the armed forces taken together.

But in any case some positive results have already been attained in the first round of negotiations. Both sides stated the need for announcing a moratorium on any unilateral actions regarding problems of the Black Sea Fleet. The sides showed they understood that the issue concerns not only transfer of military property and armament, but primarily the destinies of thousands of military servicemen and their families.

Here is just one example. In Odessa I was told about a seaman's family for which everything was felt to be going well, until recently. The husband is a lieutenant colonel, and the wife is a seaman. He took the oath of allegiance to Ukraine because he had to finish his term of service, and maintain possession of his apartment. But his wife refused. The relations between the spouses are tearing apart. Then there's the question of what the children want to do. So here at the personal level we are once again encountering the problem of moral choice.

Some time ago I had the opportunity to work in a deputy commission under the guidance of Academician Yu. Ryzhov. We were working on the conception of national security, and we came to understand that the interests of the individual must be above the interests of the society and the state. And this means that in its establishment, in its adoption of laws and conclusion of agreements, the state must not destroy preestablished interpersonal ties. It is impermissible, as they say, "to cut to the quick." Otherwise this would be an immoral state. If all leaders of the CIS countries were to make this moral principle a political one, many problems that arose with the USSR's collapse could be solved much more calmly.

Demidov on Role of COCOM After Cold War

92UF0468B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 7

[Article by reviewer Sergey Demidov: "COCOM—A Cold-War Appendix Which the West Feels Need Not Be Removed"]

[Text] Were I not a skeptic down to the marrow, certain that only a bad example is infectious, I could say that the COCOM—the Coordinating Committee for Control of Exports (half a year ago the Soviet press justifiably added three words that have now stuck permanently to this official name: "In Socialist Countries")—was "infected" by NATO. During a meeting of the COCOM held last week in the French capital, an unprecedented decision was made to invite post-communist nations to a "forum on problems of cooperation in controlling exports of modern technology" to "risky countries," under pressure from the geopolitical realities that had changed so radically following the collapse of the "camp of world

socialism," and of a number of Western European members of this committee, primarily Germany. (COCOM defines "risky countries" as states such as, for example, North Korea and Iraq.)

This sort of "forum" under the auspices of COCOM will probably become, under this international structure, approximately the same sort of organization that the Council for North Atlantic Cooperation, established under NATO in December especially for Russia, other Commonwealth republics and countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics, has become. In any case, time will tell.

For the moment, the excessively optimistic predictions of some foreign newspapers that at the Paris meeting the doors of COCOM would be flung wide open before Russia and other countries of the CIS without any further delays did not come true. But even the general agreement reached behind the traditionally closed doors by the 17 states making up the committee—the NATO countries less Iceland, plus Australia and Japan—to convene the above-mentioned forum, and equally so to soften the prohibitions on the sale, to Moscow, of high-tech "dual purpose" equipment (in this case, fiber cabling used in telecommunications), at least on the condition that it pledges to plug more reliably the channels of possible leakage of this product, suitable for creation of mass destruction weapons as well, to third-world countries, says a great deal. First that COCOM—this offspring born behind the iron curtain of the confrontation between the "two worlds"—is to live a long life. (At least in its present form.) And that from this day forward, COCOM will work "hand in hand with the former USSR and its former satellites" to create obstacles in the path of the "new strategic threat."

In the opinion of politicians not just in the West, this threat comes from developing countries under the control of regimes that directly and indirectly threaten to create nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. And not only are they threatening to do so, but they are also insistently trying to obtain them by any means.

Such that it looks as if COCOM, which came into being simultaneously with NATO in 1949, turns out to be precisely that cold-war appendix which should in no case be removed—something that is felt by Washington, which seems to have a high stake in it, and not only Washington. At least for now.

And it appears that they think the same way in Russian corridors of power.

Well, what can we say? Moscow's preparedness to work together with COCOM to shut off the technological "oxygen" to those states which, reading from one of the bulletins of the United States Information Agency (USIA), "violate human rights, practice terrorism and provoke regional instability," is more deserving of praise than punishment. In this case, however, we cannot count on the hope that in exchange for Russia's guarantees to strictly observe the rules of COCOM, our country will be

inundated, as if from the horn of plenty, by Western technology on the cutting edge.

"And until such time that the threat of counterrevolution is dispelled in Russia, transfer of technology which may be used for military purposes must continue to be, to a significant degree, a one-way street, where the USA will purchase technology and services but minimize transfer of American technology to Russia.... This is the price Russia will have to pay for American investments...." This is taken word for word from an analytical document drafted this year by the Heritage Foundation—an American "brain trust" which is taken very seriously by both the State Department and the White House. And, I'm sure, COCOM as well.

Truly, it is evident from these quotations that the price will be high. For example according to rumors out of Paris, Japan has already named its price—the Southern Kurils.

Is the West asking too high a price? All the more so when Russia possesses its own scientific developments, for example in fiber optics, that are not inferior to Western developments?

Another question begs itself as well. After Russia helps COCOM to relieve the "atomic and chemical itch of the 'risky countries,'" and after its economic position stabilizes and it begins to pull itself little by little out of the mire of its problems, will COCOM not return to its old prohibitive ways? In other words, will this organization, which we never have been invited to join, erect obstacles in the path of export of Western technology to Russia once again in short time? No one is denying this in COCOM.

Role of Women in Military Examined

*92UM1115A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jun 92 First edition p 2*

[Article by Major M. Lisovskiy: "Only Women on Alert?"]

[Text] Before, everything was simpler and easier to understand. Men plowed the land, cut trees, discovered distant countries and fundamental laws of physics. Women raised the children, kept the fires at home, and if they worked in production, it was only in the lightest sections. Now everything is turning upside down. Healthy men sell nails, and more and more representatives of the "weaker sex" are picking up crowbars and sledgehammers, boxing, and playing soccer. From all appearances, our "gentle, beautiful, delicate" women are preparing to push our brother to the background. Is this the second wave of a harsh matriarchy?

Joking aside, no. Service of women in the army—and not only as various clerks and typists—will become, it seems, commonplace in the future. In any event, one of the aviation garrisons of the Air Defense Forces already has

an entire subunit where nearly 100 percent of the alert duty is stood by female service members.

But all is in order. We remember well the historical decision of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies to end the practice of drafting students of higher educational institutions into the armed forces. Thus, the building of a "workers' and peasants'" army was finally completed. And after a certain amount of time, soldiers having too specific specialties in "civilian life" for this subunit flowed into the ranks of personnel of the combat control center of the fighter regiment command post. And we had to place at the work positions equipped with the latest computer equipment former tractor operators, drivers, metalworkers, and cultural and educational workers. Of course, we could have trained these lads to be normal operators and electricians, but this, first, would have taken months of intensive labor and, second, a burning desire to learn the secrets of the profession on the part of the trainees. But since we had neither, the commanders found another way out of the situation. They began working for two or three, forgot their native home, and, due to the constant alert duties, neglected professional studies...

Everyone knew, of course, that, according to regulations, it was authorized to place female service members "on staff" in place of compulsory-service soldiers and non-commissioned officers, especially since there was a precedent for this—the "beautiful sex" has been working in the technical maintenance unit here in place of the "strong sex" for just under 10 years, and without adverse comments.

However, whether they knew it or not, they were in no hurry to follow in their footsteps. The leadership had doubts. Will the women go for alert duty, the pay is low.

But when it was finally decided in the fall of last year, it turned out that there were far more women with a burning desire to fulfill the honorable duty and civic duty with dignity than there were vacancies. They even had to hold a candidate selection of sorts.

More than six months have passed since then. Has replacing soldiers with women in military uniform proved to be as promising as it seemed earlier? The question was put to the chief of a communications center, Senior Lieutenant Igor Ryadnov, under whose supervision recent candidates are serving. Igor Nikoleyevich answered frankly: it is hard to say so far what will come of this experiment; we will have to wait another year. But as far as the lack of soldiers is concerned, he continued, this is creating additional difficulties...

As it turns out, he had in mind difficulties again of an economic nature. Plans for building facilities, repair, and so force are still "hanging" in the subunit. You cannot force the women to dig trenches "from the fence and before lunch!"

It is understandable, therefore, that the officers in charge here began to receive more reprimands from their superiors for the worsening of affairs with "self-structure." But judging from their words, the former are not very upset due to this. They finally learned what it is to sleep soundly when alert duty is being pulled not by "extractor operators" dreaming only about a discharge into the reserves but by conscientious female specialists who have been excellently trained, theoretically and practically. But here the opinion of the same chief of the combat control center differs from the opinion of Senior Lieutenant I. Ryadnov.

I had the opportunity to see with my own eyes how privates Yelena Skvortsova and Tamara Baymatova, both wives of officers, work while participating in flight support. I immediately recalled the picture which I observed last year when compulsory-service specialists, released to stand alert duty, were at the positions. I must honestly say that the comparison does not favor the latter. The women somehow had managed, in this gloomy conglomeration of metal, glass, and plastic, to create some semblance of comfort and brought an air of order and cleanliness. But the most important thing is that, despite the comparatively short time since entering the position, they handled their duties confidently and efficiently.

Later we talked about what motivates the first female professionals in their desire to learn a seemingly purely male job. Strange as it may seem, they by no means cited any mercantile reasons, but pride in their recently acquired profession. Both Yelena Skvortsova and Tamara Baymatova understand perfectly well their responsibility for flight safety and unit combat readiness and try to do as much as they can for overall success. They also have a sense of being needed namely here in this difficult section.

In addition to them, there are also wives of servicemen on duty in the communications center—privates Galina Guzenko and Sofya Moskalyuk. There are also former "civilians"—privates Galina Zamotina, Irina Shulyakova, Lyubov Nevzorova, and Irina Filippova. Two of the female service members have a higher education, and the rest have a secondary technical education. The education level probably also to some degree affects the quality of combat training.

So, feminization of the armed forces on the scale of one individual Air Defense subunit has been accomplished. It is difficult to say whether we should be glad or sad over such a trend.

What, in fact, would you order done? The pay and allowances for extended-service personnel, even counting rations and uniform allowances, are several times less than the wages of a streetcar driver, for example. Will a young lad come into the army for that kind of money, each day seeing around himself prospering "businessmen" his own age? Add to that the housing issue.

It would not be bad to return to the question of drafting students—it is not enough that we have shortages of people due to restrictions for medical reasons, we are depriving soldier collectives of an intellectual nucleus. But... Now it turns out that for now there is no way we can handle the "bottlenecks" without the help of our selfless fighting female friends. Professionals.

We will see!

Common Ministerial Efforts on Social Protection of Servicemen

*92UM1120A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jun 92 First Edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel Yu. Kirillov: "Social Protection of Servicemen: Plans and Reality"]

[Text] Special importance presently attaches to developing the assurance of a legal basis of social protection of servicemen and persons discharged from military service and their dependents in the environment of radical economic and military reforms under way in the CIS. The problem boils down to eliminating the legal vacuum existing in the area of military service as well as in relations between the CIS countries with respect to all attendant problems.

The above is the purpose of the instruction issued by Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Unified Armed Forces, relative to the development of an integrated program that would make it possible to create an operative and legally standardized economic basis for concerted resolution of social problems in accordance with the Agreement of Heads of Commonwealth States that was signed on 14 February 1992 in Minsk. A draft concept of that program was developed by the Committee on Work with Personnel and submitted for review by the CIS Council of Ministers.

Willingness to participate in the development of a joint intergovernmental program was expressed by Russian Federation Minister of Defense Army General P. Grachev; Chairman of the State Committee of Kyrgyzstan for Defense Matters Major General D. Umataliyev; and - by direction of Ukraine Minister of Defense - Colonel V. Mulava, chief of the Social and Psychological Service of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Note should be made of the fact that the Ministry of Defense of Russia already has a draft program of its own dealing with urgent measures related to social and legal protection of servicemen, of persons discharged from military service, veterans of war and the Armed Forces, and internationalist soldiers and their dependents.

It is expected that in the near future the President of the Russian Federation will issue an ukase providing greater guarantees for servicemen in connection with the creation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. This is intended to assist in the resolution of many

pressing problems pending the passage of about 20 legislative and normative acts developed by the Ministry of Defense for the purpose of governing the life and activities of the Army and Navy.

The draft program stresses the expediency of composing a special order for issue by the Russian Federation Government dealing with the problems of troops stationed on the soil of the Baltics, Transcaucasus, Moldova, and other areas; outlines plans for providing benefits for 104,600 families of servicemen on duty on Russian soil who have no apartment; proposes the development of a system of military hospitals, polyclinics, sanatoria, rest homes, tourist bases, and pre-school institutions for children; calls for providing an additional 11,000 hospital beds and increasing the number of polyclinical institutions to accommodate an additional 81,000 visits.

Based on the fact that sanatoria and health resort service covers only 20% of present needs, plans call for doubling the number of sanatoria beds by the application of capital construction of new facilities and the reconstruction of existing institutions. Satisfaction of the need for kindergartens and nurseries for servicemen's children will require construction of an additional 114 institutions for 30,000 children. Further improvement in food provisioning for the Armed Forces will be effected by working with local organs of authority to create 14 new agricultural enterprises.

Also in the planning stage is a system of retraining and job placement for servicemen subject to discharge into the reserve. The economic aspects attendant to this measure have been given due consideration.

Processes similar to those mentioned above are under way in other CIS countries. In Ukraine there is the Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Dependents; in Byelarus, the Supreme Council's Law on Armed Forces Stationed on the Territory of Byelarus; in Kazakhstan, the Ukase on Measures for Social Protection of Servicemen and Persons Discharged from Military Service on the Territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Conditions and guarantees vary in the various states, even though most officers entered the service on an equal footing. And, unfortunately, the problems in most cases are similar. Thus, in the year 1991 there were more than 76,000 officers discharged from the CIS Unified Armed Services into the reserve. Of this number, more than 68,000 (89%) had no apartment in which to live at their stated permanent residence.

In a word, the development of a joint intergovernmental social program is becoming an essential reality. The fact is that the Agreement reached between the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States with its listing

of social and legal guarantees for servicemen, persons discharged from military service, and their dependents endows servicemen with the right to retain the citizenship of the state which they possessed at the time of their callup for (entering) military service. In addition, they upon discharge from military service are entitled to be granted citizenship of the country in which they are discharged and to claim that state as the country of their permanent residence. Importance now attaches to assuring, as declared in the Agreement, the level of rights and privileges for servicemen that was set down in the previous legal and normative acts in effect in the former USSR.

Russian Resolution on Withdrawal From Germany

92UF0468A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
No 18, 12 Jun 92 p 4

[Decree No 329 of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 20 May 1992, Moscow, "On Problems Associated With Withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces From the FRG"]

[Text] In order to protect Russia's state interests during withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from the FRG, the Government of the Russian Federation resolves:

1. To establish the Commission on Use of Property of the Western Group of Forces under the Government of the Russian Federation.
2. That the commission is to coordinate its operations with the defense minister of the Russian Federation, Army General P. S. Grachev.
3. To appoint Yevgeniy Vladimirovich Arapov chairman of the Commission on Use of Property of the Western Group of Forces.
4. To instruct Ye. V. Arapov to submit proposals on organizing the commission's work to the Government of the Russian Federation within a week's time.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Meshkov on Conversion of SS-20, 22-25
92UM1126A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Meshkov: "There Won't Be any 'Black Boxes' in Orbit: A Project Has Been Developed for the Commercial Use of Ballistic Missiles"]

[Text] It is a simple matter to blow up a pile of SS-20's, reducing them to a heap of rubbish with one push of a

button. It is more difficult with the technological, scientific-technical production that was created by military science and industry during the long years of strategic confrontation.

"IVK" Joint-Stock Company and "Kompleks" Scientific-Technical Center have developed the "Start-1" Space-Missile Complex based on SS-20 and SS-25 ballistic missile manufacturing technologies. Its function is to launch commercial satellites with payloads of up to 550 kilograms into circular, polar orbit at an altitude of up to 700 kilometers. These spacecraft can be used for scientific research, deployment of a satellite communications system, ecological monitoring, and surveying natural resources as well as for the creation of orbiting mini-shops for the production of new materials and substances.

One of "Start-1's" important specific features is its transportability. This means that not only can the launch pads already in existence at missile ranges be used to launch a launch vehicle with a satellite, but launches can be conducted outside the cosmodrome. There is no doubt about the complex's reliability: it is based upon the SS-20 and SS-25 missile production technologies that were exclusively for military use, we always directed the best minds to those matters, and we all know that we did not scrimp.

The first launch of a "Start-1" launch vehicle should be in December 1992 from the northern range at Plesetsk. The project's developers calculate that the complex's commercial operation will begin in 1993. Judging by everything, there should not be a shortage of clients. There is an enormous demand for services of this type all over the world. According to "IVK" Vice-President Sergei Zinchenko's assurances, the waiting list to launch these and other objects in peacetime has already been formed until the year 2000 and totals no less than 300 payloads.

It turns out we were in a hurry with the extravagant destruction of SS-20 missiles. They could also have been used, at a great profit.

Since the "Start-1" Space-Missile Complex project has been very closely tied to the use of strategic equipment and technology, naturally the question arose during its recent presentation at the International Trade Center in Moscow: won't this be a repetition of the contract between India and our Glavkosmos [Main Space Administration]? "IVK" Vice President S. Zinchenko decisively rejected that possibility, stating that in this case it is a question only of the sale of services and not the equipment and technology itself. The procedures to conclude a contract to launch some object or other into space envisions obtaining exhaustive information about the satellite's function. The project developers assured us that they do not intend to launch "black boxes" into orbit.

Latest on Attempt to Halt Dismantling of Krasnoyarsk Radar

92UM1122A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 5 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Correspondent Vitaliy Pyrkh, Krasnoyarsk Kray, under the rubric: "Returning to What Has Been Published": "Force a Fool To Go Begging..."]

[Text] In recent times, on 9 October 1990, 13 January 1991 and 21 February 1992, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has discussed the history of the Krasnoyarsk radar site three times, has opposed its complete dismantling, and has raised the issue about the possibility of using its "remains" in the interests of the national economy...

And then, the telephone rang at RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's Krasnoyarsk desk:

Victory! An order has been signed to cease dismantling the Krasnoyarsk radar site...

Well, thank God, I thought, common sense had nevertheless prevailed. Although, what the hell kind of victory... If only the destruction had been stopped earlier. Billions would have been saved for the state treasury. But, what now?

I called Yeniseyskiy Rayon Head of Administration F. Vstovskiy, where the Krasnoyarsk radar site is located, and asked him to comment on the event.

"We fought the whole world for an entire year just to save the industrial premises... But the two specialized Moscow trusts, that were working on the facility, tried with all their might: building No. 2 was completely destroyed and half of building No. 1 has been destroyed. Several million rubles will be required just to dispose of the construction debris. But more than one plant could have been accommodated within those walls..."

"Three years ago," Fedor Andreyevich continued, "prior to Gorbachev's trip to America, the country's former Minister of Defense Marshal Yazov and about 30 generals came to see the facility. And as one, they promised to preserve the radar site from senseless destruction. But it was not the calculations of specialists or the evaluations of professionals that won out; it was the "diplomacy" of yesterday's Party workers and KGB agents. When I recently read the conclusions of American experts that, having learned about the station's technical parameters, they no longer felt there was any reason to insist on its destruction, I even became ill. Could it really have been so easy to destroy that which might still prove useful to all humanity?"

Krasnoyarsk radar site "came tumbling down" not only as a result of the muddled thinking of politicians, who attempted to please anybody and everybody, but also due to its excessive classification.

Be that as it may, even what they managed to save is impressive. Just the repudiation of further destruction saved the treasury several tens of millions of rubles. The kray will save another R200 million in capital investments by using what has remained.

Profile of Strategic Missile Troops Division Commander

92UM1155A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA *in Russian 18 Jun 92 First edition pp 1,2*

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Poroskov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Commander of a Missile Division"]

[Text] Something had occurred in the division as a result of an individual's death, which had affected every officer in one way or another. Without going into details, I shall just say that the climate in the large collective left something to be desired. Many minor things, suppressed until then by the stringency of the military and the importance of the missilemen's mission, surfaced. Up through the chain of command went complaints and anonymous letters, the division commander's deputies were not a united team, one could feel the despondency of the unit commanders, and the young officers hurriedly submitted requests for discharge.

Even for a rear-service unit, as an example, such an atmosphere can have consequences, and here we had a formation with dozens of silo launchers of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The command element of the RVSN [Strategic Rocket Forces] did not immediately find a candidate for the position of commander of this large and complex formation. Several individuals rejected the position for various reasons. Lt Col Yakovlev, 36 years old at the time, agreed to take it. That was almost a year ago. If Vladimir Nikolayevich felt any hesitation, it was momentary. He had planned to enter the General Staff Academy and was already listed as a candidate. He decided there would be time for that later.

Yakovlev's agreement itself was not the deciding factor, of course. He had a reputation at the main headquarters of the Missile Troops as a knowledgeable, firm and at the same time, humane commander. His career had moved fairly rapidly. He graduated from the school at Kharkov with distinction, completed academic courses, became chief of staff of a regiment in the rank of senior lieutenant (and this is rare). He was the recipient of a Suvorov stipend at the Academy imeni F.I. Dzerzhinskiy and was awarded a gold medal at graduation.

There are people who say that Yakovlev is an upstart, that he was "pushed upward," to be sure. If he was "pushed upward," however, it was for some reason not to some peaceful "office" or to a scientific research institute but to a real combat job with a great deal of personal responsibility. And the opinion of those around

him and of the command element of the RVSN is the same. It is that he is a strong and effective commander who values people.

Actually, it was precisely with the people that Vladimir Nikolayevich began his work upon assuming the post. With the development of a united team of deputies. Experience had taught him that he would get nowhere by trying to be in charge of everything himself. He allocated an area of the work to each deputy in such a way that everyone was embraced by a deputy's influence and supervision. And not just in terms of location, so to speak, but also with respect to the time factor. In my opinion, this is where Yakovlev demonstrated one of his strongest qualities as a commander: the ability to arrange into a system a multitude of functions of a multitude of subordinate personnel.

The division commander calculated that there are almost two and a half thousand (!) documents and orders issued by the former Ministry of Defense of the USSR. The earliest date back to the '30s but have still not been rescinded. Add to them around 500 issued by the main commissariats. Formally, this entire library of guiding documents had to be implemented. But was this possible? So Vladimir Nikolayevich picked out around a hundred of the decisive, "vital" documents, a study of which resulted in the System for Performing the Functional Duties of a Formation Commander. In other words, a model for the year.

The chart occupied half the wall in the commander's office. It contained—by month, week and hour—everything a commander has to do, however: assemblies, exercises, drills, the summation of results, the assignment of missions, alert duty, times for hearing personal matters, and so on, and so forth.

I must admit that although the vast chart was not intended for me, it gave me a feeling of a kind of oppressive, prescribed confinement. A commander, with his profusion of duties, cannot get by without a measured pace, however. Each of the deputies has a similar table. According to them, they accomplish 90% of what is scheduled. And we know that 70% is sufficient to evaluate a system as effective. I selected one day for observation, visited various sites in the formation and could see, to the extent of my abilities, that it was effective. The telephone rang extremely rarely during our discussion. There was no reason to bother the division commander.

The system's primary purpose is to prevent even the slightest breakdown in the main mission: alert duty. After visiting one of the regiments and its most important component, the command post in a silo, the support units which service the warheads and the missiles themselves, and after flying by helicopter to the deployment site of a mobile command post, I had only one impression. It was that everything Yakovlev does, even that which might at first glance appear unrelated and of little

significance, ultimately has one objective, one purpose: to keep the combat work at a high level.

Periodically, Vladimir Nikolayevich himself takes over as commander of an alert shift. There is nothing strange about that. He wants to get to know first-hand the problems of the division's main post. A commission headed by Col Gen I. Sergeyev, deputy commander of the RVSN, recently made an inspection of the formation and gave it a high rating. Perhaps the thing which most impressed the inspectors was the fact that in a climate of universal despondency in the army, the officers here still have a sparkle in their eyes showing that such a currently unfashionable concept as zeal in the service is not alien to them.

Electronic computers began to be vigorously adopted after the new commander arrived. They turn out the training plans, the alert duty schedules for the formation's units, the details, including garrison-wide details, and the schedule for use of the training facilities, plan a column's moves to dispersal areas and the algorithm for operating in a state of heightened readiness.... The computer breaks down all of the activities by time, eliminating conflicts and breakdowns in the planning.

Launching crew officers undergo testing at the computer center for psychological compatibility. Picture two men who spend many hours in a closed space far underground. One likes to talk about literature, the other about dogs. After a time this becomes intolerable to both. There have been requests for transfer to a different crew. After an officer has spent an hour and a half answering more than 500 test questions and receives a complete profile, however, a suitable partner can be found for him. Candidates for advancement are also tested.

A cabinet in the division commander's office contains more than 50 neat, aesthetically made-up, standard folders. Here are just a few of the labels which I recall: "Foreign Armies," "Troop Performance," "Nuclear Safety".... The folders contain newspaper and magazine clippings, typed sheets, hand-written notes. One has to assume that it has taken more than just a single year to compile the files. But then, what a vast source of information the commander has at hand.

Col Yu. Sereda, formation chief of staff, spread before me with obvious pleasure two small, accordion-folded tables. The "spread-outs," as Yuriy Petrovich calls them, a copy in miniature of the tables in the commander's office, have relieved the chief of staff of the previous multiplicity of documents, which inevitably contained errors and were sometimes misplaced. Clarity, simplicity, specificity and a maximum of information within a minimum of space—these are the advantages of the commander's system. And it became clear why, during his very first months at the post, Yakovlev made up his mind to get the work moving in the most diverse areas—while keeping the alert duty as the main focus, of course.

Construction is underway everywhere on the training facilities, equipment is being installed, and the numerous classrooms are being renovated. The commander is thinking of the long term in this as well. Sooner or later army personnel will be serving under contract. And the training of the professionals will require corresponding facilities.

Vladimir Nikolayevich patiently explained to the doubters his position and the concept behind the restructuring of certain aspects of the formation's functioning, demonstrating his inherent firmness at times. But the main thing, he believed, was to interest and uplift the personnel. Once again he demonstrated one of his qualities as a commander, his mastery of psychology.

Back during his years as a cadet his father gave him Norman Copeland's booklet "Psychology and the Soldier." Perhaps it all began with that thin booklet, which amazed the young man with its simple wisdom. Quotations and advice given by military authorities of various times and armies appeared in his notebook and on separate pieces of paper.

"The entire art of directing soldiers can be expressed with the formula: Make optimists of them. One contented soldier is worth three dissatisfied ones." Col A. Kopylov, division rear-services chief, showed me the soldiers' mess halls. I can say without exaggeration they were like none I had seen in any unit. A filigree screen separated the common hall into subunit areas. Vladimir Nikolayevich called this a minor form of army privatization. It was as though the dishes and tables belonged to the subunit. And no one any longer bends forks, carries off bowls or pries the fine ceramic tiles off the walls.

One hall is decorated with gzhell [ceramics], a second with Rostov enamel, and a third sparkles with lacquer [khokhloma]. All in moderation, everything restrained, without garishness. The murals were skilfully executed by warrant officers V. Lyakh and N. Opalko. The foyer is decorated with a panel depicting a tower and church domes of wood in relief. Even the gate to the hall is done as in olden times: forged handles and arrow-shaped metal fasteners. The officers' assembly hall is also done in the old style to remind one of the days of glory of Russian arms. The commander refers to it as an education in culture. I would add: and in history. You look at it and think: No, an indifferent person, one without imagination, could not have planned this.

Yakovlev replaced the cooks, who were extended-duty personnel, with women, and the food improved to an incomparable degree. The standard ration is extensively supplemented with produce from a unit, subsidiary farm, and each unit has cows, rabbits, hogs, chickens and sheep. I could see that the soldiers were satisfied.

Nor are the officers grumbling. Lt Col A. Ignatov, chief of the personnel section, cited the following figures. In 1990 18 officers submitted requests for discharge, eight the following year but only three this year. Some of them have taken their requests back. This year there was a

dilemma in that there were fewer applicants for the academy than there were openings. The personnel do not want to give up their well-organized lives or to change collectives. Several officers from other troop arms have applied to serve in the formation.

The officers, particularly those performing alert duty, were taken care of even before Yakovlev, of course. Today, however, everyone can see the practical return from his work. An incongruity developed with the introduction of payment of rations allowances, for example, in that the more alert duty one performed, the less he received. The division commander decided to feed the alert-duty personnel from the subsidiary farm. In another case he provided an incentive. Whoever performed best on alert duty or during the end-of-training period evaluation was authorized to purchase scarce goods out of turn. It has been the same with respect to improving the housing situation. The foundation for an 80-unit apartment building was recently laid.

A newcomer walking around the garrison cannot fail to notice several playgrounds where thistle previously grew, next to a pond a caravel seemingly prepared to cast off, a stylistic beacon which serves as a sundial during the day, an ancient fort enclosed by a fence of massive chains in which empty nitrogen cylinders serve as canons. A cooperative cafe recently opened in a little sunken square. There is a lot of greenery, and there will be even more. Come spring, every officer has to plant a tree. The post is shrouded in peace and quiet and permeated by a feeling of coziness, like an oasis in the midst of our hectic life. And one forgets for a time the fact that not far away are silos covered with green, metallic lids....

At Yakovlev's suggestion the formation has acquired its own symbol and a motto, "Duty, Honor, Conscience, Valor." The chaotic and noisy agitation has disappeared throughout. And the new army has become imbued with the spirit of the old, Russian army. Suvorov, Dragomirov, Rumyantsev, Aleksandr Nevskiy... now speak to the enlisted man and the officer. Veterans invited to the post on Victory Day shed a few tears. At a time when monuments are being razed throughout the nation, two new ones have been erected in the formation during the past year. Major-General N. Lopatin, former commander of the division, threw up his hands and said: "How could so much be accomplished in a few months"!

I have to admit that I myself was a doubter when I began the temporary duty assignment. I was not planning to write about the division commander. Things turned out differently. Perhaps I have used to many bright colors in my portrait of Vladimir Nikolayevich. I see him as a typical representative of the new generation of commanders, however, who, despite the upheavals being experienced by the army, are loyal to themselves and to their job. And they perform it intelligently and firmly. With faith that they are needed by the people—today and tomorrow.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

In Praise of S-300 SAM Performance

92UM1119A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jun 92 First Edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dokuchayev: "S-300: The Almaz Falcon"]

[Text] While the battles were taking place in the Persian Gulf area, quite a sensation was produced by the American Patriot missile system. However, a detailed analysis conducted after the end of the war indicated that the system had not performed as well as expected. In any event, the domestic S-300 SAM system when compared with the American system shows superiority in some characteristics, while in other aspects it is at least its equal. Our experts and those of foreign countries agree that the latest generation of the Russian SAM is the best in the world. JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, which specializes in publishing information on modern weapons and enjoys a reputation for its objective coverage, writes that: "Russia produces the world's most diverse systems, the SA-10, SA-11, and SA-12, which are the most sophisticated and highly effective weapons." (The SA-10 is the West's designation for the S-300 system.)

The S-300 came out as the answer to a new offensive weapon that appeared in the USA in the 1970s: a cruise missile offering long range. To counter this threat, it was necessary to develop a SAM that would simultaneously destroy several targets and repel massive attacks at all altitudes, to include low-flying targets, something which is extremely difficult to do. Our scientists and laborers were successful in attaining their goal.

What was produced was a system that was capable of destroying present and future aircraft, cruise missiles, and other aerial weapons flying at altitudes of from 25 meters to their service ceiling. It offers a short reaction time, a great degree of automation of mechanisms, and a highly effective rate of fire. It can engage up to six targets simultaneously, with one or two rockets aimed at each target. This constitutes the major difference between this system and the previous S-75 and S-125 systems, in which the guidance systems were capable of controlling several rockets aimed at a target, but they could not open fire simultaneously on several targets. The vertical launch arrangement employed in the S-300 system makes it possible to engage targets incoming from any direction, without the necessity of swinging the launchers in the direction of the targets. The missile attacks low-flying targets from above, in the manner of a falcon.

The S-300 is also capable of engaging ballistic missiles of the American Lance type. After the war on the Arabian Peninsula was concluded, the system underwent a series of test firing. The results indicated that all the missiles that had been launched against the S-300 were destroyed. In this connection, it was discovered in one of the firings that two out of four missiles that had been destroyed fell a distance of 7 to 8 kilometers from their

intended point of impact, a magnitude which in our time is considered to be nothing short of excellent.

Characteristics	
Range	to 90 km
Altitude:	
Minimum	25 m
Maximum	service ceiling
Aerial target speeds	to 4,200 km/h
Target simultaneous engagement	up to 6
Missiles simultaneously launched	up to 12
Firing time interval	3-second launch
Deployment time from travel position	5 min.
Guidance	terminal homing by missile
Number of missiles in system	up to 48

The person considered to be the theoretician behind the creation of virtually all domestic SAMs was Academician Aleksandr Raspletin. He stood at the forefront of decision-making affecting the ideas in use today. After his death, the collective of the Almaz Scientific Production Association worked on the creation of the S-300 under the supervision of Academician Boris Bunkin. This firm's specialists possess a solid background in the development, production, and operation of surface-to-air guided systems, and they employ the latest technologies to accomplish their goals.

Description, Technical Parameters of MIG-29

92UM1132A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
12 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Andryushkov: "The MIG-29: Fighter for the Front"]

[Text] This single-seat, two-engine fighter, designed for operations over the battlefield and performing tactical missions, has become widely known both in our country and throughout the world thanks to its high performance characteristics. In London and Paris, Vancouver and Moscow, spectators have been captivated by the advanced aerobatic maneuvers performed in this aircraft. These include the unique tailslides demonstrated by test pilot Anatoliy Kvochur, when the aircraft stalls in a vertical climb and then begins to slide on the tail. No one has been able to repeat this on another aircraft of this class.

Next week, 15-21 June, visitors to the International Air Show in Berlin-Brandenburg will become acquainted with our frontal fighter.

The MIG-29 is the brainchild of the Experimental Design Bureau imeni A.I. Mikoyan. Designed in Moscow, it is also built in the capital—at one of the oldest and most famous domestic aircraft plants, Znamya Truda, which is part of the Moscow Aircraft Production Association (MAPO).

"This aircraft," says Academician Rostislav Apollosovich Belyakov, chief designer of the experimental design bureau, "puts together many achievements of science and technology. Surpassing its predecessors in combat capabilities, it has remained convenient and simple to operate. It is noted for its high reliability..."

The MIG-29 is distinguished by an integrated airframe configuration, in which the wing smoothly transitions into the fuselage. Special leading-edge wing extensions provide the aircraft high lift effectiveness when maneuvering at high angles of attack without stalling into a spin. The special vortex generators installed on the pitot-static tube boom are an innovation in aircraft construction. They help the air flow smoothly over the MIG-29 or, as the aviators say, laminarly, that is, without mixing.

The design of the MIG-29 makes wide use of composite materials, aluminum-lithium alloys, which made the aircraft light and strong. The air intakes, like on other fourth-generation aircraft, are reliably protected from foreign object damage during taxi, takeoff, and landing.

The powerplant of this high-class frontal fighter consists of two RD-33 turbojet bypass engines. When the afterburner is engaged on takeoff, they develop 16,600 kg of thrust, which gives the aircraft a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than 1:1. From the ground it sometimes seems that the MIG-29 is gaining altitude on its back. This takeoff is very beautiful and quick.

The fighter is armed with a built-in 30-mm cannon and six air-to-air missiles and is capable of engaging the enemy at long and short range. From the cannons, say, 4-6 rounds are sufficient to destroy the target. The weapons control system includes a pulse-Doppler radar, which detects targets against ground clutter, and an optico-electronic sighting system. The pilot is tied into the system by an onboard computer and a helmet-mounted sight. An infrared system guarantees a high degree of accuracy of target coordinate measurement.

Bold in the attack, the MIG-29 defends itself not only with powerful onboard weapons. Special stakes forward of the two tailfins contain dispensers for infrared decoy flares and dipole reflectors to draw away enemy missiles.

Basic Data on the MIG-29

Crew size	1
Engine	2 x RD-33
Length, m	17.32
Wingspan, m	11.36
Wing area, m	38
Takeoff weight, kg:	
normal	15,000
maximum	18,000
Ground speed, km/hr	1500

Maximum speed, km/hr	2450
Service ceiling, m	18,000
Rate of climb, m/sec	330
Flight range, km	2100
Operational G-load	9
Takeoff run, m:	
without afterburner	600-700
with afterburner	260

When engaged in a close-range dogfight and also when flying in formation, three panoramic mirrors in the cockpit help the pilot observe the situation in the rear hemisphere. These are also used by automobile drivers. It is just that speeds in the sky are altogether different.

The MIG-29 prototype was first launched into the air on 6 October 1977. It was piloted by the distinguished test pilot Aleksandr Fedotov, Hero of the Soviet Union. The fighter entered series production 5 years later. It is flown not only by our aviators. The aircraft is in service in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Syria, India, North Korea, Germany, and a number of other countries. Comments on the aircraft are most kind. This is an awesome force in skilled hands.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Naval Aviators Appeal to Presidents of Russia, Ukraine

92UM1156B Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 4, Apr 92 p 13

[Appeal from the Personnel of the Center for Combat Training of Ship-Based Aviation to the Presidents of Russia and Ukraine]

[Text] Esteemed Presidents!

We, the men of the Center for the Combat Training of Ship-Based Aviation—pilots, engineers, technicians and junior aviation specialists—voice our concern over the statements given via the mass information media by the people's deputies of Ukraine and Russian on the abandoning of the use and construction of aircraft-carrying cruisers for the Navy.

As of today, the Navy, and particularly its surface forces, in the event of real military operations, would be in an extremely difficult position. The U.S. Navy, for ensuring the defense of national interests, has 15 operational aircraft carriers, around 1,300 carrier-based aircraft, thousands of trained pilots and a fundamental base for the training of the flight and engineer-technical personnel for the carrier fleet. In a period of threats, the U.S., by drawing on the multipurpose and universal landing vessels, helicopter carriers and the organized Navy Reserve, is capable of increasing the carrier fleet by 1.5-2 fold. Moreover, the navies of Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain, Brazil, India and Argentina possess carriers. At present China is showing great interest in carrier ships. The deployed carrier task forces represent

the greatest danger for the territory of the Commonwealth and for the Naval forces. In addition, the possibility of a confrontation at sea is much greater than on land.

For neutralizing this danger, the Navy has only four aircraft-carrying cruisers of the Kiev class with low combat qualities, and several container ships which can take helicopters and the Yak-38 VTOL assault planes. These planes are not capable of providing the combat stability of the fleet forces and in addition have already been decommissioned.

The sole heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov is designed for the basing of the Su-27K and MiG-29K fighters and carries out strictly defensive missions to provide a cover for the diverse fleet forces against air attack. The building of such ships conforms to our defensive doctrine and their employment will make it possible to reduce the losses of surface ships, submarines and naval aircraft of the Commonwealth in the course of possible combat operations.

The value of the losses due to the absence of carriers in the event of a military conflict will be several fold more than the cost of building and operating the aircraft-carrying cruisers. From the moral and ethical standpoint, we consider it immoral to link greater prosperity for serviceman families with the refusal to develop the aircraft-carrying cruisers as in a combat situation this will become the reason for the unjustified loss of our sailors.

For training the pilots of the ship-based aviation and the personnel of the aviation departments of the aircraft-carrying cruisers, a Center for Combat Training has been organized at Saki Airfield, and here they have built an unique training facility, the NITKA, which, in addition to training specialists for ship-based aviation, carries out test work in developing new aviation equipment and ship aviation technical facilities involving over 20 institutes, experimental design bureaus, industrial institutions and enterprises from the Commonwealth countries. Since 1974 to the present, the expenditures on building the complex have been about 1 billion rubles (in 1991 prices). Without this complex it would be impossible to train the flight personnel for the ship-based aviation, while the construction of an analogous facility in another region, out of economic considerations, would be a crime to our peoples in this grieved period.

Esteemed Presidents! We realize that this is a matter of one of the largest military construction programs, but we request that our opinion be taken into account in settling the fate of the carriers. You will set the amounts of the minimally necessary or reasonable defense sufficiency both for the Armed Forces as a whole as well as for the Navy, in particular, and your wisdom will determine the defense capability of all the Commonwealth states not only today but also for several decades to come.

We, the men of the Center for the Combat Training of Ship-Based Aviation, place on you the entire burden of responsibility to the Armed Forces, the peoples of the Commonwealth and the future generations for the further fate of the ship-based aviation.

The appeal has been discussed and approved at an assembly of the personnel of the Center for the Combat Training of Ship-Based Aviation.

7 February 1992. Crimea, Saki-4

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Official Department: New Appointments

92UM1156A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 4, Apr 92 p 13

[Unattributed Official Department Announcing New Appointments]

[Text] First Deputy Commander of the Navy, Admiral Feliks Nikolayevich Gromov

Gromov was born on 29 August 1937, in the city of Vladivostok. In 1959, he completed the Pacific Higher Naval School imeni S.O. Makarov.

He began his naval career in the position of deputy commander of a primary gun battery on a destroyer. Then he was the commander of the main gun control group, the commander of a gunnery department, the executive officer and commander of a destroyer and the executive officer and commander of a cruiser. After completing the courses for officer personnel at the Navy Academy in 1977, he was the chief of staff of a division, of an operational squadron and the squadron commander. From 1984, he was the first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet. In 1986, he completed the VAK [Higher Officers' Evaluation Board] at the General Staff Military Academy. Since 1988, he has been the commander of the Northern Fleet.

He is married and has a daughter and a son.

Commander of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Oleg Aleksandrovich Yerofeyev

Yerofeyev was born on 10 July 1940 in the town of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. In 1961, he completed the Caspian Higher Naval School imeni S.M. Kirov.

He began his naval career in the position of the commander of the ship control crew of a medium submarine. Then he was the commander of a group and a department on a nuclear submarine. After completing the Navy VSOK [abbreviation unknown] he was the first mate, the executive officer and the commander of a nuclear submarine. In 1976, after completing the Navy Academy, he was appointed the chief of staff and formation commander and chief of staff of a large force. In 1987, he completed the General Staff Military Academy and was appointed the commander of a large force. Since

1990, he has been the chief of staff and the first deputy commander of the Northern Fleet.

He is married and has a daughter.

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Submariners' Hunger Strike Over Retirement

*92UM1146A Murmansk POLYARNAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 10 Apr 92 p 1*

[Article: "Submariners' Hunger Strike"]

[Text] On 7 April residents of Severomorsk looked on curiously as a group of young officers stood in the city's central square, Safonov Square, with signs reading: "We demand discharge from the navy. As a sign of protest against illegal actions of the command we announce a hunger strike," "A prohibition on retirement is a prohibition on voluntary service."

The senior lieutenants of the crew of a certain nuclear submarine came to the fleet's center from a remote garrison to petition for discharge into the reserves. A. Pyslaru, A. Pervushin, V. Sirovoy and S. Lobach had filled out discharge applications back in December of last year. It is since then that this story has been in the making. The local command denied retirement to the young officers.

The hunger strike on that square in Severomorsk did not last long. Staff officers showed up, and a compromise was achieved in the course of negotiations. The hunger strike has now been called off, the submariners will be received by the fleet commander in the next day or two, and the subsequent fate of the senior lieutenants will be decided on an individual basis.

Submarine Training At Paldiski To End

*92UN1472B Tallinn ARIPAEV in Estonian
No 33, 7 May 92 p 9*

[BNS release: "Russian Soldiers No Longer Trained At Paldiski"]

[Text] The last of the submariners, taking their supplementary training in Estonia, will be leaving the Paldiski Military base under Russia's authority on May 8.

The last detachment, totalling 127 men, was brought to Paldiski via the Tartu air base at the end of March, without permission from the Estonian government. Nevertheless, Estonian authorities had, after negotiations with Russian military personnel, conceded to let the navy crews stay in Paldiski for a month.

The Russian military authorities have not submitted any additional request to bring new submarine crews to Paldiski. "There was a request to bring in 19 service people, but this has not been approved by the Estonian side," said Toomas Puura, deputy defense minister.

The Russian military is seeking permission for a total of 3,100 recruits to be brought into Estonia this spring, to supplement all branches of service based here. The plan also calls for 3,666 men to be taken out at the same time. The deputy defense minister said that the Russian authorities have no legal basis for bringing recruits into Estonia.

Smirnov on Danger From Scrapped Submarines in Maritime Kray

*92UM1111A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 May 92 p 2*

[Article by Pacific Ocean Fleet Technical Directorate Nuclear Submarine Operation and Technical Servicing Department Chief Captain 1st Rank Pavel Smirnov, under the rubric: "Ecology": "Nuclear Privatization"]

[Text] There is a deathly silence in the small bay at the Pacific Ocean Fleet base. A tense, deceptive silence. Dozens of submarines have been laid up here for a prolonged period of time near inhabited villages. It is a delayed-action nuclear mine, ready to burst its filling at any moment... We have finally understood that the "tamed" atom can threaten with its restiveness when the opportunity presents itself. As it already had on the first nuclear-powered ships and the submarines of the latest generations, at Mayak Chemical Factory, Leningrad AES [Nuclear Power Plant], and at Chernobyl and Balakovo... For some people, these are simply "accidents," for hundreds of thousands—broken, ruined lives and futures.

Here is yet another "hot spot" that is capable of breaking out in a nuclear nightmare. What can we anticipate from the 29 nuclear submarines that have accumulated at Primorye piers that are obsolete and need to be salvaged?

Construction of the nuclear fleet that was launched in the 1950's was impressive in scale and has remained in the consciousness of the Soviet people only as a political stereotype—the country became the possessor of a blue-water nuclear missile navy. However, from what we know today, I think that we can confidently state that, during the period of the mass launching of nuclear submarines from the shipbuilding slips, no one seriously thought about the time when these unique ships would have to enter their "last port."

As a matter of fact, to this day this great maritime power does not have the material-technical facilities or technology to salvage military ships and ships in general, and those with nuclear power plants in particular.

Having served faithfully for decades, they stand at remote piers in the position of nudes, having lost hope of standing their last "combat duty"—to give themselves to the people in the form of secondary resources, released crews and freed-up resources for their maintenance, and having concealed their radioactive filling from the people in a worthy manner.

The Russian taxpayer needs to know just what he has invested from his own pocket for the maintenance of written-off nuclear submarines. The 29 nuclear submarines that have accumulated at the piers have required 13.5 million rubles for the maintenance of crews, 35 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 1,200 men of the crews that guard the previously mentioned memorials to our "farsighted policies" (here and later—in 1990 prices).

By the year 2000, that is, when a state program has determined the completion of construction of nuclear submarine reactor compartment storage facilities (the former USSR Supreme Soviet hatched this project), our taxpayers will pay as much as R4.1 billion from their own pockets for the storage of 60 written off nuclear submarines. Written off and not functioning! And just in the Pacific Ocean Fleet!

The storage concept being employed at the present time on the issues of removing nuclear-powered ships from operation has resulted in an impasse: we do not have any storage facilities for cut-up reactor compartments and they will only appear on the eve of the 21st century. The projects, lagging behind the nuclear submarines, were calculated on the expectation of the construction of a burial ground, and appeals to wait in such an important issue are simply immoral.

It is naive to suggest that, having waited these 10-20 years, someone will come along and develop a new, probably attractive salvage and storage technology. That someone—is we ourselves. And any stoppage is leaving its imprint on us. We grow and improve ourselves together with the development of technologies. The technologies of the year 2000 are being born in today's people and in their projects. But the ships are already anchored in the anchorage right now.

We have unloaded the nuclear fuel from 16 submarines. The existing capabilities of ship reactor reloading systems will support the unloading of the nuclear filling from the reactors of written-off nuclear submarines only until the year 2000. I doubt that very much because the respected Ukrainian President Mr. Kravchuk has his own "naval" program. And it does not provide for construction of reactor reloading tenders. Nikolayev's shipbuilders have stopped building them. The workers of "Zvezda" Plant, a specialized enterprise for nuclear submarine repair where these operations have been provided for by a technological repair chain, are banning the unloading of reactor cores on their territory. And we can understand them as human beings.

But who will still understand something else—then where do we do all of this? In another city? There are the same people there. On an uninhabited island? We can and we certainly should. But how much time and resources will be required for the construction of this facility? Into whose pockets will we thrust our hands to pay for that construction and how much will we be devastated by today's inflation?

The lack of ship dismantling plants and capabilities in the region does not permit us to properly begin salvaging nuclear submarines and the lack of storage facilities for cut-up reactor compartments—for cutting up and burying them.

There are also no nuclear submarines in the Pacific Ocean Fleet that have been prepared for safe anchorage afloat. I don't think there are any in the Northern Fleet either. We live in the same state.

That is the sad triad—there is no capacity for cutting up, no storage for reactor compartments, and no submarines capable of standing afloat for a long time and safely.

Anyone who thinks that the anchoring of combat and written-off ships afloat is carried out equally while observing safety principles is naive. The psychology of a crew that is preparing a submarine to go to sea where it can end up on the bottom "for eternal rest" due to the lackadaisical attitude of a single crew member is distinct from the psychology of a crew of a written-off ship. It has one road ahead of it that is not being blown by the sea. And no matter how much educational work is conducted, we cannot change the psychology. And therefore—there is a real possibility of placing a ship with its "interesting" filling on the bottom.

Decree No 545-84, dated 31 July 1991, of the former USSR Cabinet of Ministers "authorized" nuclear-powered ship commanders to store nuclear submarines that had been withdrawn for scrap afloat without cutting out the reactor compartments and with the reactor cores removed beforehand. But what about those unfortunate ships from which we are incapable of removing the nuclear fuel due to our total deficit? Not store them? And why "authorize" and not "order to preserve"? Well because if you authorize, then the ship commander will be responsible for everything—to his own conscience and to the court. But for the command—issued to him... Intelligent people wrote the document.

Calculations show that, using the nuclear submarines salvage and long-term storage preparation work rates that have been set forth in governmental and departmental decisions, the navy will only be rid of them by 2010! And at that time, whether we want it or not, the ships will be afloat. But in that case everything will depend on the state of the ship's hull that has not been prepared for long-term storage, hundreds of onboard openings in it, the reduced crew and God knows what else. Is there an alternative to that?

The essence of my proposals is that reactor compartments be stored in selected water areas of the sea off the coastline. The funds freed from salvaging would be directed to the development of industrial production to return the metal from the reactor compartments to the national economy. Due to the high content of radionuclides in them, store the metals in a regional radioactive waste storage facility.

Russian Federation Gosatomnadzora [State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry] Official N. Bisovka is worried that I am creating radioactive waste cemeteries by burying the reactor compartments at sea. I am thereby violating Article 50 of the recently adopted law on the protection of the environment. But isn't it still safer to store it? A technically prepared, preserved, hermetically sealed, and visually observed compartment—on the bottom, or an unprepared submarine with many onboard openings—afloat?

At the present time, there are three written-off ships with damaged nuclear power plants in the Pacific Ocean Fleet. The countdown of their anchorage began 13 years ago. But, so far there are no methods and technologies for their burial and isolation from the biosphere. How much more time yet are we prepared to have them remain in that state?

As of today, the proposed variation of the burial of damaged compartments in sarcophagi is the only real method for their reliable temporary isolation from the biosphere. We already have these sarcophagi manufactured, that is, already today, and, more precisely, we could have packed the "sick body" in them already the day before yesterday. They will ensure radiation into the atmosphere is at the level of the natural background and will permit us to direct the radiation potential of a damaged compartment within itself. A quarter century of a controlled anchorage will provide the opportunity for science to think of something and how to deal with the "nuclear genie". The time-out, set forth in these proposals, forces us to more rapidly seek ways to resolve the problem.

The Far Eastern Department of the Russian Academy of Science is ready to participate in the development and equipping of a scientific range, based on a compartment storage facility. It has already developed its own series of measures. Development of a system of automated monitoring of the radiation background, organization of international ecological control, and educational activities for radiation protection are envisioned in it.

It is too bad that the experts from Minekologii [Ministry of the Ecology] did not note that.

The savings on operational expenditures will total from R1.5 to 2.5 billion, 280-360 million kilowatt-hours of electricity, 150,000-200,000 tonnes of scrap metal, and 2,500 personnel from the crews of the written-off ships—that is far from the total list of "goods" which we thirst for at Russian economy auctions. Will they find purchasers for them in the administration of Primorskiy Kray?

Or, having become convinced of the Russians' inability to develop something worthy, will they sell the ships for next to nothing abroad?

Then we will once again not find the money for the residents of village Shkotovo-22 for the elimination of

the aftereffects of the nuclear accident on one of the nuclear submarines in 1985.

I think that the government itself is more of a threat to the safety and health of the people, who live side by side with a nuclear submarine, than the submarine. Because so far we do not see steps directed at the elimination of the accumulating nuclear Mont Blanc.

Description of 'Snegovaya Pad' Munitions Dump

*92UM1113A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 20 May 92 pp 1, 6*

[Article by Oleg Rubnikovich: "Deadly Fireworks at the 'Snegovaya Pad' Secret Facility"]

[Text] *An investigation has not yet determined if the munitions dump of the Pacific Fleet was intentionally blown up or not.*

There is a deep, gaping crater at munitions dump No 17, which caught fire first. A fragment-riddled Ural fire truck stands nearby. There is a graveyard of disfigured trees where a forest used to be. The ground is not visible—under your feet is a solid mire of fragments and undetonated shells. Over about a 50-hectare area, only nine of the 52 storage facilities remain undamaged. Rocket-propelled munitions were located in them.


Combat engineers are now working on the hills. Their commander cannot say when they will finish the dangerous task. Meanwhile, local residents, in their words, survived the uneasy days normally and are now trying to get into the arsenal and gather a few more rounds and shells "as a keepsake." The militia and military patrols are not bored for the lack of work, constantly capturing daredevils risking life and limb.

The marine escorting us pointed towards a shell on the ground. "If you pick it up, it will explode," he said calmly. On 16 May, two officer candidates standing guard made a bonfire and did not notice that there was a grenade under the firewood. One died on the spot, and the other was taken to the hospital in serious condition.

The "Snegovaya Pad" secret facility, hidden on a hill about 300 meters from the blocks of Vladivostok, was enclosed by two rows of barbed wire connected to an alarm system. Large guard dogs ran between the rows of wire, having lost their senses from the noise of the exploding shells. Fragments flew in all directions in a radius of 4 km.

In the words of the deputy chairman of the Committee for Civil Defense and Emergency Situations, Lieutenant-General A. Tkachev, if a stray round would have landed in the rocket-propelled munitions storage facility, rockets would have scattered over a radius of 10-14 km, and then it simply would have been impossible to predict the consequences. According to the military, in the evening on 15 May, such a danger had practically passed—the forest fire was extinguished, and special

Layout of the “Snegovaya Pad” Installation, City of Vladivostok



equipment had started to clear away the debris so that the fire trucks could approach the rocket-propelled munitions storage facilities.

At the same time as this, an IL-76 arriving from Moscow and equipped with 30-tonne water tanks appeared in the sky. They figured that it would be able to douse the rocket projectile storage facilities from the air. The pilots made seven passes and dropped hundreds of tonnes of water on this dangerous area. In the words of the pilots, although they were unable to descend to the planned altitude of 490 meters due to the hills, the water drops turned out to be fairly precise.

According to some data, scheduled work was being done at storage facility No 17, where discarded powder was stored, not long before the fire. Several hours after the end of the workday, a fire broke out. Since there was no electrical wiring in the powder storage facility, the version about a short circuit can be ruled out. About 20 investigators from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, MBR [no expansion given], and the Procurator's Office are working at the scene. Incidentally, some of the local officers believe that the real cause of the fire will remain a secret.

The commander of the Pacific Fleet, Gennadiy Khvatov, has not specified what the financial losses are at the munitions dump, where nearly 70 railcars of shells were stored. Vladivostok needs a minimum of 50 million rubles for recovery work.

The residents of the city now look cautiously at another secret installation—a torpedo storage facility.

(The editorial staff thanks the press service of the State Committee of Russia for Emergency Situations for its help in preparing the material.)

Isolated Northern Fleet Garrison Appeals for Help

92UM1146B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 8

[Letter to the Editor: "A Navy Without Money"]

[Text] This letter is from officers of a remote garrison of the Northern Fleet. We are the only subscribers to your newspaper in the town of Liinakhamari. We are pleased that a newspaper such as yours has appeared in Russia. We are highly respectful of you and your work. We were forced to write you for the following reasons.

Out of purely bureaucratic interests, we are not told the address of the higher command, and the command itself doesn't visit remote garrisons for years at a time. Consequently we do not know any other way to solve our problems.

We sincerely ask you to forward the following letter to Army General Grachev, the Russian minister of defense, because we see no other real channel of communications with him.

We wish success and blossoming of your newspaper from the bottoms of our hearts.

[Signed] Officers of Military Unit X

Comrade generals and admirals!

This letter is written by officers serving in a remote garrison of the Northern Fleet—the town of Liinakhamari. Since April of this year we have not been receiving the pay and ration allowance apportioned to us by law. Our unit is the only one in this position, in which it was placed by the local financial organ, since other military units have received money, at least for April.

We understand the entire gravity of the situation in the country. We understand that civilians are raising their wages to figures in the tens of thousands by means of strikes. We understand that seagoing personnel are squeezing money out of the command by refusing to go to sea. We are unanimously opposed to these extreme measures, because we understand that without our weapons, ships at sea are nothing more than targets for the enemy.

We are categorically opposed to stating any kind of ultimatums to the command. We must prepare weapons for use, and we will continue to do so. This is why the officers' assembly insistently requests that this problem be solved, since the people have run out of cash, and besides the fact that people need something to eat, the leave season is now beginning. Most of us have families. The children need to be taken somewhere for the summer. Many need to go away on leave, but they can't because they have no money.

We ask again that you remember us and our families, and solve this problem.

This letter was unanimously supported at an assembly of the unit's officers on 22 May 1992.

[Signed] Chairman of the Officers' Assembly of Unit X Captain 3d Rank A. Shushurikhin

The editor's office knows the number of the military unit from which the letter was received.

'Anchar' Nuclear-Powered Destroyer Project Reviewed

92UM1158A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Senior Lieutenant V. Fatigarov: "The 'Anchar' Project: The Idea of Developing a Multimission Destroyer Class Nuclear-Powered Ship Has Occupied the Minds of Military Shipbuilders for More Than 15 Years"]

[Text] Even today there are still few people who know (naturally, in our country, but they have been well informed about it abroad) that, beginning from the end of the 1950's, the designs for many of our Navy's ships

were brought to maturation behind the walls of the St. Petersburg Household Guards Regiment's former barracks. It is specialists of that NII [Scientific Research Institute], together with the design bureau headed at that time by Professor V. Yukhnin who comes from a long line of shipbuilders, that stood at the sources of the development of the first Naval surface vessel with a nuclear power plant (AEU) which still yesterday was known as the Kirov (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that the cruiser will bear the name of the famous Naval Commander Admiral Ushakov).

All the more so that few people know that the multimission destroyer class ship project was born along with the design of the nuclear giant from the mid 1970's. It received the code name Anchar. At that time, its designation was formulated as a nuclear vessel for immediate tracking. While I was a cadet at the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F.E. Dzerzhinsky, I participated in fitting-out work on Sovremennyy class destroyers. It was hard to imagine that a nuclear "heart" could beat in such a relatively small hull. Nevertheless, we carried out the work on Anchar in precisely that direction, not without support "from above".

The support turned out to be powerful. According to the testimony of Retired Rear Admiral B. Kolzayev, an institute veteran and former head of one of its departments, then Navy Commander-in-Chief S. Gorshkov visited the NII at least twice a year and knew its leading specialists personally. Powerful scientific forces were thrown into the Anchar design effort, and furthermore they were united. V. Perevalov became the chief designer of the nuclear "youngster" and V. Yukhnin became the project director—both were from the planning and design bureau, from which the nuclear cruisers Kirov, Frunze, Kalinin and Yuriy Andropov subsequently sailed (I reiterate all of these ships have received new names).

Retired Captain 1st Rank A. Borisov, who has been involved with designing surface vessels since 1944, said:

"Our Anchar was developed like a ship functioning in an aircraft carrier formation. It was oriented toward the first Soviet nuclear aircraft carrier Orel which was never produced and later toward the not fitted-out Ulyanovsk in Nikolayev. In the process, Anchar was planned as a multimission ship. Due to a whole series of new solutions on power engineering and weaponry, the Anchar would have had a 12,000 ton displacement, which is two times less than a nuclear cruiser's displacement."

Captain 1st Rank B. Kuzin, head of an NII department, described some of them:

"A combination nuclear-gas turbine power plant was developed for Anchar, it is one of a kind, there is nothing analogous to it in world shipbuilding practice. The gas turbine is utilized in ordinary modes and the atom only becomes involved in the booster mode which provides increased speed for a prolonged period of time.

Increased speeds would have been necessary for the Anchar during its service with the Ulyanovsk.

"The latest for that time antisubmarine and air defense systems supported the primary antisubmarine warfare and air defense missions. They planned to install the sonar system that subsequently proved itself on the antisubmarine ship Udaloy. Work on the Anchar continued right up to 1990."

Just what prevented the detail design from shifting to construction of Anchar? That is a rhetorical question since the answer to it is well known: political cataclysms blew up the previous state system and such institutions as the military-industrial complex along with it.

Captain 1st Rank Kuzin thinks that the Anchar remains a promising design even today. Many successful innovations along individual types of equipment and weaponry were used in it. Take just artillery. For now, there is no such 130 mm artillery system in the navy. It is undergoing comprehensive testing right now. Stationary vertical launchers for various types of missiles would also be used for the first time: antiship, antisubmarine, air defense and those for the destruction of enemy coastal targets.

As Captain 1st Rank Kuzin stressed, during the time when the Anchar was being designed, they even considered proposals to design a 1500-ton nuclear escort ship and also nuclear power engineering for hovercraft and wing-in-ground effect craft [ekranoplany]. All of these projects were not realized for two reasons. First, due to the high degree of technical risk—the model was developed without assurance of its normal operation and, second, these vessels turned out to be unjustifiably expensive. They did not at all satisfy the important criterion of cost-effectiveness. But these were the first approaches. Would they be continued in the Russian navy? After all, today the military ship-building NII is a component of the Russian defense complex.

Deputy CIS Navy Commander for Shipbuilding and Weaponry Rear Admiral L. Belyshev is convinced that the Russian navy will be built according to the principle of creating task forces, the foundation of which will be aircraft-carrying ships—as the most effective and economically advantageous.

It is therefore possible that this will call for the Anchar project.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Oil Suppliers Demand Payment From Urals MD
*92UM1131A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
 11 Jun 92 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Central Missile Fuel and Fuel Directorate Deputy Chief Major-General Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Shelenin by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent P. Altunin: "What Is in the Army's Fuel Tank?"]

[Text] "The increase of prices for gasoline and diesel fuel have introduced real chaos in supplying military district troops with these types of fuel. Gas stations, as if by command, have pronounced their imposed settlement on mutual calculations. The single ration coupons presented by Army consumers at refueling facilities have suddenly totally lost their weight... For example, in Samara, they issued gasoline for them in the ratio of 1:5, in Yekaterinburg—1:6 and, in Kurgan—1:8. Taraganov, head of Rosnefteprodukt [Russian Petroleum Products] Concern, sometimes issues instructions to subordinate petroleum drilling organizations to restrict the output of petroleum products to military district consumers. Gas facilities are demanding payment in advance for petroleum, oil, and lubricants products and they do not accept checks from the military..."

[Signed] Lieutenant Colonel M. Takhtarkin
Volga-Urals Military District Fuel Services Deputy Chief

Our correspondent met with Central Missile Fuel and Fuel Directorate Chief Major-General A. Shelenin.

[Altunin] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, how do you comment on that telegram?

[Shelenin] Everything is precisely that way. But I would not begin to panic. If you don't object, let's conduct the conversation from the general to the specific...

[Altunin] Shall we begin with the situation in the country after the recent price increases for energy carriers?

[Shelenin] I'll have to state quite frankly that the situation is difficult. Indeed, it was not an unexpected development for us. We knew that if the business with the energy carriers was not corrected at this stage, there would be neither reform, a convertible ruble, nor entry into the world market. Judge for yourself. A tonne of oil was selling for R350 in our country with world oil prices of \$120-125 per tonne. That's a kilogram of sausage or a small bottle of eau de Cologne... It is not surprising that the wild resale of valuable fuel began in other countries, including by our partners throughout the CIS.

[Altunin] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, but that is already yesterday. But what, in your opinion, awaits us after the price increases?

[Shelenin] You can't predict everything today. But, I think that there will be a surge of resources into the oil and gas industry. It is on the verge of destruction in our country. Furthermore, according to the prediction of experts, the flow of oil dollars into the country will practically double in a year and we have an urgent need for them today, including for the resolution of the army's social problems.

[Altunin] What awaits us when price restraints for energy carriers have been totally eased?

[Shelenin] I think that there should not be a great increase of prices for consumer goods. Lately, 40 percent of the oil is already being sold at free prices.

[Altunin] But now let's turn to army activity: what about gas for the troops?

[Shelenin] Last year, the fuel resources allocated to the Armed Forces totaled 90 percent of the year before last. And this year, already with regard to last year, they have been cut by another 30 percent.

[Altunin] But what is the possible minimum, the low mark?

[Shelenin] We have already long ago reached the minimum. And today, fuel is frequently expended only for the transportation of foodstuffs and to support alert duty and daily details at military units...

[Altunin] Is the situation with fuel in the Volga-Urals Military District that was described in the telegram an exception?

[Shelenin] We have already looked into these facts. Objectively—right now the lion's share of fuel has been directed to agricultural work. But subjectively—local problems and the insolvency of bulk plants... And the fact that they demand payment in advance—that is not their ill will but a need. And we have already issued instructions to the troops on payment in advance.

One of the causes of the extreme shortage of fuel today is the fact that the CIS countries have stopped supplying units quartered there that are not "native" to them. Russia has taken them under its jurisdiction—I have in mind the Northwestern Group of Forces, the Transcaucasus Military District, the 14th Army, and others. But they "forgot" to add fuel for them. Another reason—is the lack of monetary resources for purchases. Practically throughout January, we received fuel from industry on credit. Hard currency resources have also not been allocated for fuel deliveries to the WGF [Western Group of Forces]. All of this is the reality of our days.

[Altunin] Therefore, now we need to shift from conservation to super conservation?

[Shelenin] I would say to rational conversation. What was the attitude toward fuel in the country and in the army until recently? It flowed like a river. I am not talking about Afghanistan—an entire sea flowed there... But even in the daily life of the troops, we sometimes lived according to the principle: excessively consume—they will not leave us without fuel. And they actually did not. Now it's another matter...

[Altunin] What do you put into the concept "rational conservation"?

[Shelenin] This is a whole series of measures. And we at the Central Directorate have already planned a conservation program until 1995. "Up above" they think that

we must be concerned about developing more economical vehicles, about reducing fuel consumption operating standards, about switching over to diesel fleets, providing training groups with simulators, etc. On the military district level—this is the construction of new and the design of facilities, fuel depots (they are 80 percent dilapidated), without interruptions—seasonal servicing of vehicles, specifically its more qualitative preparation for winter. This is widest possible use of rail and pipeline transportation. For the troop element—centralized delivery and hauling out of vehicles and training only in that amount which is necessary. Maintenance of vehicles directly at ranges and tank ranges so that equipment is not driven back and forth, etc...

[Altunin] Anatoliy Mikhaylovich, but how are such, it would seem, elementary requirements being complied with today?

[Shelenin] On the whole, poorly. There are cases of a careless attitude toward fuel: violations of discipline limits, above standard consumption, and premature replacement of oil and special liquids. Frequently, when there is excessive consumption, unit commanders, especially of centrally subordinated units, solicit "additional fuel allocations" through their commanders at higher levels. And "kind uncles", without having verified or having clarified the causes, "issue" additional gasoline or kerosene for their wards.

[Altunin] But really hasn't embezzlement of public property also occurred? Did the cases in the Southern Group of Forces when entire tank trucks of gasoline went "on the side" not become a lesson?

[Shelenin] Unfortunately, yes. Control has been slackened—both commanders', from our service, and from the procurator's office. Say, Unit Commander Ye. Korablev, with the blessing of his senior commander, supplied not only himself with "unlimited gasoline" in the sense of the use of fuel for his personal life, but also illegally sold it to kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and to lumber combines...

Summer military training plans were being fulfilled in January in the Far Eastern Military District and half of monthly norm was expended for refueling scheduled aircraft that carry out primarily commercial flights. Here aviation kerosene is issued to alien organizations and is being used to heat boiler rooms. At one airfield alone (Unit Commander Colonel A. Niparko), excessive consumption over the fuel limit totaled 1,908 tons last year. And now we pay, not 10 or 20 kopeks for fuel as it was not so long ago, but nearly R10.

[Altunin] Do lubricants now also cost a pretty penny?

[Shelenin] Yes and how expensive they are! We pay R100 per kilogram of motor vehicle or tank oil, and 150 per kilogram of aviation oil, and up to R3,000 per kilogram for some individual types of lubricants...

[Altunin] We all know that there was a directive several years ago that authorizes servicemen to refuel their personal automobiles at their own unit for cash. Is it still in force?

[Shelenin] Yes, it has not been rescinded. And I think that it may be (there is no other solution) used at remote garrisons where there is no possibility to refuel. But we need to bear in mind that the cost of gasoline in these cases is higher than at an AZS [Filling Station] and overhead costs are taken into account.

[Altunin] I would like to recall the recent past (about 3-4 years ago): a territorial system of rear services support had been created and your central directorate was a pioneer in this matter. Has that system justified itself?

[Shelenin] Certainly. There are five, six, or seven territorial fuel supply centers in each military district. They unite bases and depots which previously operated according to the mechanical "receive-issue" scheme. Now they are directly connected, on the one hand, with the troops and, on the other hand—with the military districts and with support organs. They themselves plan receipt and issue and conduct the appropriate documentation. Now the centers and military districts have greater capabilities to analyze and work toward the future.

[Altunin] If we have touched upon the future, how do you see the future in your service?

[Shelenin] In principle, we need to give even more independence to armies, divisions, and regiments in the acquisition of petroleum products. We are working in this direction.

It is advisable in the Russian Federation to create a coordinating committee which would determine the general line in extraction, production, and transportation of petroleum products, and also a joint-stock company that is directly involved with supplying the troops and navy forces with fuel and lubricants.

We have sent our proposals on that score to the Russian Government. Its decisions would regulate the steady, effective work on Armed Forces's petroleum product support.

Location of Munitions Dumps Noted

92UM1147A Moscow KOMSOROLOSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by T. Bocharova and V. Nelyubin: "Yerevan. Vladivostok. After That—Everywhere?"]

[Text] We were prepared to destroy "the entire world of violence." Could we have blown ourselves up as well?

There is a pine forest of amazing beauty near Kansk. But you won't find any picnicking urbanites or ubiquitous mushroom and berry farms in this forest. Here behind several rows of barbed wire is where a naval arsenal sits.

The remoteness of the arsenal from the sea (the closest sea to Kansk is 3,000 km away) is explained historically. The facility was created in 1942, and by the yardsticks of those times, this was an ideal place in which to locate it.

The 6 kilometers that separated the arsenal from Kansk at that time were felt to be fully sufficient to ensure the safety of the city's residents in the event of an accident. But now urban buildup has spread right up to the secret facility, and specialists estimate that if the bulk of the arsenal's ammunition were to blow up, half of Kansk would be wiped from the face of the Earth, and the lives of 50,000 persons would be in jeopardy. For a long time no one gave this much thought. But when the naval arsenal in Vladivostok blew up, Kansk began to worry. Commissions began visiting the local land-based seamen, and journalists were allowed to see the mines and torpedoes for the first time. And last week the city soviet of Kansk decided to "ask the Krasnoyarsk Kray Soviet to raise the issue of moving the arsenal outside the city and the rayon before the minister of defense and the Russian government."

Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Gutyar, the arsenal's commander, does not share the apprehensions of the city's residents:

"What happened in Vladivostok cannot be repeated here. That was an artillery depot, and the powder-filled shells and rounds blew up because they were exposed to the heat of a fire. We store mines, torpedoes and depth charges containing TNT, and it is impossible to explode them without special detonators, which are stored separately."

It became known to us that the naval arsenal is not the only major storage site of this sort in Krasnoyarsk Kray. There is an air force arsenal in that same Kanskiy Rayon, and the Main Missile-Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has an arsenal in Achinskiy Rayon. And as we found out, the conditions under which ammunition is stored in them is, mildly speaking, unsatisfactory.

One last piece of news: Construction of dachas has begun in Achinskiy Rayon within the artillery arsenal's security zone with the blessing of the local administration. Regular explosions at a quarry that was opened not far away have started damaging the military depots: A wall recently collapsed in one of them.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Details of Attack on Tank Regiment in Gori

92UM1144A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jun 92 First Edition p 1

[Article by Major K. Litvinov: "Tragic Events in Gori. Casualties on Both Sides. Are Police Monitoring the Situation?"]

[Text] The night of 13-14 June was a tragic night in Gori. It all began when irregulars in National Guard uniform and civilians in camouflage outfits (there were a total of around 200 of them) demanded issue of weapons and equipment by the commander of a tank regiment stationed in Gori. When they were refused, they attacked the guardhouse, headquarters and depots. The regiment was alerted. Russian forces even had to use helicopters to repel the attack. The outcome of the night engagement was regrettable: on the regiment's side—two killed, three severely wounded (one of them died in the hospital), and a woman and child were lightly wounded. The attackers lost 12 persons killed. The time of the attack and its organization lead one to believe that this was a well planned operation (Saturday, the second half of the day). Most of the regular officers and warrant officers had gone home, and except for the daily detail, the personnel were off duty. The guardhouse was seized and the guards were disarmed efficiently. Motor vehicles in which to load the "commandeered" property and ammunition were driven right up to the depots and storehouses.

However, the attackers did not account for the fact that besides the guards who were normally there, there were 80 airborne troops in the unit, transferred there to beef up security. They were armed, and they occupied one of the barracks as an alert combat subunit. The airborne troops were the first to repel the attackers. At that same time, officers and warrant officers began arriving from the nearby residential compound. They entered into combat (with whatever they could muster up) and drove a T-72 tank out of the motor pool. This in general terms is the way the events unfolded.

Criminal proceedings have now been instituted by the procuracy of the Transcaucasian Military District. The investigation is under way. Some of the findings are unbelievable. There are many things to unravel. In particular one of the department chiefs of the general staff of the Georgian Ministry of Defense asserted in a private interview that no operation of any kind had been planned against the Gori regiment by the republic's Ministry of Defense. Also requiring investigation is the role played by a certain general from the staff and administration of the Transcaucasian Military District

serving in an operations group under the district headquarters: He surfaced in Gori among the Guards soldiers "commandeering" the regiment. They say that he was attempting to stop the attackers and to bring them to their senses. One other detail: Having repelled the attack, the tankmen drove their tanks outside the unit and "flattened" the column of private Zhigulis and trucks that brought the Guards soldiers here.

Lieutenant General Sufiyan Beppayev, deputy troop commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, communicated that Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Georgian State Soviet, visited Gori. As it turns out, the attack upon the Russian tank regiment was initiated by a certain officer from the National Guard—Erik Kutateladze, who acted without orders from the republic's Ministry of Defense. He himself was wounded in the head during the attack.

The subsequent actions of the tankmen, Transcaucasian Military District deputy troop commander Lieutenant General Sufiyan Beppayev admitted, were uncontrollable. As a result the city suffered damage, many motor vehicles were destroyed, and there were casualties among the population.

Yesterday, 8-year-old Marina Savoskina, a major's daughter, died from her wounds.

The situation in Gori is now being monitored by the local police. Yesterday a mob of predominantly women and children approached the garrison three times, demanding that the unit command be punished. The police dispersed the gathering with gunfire into the air. The district command and the republic's leadership are doing everything they can to cool passions down. Nineteen of the captured irregulars were released yesterday from the regiment. They in turn released an officer who had been taken hostage—Lieutenant Colonel Dimitriy Maksimenko from the district's combat training directorate.

Obviously some armed formations needed tanks. That they went unpunished has added to the impudent resolve of the attackers. And this is during a time when the Georgian State Soviet was examining the issue of armed formations. It was decided that all of their members who were not within the composition of the Georgian Army had to surrender their weapons prior to 15 June. As far as the actions of the tankmen are concerned, it may be supposed that the people lost their nerve. The vandalism occurring in the Transcaucasus in relation to Russian forces did play its crucial role after all.

By the way, troops of the Transcaucasian Military District have been raised to a higher state of combat readiness.

UKRAINE**National Guard Units Bolster Border Guard**

*92UM118A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
27 May 92 p 1*

[Unattributed article: "In the Special Operations Zone"]

[Text] As the Ukrainian National Guard Press Center has reported, several Ukrainian National Guard military units have arrived in the 50-kilometer special operations zone in the area of the state border with the Republic of Moldova to continue performing tasks in accordance with the 17 March 1992 Ukrainian Presidential Decree. National Guard regimental maneuver groups along with the border guards are guarding the inviolability of Ukraine's state border and are protecting the safety of its citizens.

National Guard Commander Major-General of the Guard Vladimir Kukharets has ordered his subordinate units, in cooperation with the Border Troops and internal affairs organs, to monitor citizens' and officials' observance of the established rules of this regime in the special operations zone and to stop violations of the law. Steps will be taken to detain violators who dare to cross the Ukrainian border with weapons in the special operations zone in accordance with the Regulation On the Rights and Obligations of Ukrainian National Guard Personnel.

Ex-Soldiers Called On to Work the Land

*92UM1149C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 May 92 p 3*

[Article by Major-General Boris Lavrinenko, deputy chairman of the Committee on Issues of Social Protection for Servicemen of the Ukraine Cabinet of Ministers, under the rubric "Military Reform: Ways of Entering the Market": "A Free State Begins With a Free Peasant"]

[Text] Ukraine has long been called the breadbasket of Europe. Possessing fertile lands, a generous sun and work-loving people, however, it has not been able to achieve freedom, flourishing and prosperity "as if the village burned down," as Taras Shevchenko sighed bitterly.

So many years have passed, but the village in Ukraine is still in decline and Ukraine is in decline without the village even to this day.

Independent America started out at one time with the assimilation of the wild prairies by immigrants from all continents, and no few of our countrymen, as is well known, were among them.

The creation of a free Ukraine could also start with the assimilation of one's own village by all those to whom it is dear.

A movement in this direction has started and is growing; more than two thousand peasant (individual farming) farms and one thousand cooperatives producing agricultural products had already been created and were in operation as of 1

Jan 92. It is expected that the number of such enterprises will reach at least 50,000 in the near future.

The successes on this path of freeing up the production and social capabilities of the village would understandably be substantially greater if the boycott of land reform on the part of a certain subsegment of officials and the inaccessibility of material, technical and financial resources were not making themselves felt.

Our young state, taking the first steps along the path of its independence, is making efforts to create the necessary legislative and legal-standards foundation for the resurrection of the village. Changes have thus been made in the Land Code of Ukraine, the laws "The Peasant (Individual Farming) Farm" and "Collective Agriculture" have been adopted and entered into force, new opportunities have been opened up for entrepreneurial initiative in the village and legal guarantees for the processes of agricultural economic transformations have been created.

The size of the land allotment being offered for lifelong inherited ownership or private property in particular, in accordance with Article 6 of the law "The Peasant (Individual Farming) Farm," could reach 50 hectares of agricultural lands and 100 hectares of all lands.

In that same law (Paragraph 3 Article 3) the state guarantees the observance and protection of legal property and other rights and interests of the peasant (individual farming) farm and creates beneficial terms for credit, taxation, insurance and material and technical supply for the three-year period of emergence of the peasant (individual farming) farm. The fulfillment of these and other tasks has been entrusted to the newly created Ukrainian State Fund for the Support of Peasant (Individual Farming) Farms. Divisions of it have been opened and have begun to operate in all oblasts of the republic.

Especial attention is devoted to settlers who want to create a peasant (individual farming) farm at difficult-to-reach populated areas. It is envisaged that the construction of housing and economic structures for them will be accomplished through the state budget. This housing is transferred to their full ownership after 10 years from the moment they started their agricultural activity. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, in fulfillment of that law, has made some changes and additions to the resolution that had previously been adopted on 20 Jul 91, "The Development of Peasant (Individual Farming) Farms and Cooperatives for the Output of Agricultural Products," by decree No. 133 of 14 Mar 92.

This pertains in particular to the material and technical supply for peasant farms. No less than one tractor with a set of agricultural machinery and one truck at prevailing prices are allocated to each peasant (individual farming) farm as needed for production. The aforementioned fund could also render substantial assistance in acquiring them.

The settlers are also granted one-time monetary assistance in the amount of 15 times the minimum salary scale for the head of the family and one quarter of that assistance for each member of the family.

The allocation of the necessary material and financial resources for the purpose of resurrecting the peasantry is also envisaged by the law "The Priority of Social Development of the Village" that will be refined in the near future by the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in accordance with the contemporary conditions for the transition to market relations.

The richest lands in Ukraine thus await energetic and modern people with initiative, ready to create their own fate through their own labor—a prosperous fate independent of the village bosses—who will return to Ukraine its glory and its freedom.

These circumstances merit particular attention, in our opinion, on the part of servicemen, who will irreversibly face the question of the choice of a new lifestyle as a result of the processes that are transpiring in our society. It should be understood, in seeking perspective, that a great deal today depends on personal abilities and strengths, on the conscious choice of one's place in society. Either among the unemployed in the city or on one's own farming homestead, guaranteeing well-being and independence.

Dear Readers!

The Committee on Issues of Social Protection of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine appeals to you with a proposal—if you are being discharged from the armed forces and you have the desire to realize your potential in farming, on a collective agricultural enterprise or in other sectors of the agro-industrial complex, send us a postcard with your mailing address. We will send you a questionnaire in which you will be able to report on yourself, your desires and your plans in life in detail.

That data will be transmitted to interested organizations, which will deal directly with you with a concrete proposal to move and get set up in a village.

Write to us at the address 252009, Kiev-9, Ul. Bankovaya, 6, Committee on Issues of Social Protection of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Please make the notation "Resurrection of the Village" on the envelope.

Czech Delegates Visit Kiev

*92UM1150A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jun 92 p 1*

[Report from Press Service of the Ukraine Ministry of Defense under the rubric "Military Contacts Are Expanding": "Further Down the Path of Collaboration"]

[Text] A military delegation from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic visited Ukraine on June 3 of this year in accordance with an agreement on bilateral collaboration between the ministries of defense of Ukraine and the ChSFR for the period 1992-93.

The chief of the armaments directorate, the chief of the chemical troops, the chief of PVO [air defense], and deputy commander in chief of the air forces and PVO,

and representatives of rear support and repairs, as well as other officials of the Federal Ministry of Defense of the ChSFR, will hold a series of meetings with their colleagues from the armed forces of Ukraine, in the course of which the basic guidelines of the agreement on collaboration will in fact be implemented and acceptable solutions to issues of mutual interest will be reached.

The military specialists from the Ukraine Ministry of Defense will later make a return working visit to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Military Transport to Aid Local Soviets

*92UM1149B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 May 92 p 1*

[Report from Ukraine Ministry of Defense Press Service under the rubric "At the Ukraine Ministry of Defense": "For the Needs of the National Economy"]

[Text] Serious help has appeared for the national economy of sovereign Ukraine. The enterprises and organizations of ministries and agencies, as well as the executive committees of the local Soviets of Peoples Deputies, can now count on the military-transport aviation of the armed forces of Ukraine.

A special instruction developed at the Ministry of Defense has defined the procedure for the performance of paid shipments of national-economic freights and the settlements for them, as well as the procedure for the utilization of the monetary funds received and the monitoring of their expenditure.

The performance of transport shipments is envisaged by direct contracts concluded between the commanders of aviation units and customers with the permission of the appropriate superiors. Aircraft and helicopters will be specially allocated for this purpose, and they will also, by the way, deliver freights on the return trips as well.

Payment for the shipments is in advance, as a rule, by non-cash transactions. The shipping cost when transporting freights by dedicated runs is determined proceeding from the type of aircraft or helicopter and the planned duration of the flight. The cost of the services on the return-flight shipments is determined proceeding from the duration of the routing, the class of freight being shipped and its weight.

The money received by military-transport aviation for the paid freight shipments will be distributed as follows: 25 percent to the state budget and 75 percent for use in accordance with an expense estimate approved by the commander-in-chief of the Air Forces. That includes 40 percent for the resolution of the housing problem and 35 percent for the upkeep of aviation hardware, servicing of aircraft at the airfields of civil aviation and other ministries and agencies, for the reimbursement of additional expenditures connected with the paid shipments, for social development etc.

There is no doubt that the military fliers will render good assistance to the emergence of the young economy of their state.

Donetsk Officer on Call-Up

*92UM1150B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jun 92 p 2*

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Major Vladimir Knysh (by telephone), city of Donetsk: "What Awaits Sanek in the Ranks"—*The Draft for Service is Underway*]

[Text] *In Donetsk we are working just as efficiently as at the prior stopping points. I had a businesslike and detailed discussion with the oblast military commissar, Major-General Yu. Yashtakov, and the first deputy head of the oblast state administration, A. Shevchenko.*

It is visible at once that the civilians and military are working as one, without dividing the duties into "yours" and "ours." They are resolving all difficulties together. The draft is thus proceeding according to plan, although the medical personnel have been on strike for a week now, but largely thanks to Valentina Dmitriyevna Kiyan—the chief juvenile physician of the health-care administration of Donetsk Oblast—the strike has been removed from the agenda, so to speak, in the work of the draft medical commission.

And now something else, or rather someone else, having in mind my local colleagues, the journalists. Yes, they have not remained detached observers. The local newspaper people were at the assembly point from morning, taking all of the necessary information. But as early as May 18, on the day of the start of the draft into the armed forces of Ukraine, the regional weekly DONETSKIYE NOVOSTI brought to the surface an "opus" by its commentator on issues of law and national policy, Yaroslav Levitskiy, under the resounding title of "You, Sanek, Will Not Join the Ranks!"

The title itself makes clear the sense of the feature. In it the author gives recommendations to his acquaintance, some Sanek Yakushenko—and through him other young men as well—on how to avoid the draft for army service. He writes bluntly, and I quote: "How can one not serve in the army?.. Refuse to receive the notice... evade going through the medical commission under any pretext, and do not react to the attempts at intimidation by the procurator..."

And so on. The recommendations are precise, professional and are placed on a legal footing. Yaroslav even gives "valuable" advice to believers on how to avoid alternative service.

The feature begins with an interview with the military commissar of the city of Selidovo, Lieutenant Colonel A.S. Semyannikov. The questions are clever, with dual intent, as if the lieutenant colonel will "crack" and issue the "needed" information. But alas, the answers testify

to something else—that subterfuge and cheap sensationalism will not distract the military commissar. The correspondent then tries to scheme and dilute the speech of the interviewee with various expressions. And that is felt at once.

I got hold of the military commissar of the city of Selidovo by telephone. Lieutenant Colonel A. Semyannikov was a little confused: "I haven't read the articles yet. The correspondent said that he wanted to talk about the draft. We talked for 30 minutes, and he displayed incompetence in not knowing the issues that a military commissar should be occupied with. That is understandable overall. A young fellow, who had recently served in a construction battalion. He was interested in how to register. This was our own registrant, by the way. He asked the questions with a catch, and then took on the personal cases of the refuseniks and worked with them."

"Recently served in a construction battalion..." This elaboration puts everything in its place in principle. The former member of a construction battalion, today a "commentator on issues of law and national policy," was clearly in the sway of past recollections of service (you will agree that service there is no plum), and did everything to see that "all the bile and all the spite" would be vented in the newspaper column. Without grounds. That he was able to do. The innocent and the guilty, the "chief petty thief" and the cafeteria chief who gave the meat due the soldiers to the unit commander's wife, they all caught it.

I would clarify, this being the end of the material, the author's conjecture of what awaited his friend, Sanek, in the ranks.

There were in fact only three refuseniks among all of the draftees in the city of Selidovo. That was one of the lowest values in the region.

The fellows from the Donetsk region are joining the ranks without coercion. Andrey Urvachev from Khartsizsk and Sergey Isayev from Yenakiyevo were surprised: "What coercion? Our parents understand that we have to serve. We were assembled and sent off without delay. If I end up in the marines, help me!.. We also agreed to run cross-country every day, and to bear all of the other burdens of the service. We know everything and do not intend to shirk our service. The more so as we will be serving in Ukraine."

And that was the sentiment of all the young men who have now been drafted that I spoke with at the Donetsk Oblast assembly point.

I cannot fail to say to the former member of the construction battalion, and today my colleague, Yaroslav Levitskiy: "Do not play with the young men's heads, do not frighten them. I do not know how your fate took shape, but it is very dishonorable to shift everything from a sick head to a healthy one."

Kiev Officials on Call-Up, Health of Draftees

92UM1150C Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Colonel (Retired) Vasiliy Perminov: "A Sad Paradox"]

[Text] The work of the draft commission of the Minskiy Rayon military commissariat of the city of Kiev, where I had occasion to visit, left a good impression. I also like the youth passing through the commission overall, burning with a passionate desire to find out where and in what branch of the service they will be serving in the armed forces of Ukraine. The absolute majority of them appearing before the prestigious members of the commission were animated and well prepared for honorable military service.

The rayon military commissar, Colonel Nikolay Fedorovich Karabanov, spoke with each of them in detail in order to observe the norms of the corresponding legislation and satisfy the desires of the future soldiers. But the discussion with Aleksey Vasyura was brief to the utmost. To the question "Where do you wish to serve?" he broke into a smile: "In the border troops... with my faithful dog..."

Vasyura got the "OK." It could not have been any other way. He had genuinely prepared himself for the difficult and crucial service on the border, and had trained his beloved four-legged friend thoroughly. The corresponding border officers had long since taken note of Aleksey.

Aleksey Piven, Aleksandr Ryabets, Vitaliy Pashkovskiy, Valeriy Shakhox and many other youth who were assigned to military service in their favorite fields left the draft commission satisfied. All, in short, who conform in the state of their health, special training and moral and working qualities. One could hope that they will be excellent sailors, border guards, communications specialists, combat engineers and air-defense soldiers.

And it was not the fault of the members of the draft commission that the "ratings" of some did not permit them to be assigned for service where they wanted. And that was first and foremost on physical grounds. And there would have proved to be considerably more if all who had been given notices had come to the draft commission. Strange as it may be, more than twenty people ignored it.

These problems are especially troubling to the military commissar, the officers subordinate to him and the draft commission. One of its members, medical specialist Vladimir Vasilyevich Nemykin, said with distress, "The

state of health of the draft contingent is extremely troubling. It is enough to say that about 250 of the youth were deemed unfit for military service due to curvature of the spine, flat feet or cardiovascular, gastro-intestinal and other diseases. More than four hundred draftees are undergoing medical recertification today, of whom many are trying to evade the service under any pretext whatsoever. It must be said that the physical education of the youth is set up poorly in some families and at some schools or special educational institutions. Many of them shun useful labor, do not engage in sports and lead abnormal lifestyles."

The figures also testify convincingly to the state of discipline among the draftees of the rayon. The internal-affairs bodies, as was reported by military commissariat 2nd Division Chief Lieutenant Colonel Aleksey Pavlovich Semenchenko, are seeking 81 people, 43 of whom are subject to being sent to the army. Cases of refusals to accept notices and failure to appear at medical and draft commissions are plentiful. And that is at a time when a year and a half of service only on the territory of Ukraine has been legislatively defined—right next door, so to speak, and in particular close to the capital of Kiev, on the territory of Kiev oblast and those adjoining it.

The so-called "fine fellows" Miroslav Glushak, Artem Prityka and Oleg Pivovarenko did not deign to appear at the military commissariat in the last call-up after a multitude of notices. By their own desire and at the exhortation of their parents, I would note. It would seem today, when the Law of Ukraine "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" has been adopted, that the "refuseniks" and their guardians should heed it and their own good sense. But the mothers and fathers continue to safeguard their offspring under cozy domestic conditions. Army service does not pertain to them, they say.

That is what the parents of some of the other eighteen-year-olds for whom the time has come to fulfill their honored military duty also assume. Since their sons are set up pretty well in various cooperatives and other "income-producing" organizations, with solid profits every day. And some, without a twinge of conscience, declare, "I should earn money. The army is for people of another type..."

There is bravado for you. But the law, after all, is written for everyone. And it is about time for the enthusiasts of the easy life and their soft-hearted forebears to think some about that... The military commissariat has transmitted to the rayon police department materials on 11 "refuseniks." The next are being readied. Legality will undoubtedly triumph. And then let those who look at honorable military service as something third-rate today not complain about anyone.

PVO Chief of Staff on Development of Air Defenses

92UM1149D Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Army PVO [Air Defense] Chief of Staff Major-General Vladimir Tkachev under the rubric "Viewpoint of a Professional": "Scientific Sophistication, Mobility, Reliability, Economy—Such Are the Requirements Being Posed Toward Ukrainian Air Defense"]

[Text] The peaceful future of our planet depends first and foremost on the good will of the peoples inhabiting it, the efforts of the governments of countries possessing enormous military potential and the desire to cut back, and subsequently destroy, the weapons of mass destruction that create a real threat to the lives of people.

Ukraine unreservedly repudiates warfare and the use of force or the threat of force as a means of achieving political, economic or other aims, and feels that all disputed issues should be resolved primarily by political means. Ukraine has declared its adherence to the three non-nuclear principles—not to receive, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. The presence of nuclear weapons on its territory is considered to be temporary.

The changes that are occurring in the contemporary military-political situation around the world, however, will provide no complete guarantee of the disappearance of military danger to Ukraine for the foreseeable future. The process of augmenting offensive potential, even in the face of substantial cutbacks, has not yet halted in the organizational development of the armed forces of the leading countries around the world. A defensive nature has not yet been imparted to the groupings of countries with those armed forces. The latest high-precision means of aerial offensive, able to act in surprise in concealed fashion and in the shortest possible time, continue to remain in service with the air forces and navies.

The composition of the armed forces of Ukraine, proceeding from the basic provisions of the Concepts of Defensive Military Doctrine, should ultimately include three types of armed forces—Ground Defense Forces, Airspace Defense Troops (air forces and air-defense troops) and the Navy. The creation of the armed forces of Ukraine, according to plan, will be implemented gradually with completion by 1995. This period could hypothetically be called the transitional one. The conceptual framework for the creation of the Air-Defense Troops of Ukraine and their development should be a constituent element of the creation of our own armed forces.

Contemporary war, if it were to be unleashed, would begin with rapid aerial electronic and fire incursion in full depth onto enemy territory. The wars in Vietnam, Egypt and Syria are confirmation of this. The war in the Persian Gulf zone visibly demonstrated the increasing significance of the course and outcome of battle with an airborne enemy for the achievement of overall success in war. The month-and-a-half aerial offensive by the MNF [multinational

forces] (aerial campaign) ensured the rout of the ground forces and the capitulation of Iraq in a brief period of time.

PVO with elements of anti-missile defense is thus even today becoming a most important operational-strategic factor. And for Ukraine, which has declared itself a non-nuclear power, it is moreover the sole restraint.

The conceptual framework for the organizational development of the armed forces that is now being realized, therefore, does not seem to be a promising one without assigning priority to the defensive forces for fighting aerial attack.

The concepts for the organizational development of the contemporary armed forces must envisage, first and foremost, the creation of defensive forces for fighting an air and space offensive and able to protect the territory of the state.

The defensive forces can only defend by their nature, and their creation and bringing of their composition and size to a level sufficient to ensure reliable protection against strikes from the air is thus entirely legitimate and in complete conformity with the defensive nature of military doctrine. It is namely the PVO troops that are called upon to take upon themselves the repulsion of the first surprise strike from the air in the interests of protecting facilities and troops and the organizational basis of military operations. There are no alternatives to them. No other types of forces and armaments would be able to perform these tasks.

The foundation for the creation of the PVO troops of Ukraine is the PVO army with elements of anti-missile defense with the operational subordination to a unified command, in peacetime as well, of all PVO manpower and equipment, the PVO ground-defense troops, the fighter aviation of the Air Forces, Navy, EW elements and aerial reconnaissance.

The fragmented PVO forces deployed across the territory of Ukraine should be combined into a unified system and perform their missions not only in the interests of the individual branch of the armed forces, but also in the interests of protecting the entire territory of the state. A systems approach to the resolution of this problem makes it possible to organize the use of the considerable forces of the PVO and accomplish strategic and operational tasks at a higher level successfully.

Unified command and control in the initial period of a war when repelling a surprise aerial attack, the use of all PVO assets according to a unified plan and intent, unified information on an airborne enemy and a system of command posts united by technically linked ASU [automatic control systems] and communications should provide for the most effective utilization of PVO forces for fighting an airborne enemy.

The PVO troops should be on constant readiness and able to resolve, with their peacetime composition, the following tasks:

- performance of operational-strategic reconnaissance of an airborne enemy;
- warning of the troops of the operations of an air or space enemy;
- electronic warfare;

—destruction of enemy airborne offensive weapons;
—coverage of major administrative and production centers, state command and control bodies, AESs [nuclear power plants] and other vitally important facilities.

The PVO system being created should possess high ability to withstand combat, to be restructured quickly in regroupings of troops, to be restored rapidly and to be sufficiently resistant to jamming.

The realization of these requirements could be accomplished through a conversion from a facility-based to a mobile zone-facility PVO system, able to wage active battle with an airborne enemy using the basic forces in the distant approaches and to accomplish the destruction of aircraft and cruise missiles that have penetrated right at the defended facilities. The zone-facility groupings are more resistant to jamming, both against the various types of gear used and through the operational-tactical measures used when structuring the system.

Stationary PVO has virtually outlived its usefulness with the start of the use of satellite reconnaissance systems. Mobile PVO proved its advantages in the war in Vietnam, and stationary PVO its complete insolvency in the war with Iraq. The rejection of stationary PVO and conversion to mobile means of battling an airborne enemy should thus become an objective factor in raising the ability of PVO systems to withstand combat.

The high survivability of the PVO system also assumes the presence of a powerful mobile reserve for the commanding general of PVO, able to be used both to augment the efforts in the sector with the main strike and to restore the PVO system rapidly.

The immediate transfer of the fighter air regiments and operationally subordinate units of the Air Forces fighter air cover from the Air Forces to the PVO troops would expand considerably the capabilities of fighter air coverage of groupings of troops (forces) and facilities on distant approaches. The task of coordinating efforts when destroying enemy jamming, reconnaissance, EW and command-and-control aircraft would be eased at the same time.

The command and control of all PVO systems and assets on the territory of Ukraine should be unified, centralized and automated at all levels, as well as organizationally by the regions in which the responsibility for PVO is entrusted to one official. The command-and-control system should be linked to a unified automated system for comprehensive reconnaissance of the enemy.

The survivability of the system should be ensured through the creation of a system of mobile command posts with communications centers at all levels.

It would thus be expedient to structure the PVO system of Ukraine, in my opinion, using the following basic principles.

1. The operational-strategic level of the tasks being resolved.

2. A systems approach—the creation of an interagency, unified PVO system for Ukraine, and the operational subordination of the PVO manpower and equipment of the branches of the armed forces and elements of the PRN and PRO [antimissile defense] to the unified command.

3. The creation of an intrinsic integrated system of reconnaissance and warning.

4. A transition to the creation of mobile zone-facility groupings of PVO forces and equipment and the rejection of stationary groupings of ZRV [air-defense missile troops] and RTV [EW troops].

5. Unified and centralized command and control by regions and sectors, with automation of command and control processes.

6. The creation of direct-coverage troops in the formations and units of the branches of the armed forces.

7. The presence of a mobile reserve of the commanding general of the PVO of Ukraine.

The organizational structure of the PVO troops should facilitate the resolution of a whole set of issues connected with their everyday activity, technical support and training and—without substantial restructuring—waging battle and controlling manpower and equipment in the course of it from the beginning of combat operations.

The integrated system of reconnaissance and warning for the air defense of Ukraine will function and support the fulfillment of the missions of reconnaissance under everyday conditions, during periods of threat and with the start of aggression. This system should unite into a unified reconnaissance cycle, in peacetime, two functionally completed subsystems:

—the subsystem for warning of a missile attack and monitoring outer space (SPRN and KKP);
—the subsystem for warning of an aerial attack (SVI detection).

The command-and-control system of the PVO troops of Ukraine should be an aggregate of functionally linked stationary and mobile bodies and command posts provided with means of automation and communications.

It is seen as a unified and automated system that includes three mutually linked subsystems:

—command and signal system, which provides for the timely bringing of troops to the required degrees of combat readiness and their maintenance there;

—an automated system of combat command and control that supports the command and control of troops immediately during the process of fulfilling the combat mission;

—an information and computation system that supports the command and staff at the stages of preparations for air-defense operations (battle) and the restoration of destroyed groupings of forces in the process of an air-defense operation.

The communications system of the PVO troops should include standard communications centers for command posts, forming a station network for PVO of Ukraine communications and being a constituent element of the station control network of the armed forces of Ukraine, and mobile communications centers (subunits) to augment the communications organized from the reserve command posts at all levels, centers (communications stations) and relay posts for courier and postal communications for the receipt, processing and delivery of combat documents, all types of secret and postal dispatches and periodicals. And, finally, stores for the storage of communications and ASU equipment and repair subunits.

The gradual re-arming of fighter aviation with new aviation hardware, with the simultaneous cutback of the number of air regiments with the assurance of a rise in combat capabilities therein, must be implemented in order to improve fighter air cover for the territory of Ukraine.

The basis of the air-defense missile cover should be the creation of a group of air-defense missile troops in Ukraine based on the PVO army, with the inclusion in it of general-purpose and naval PVO units. The air-defense missile defense becomes operational, flexible, deeply echeloned in depth and mobile therein.

The development of a new generation of ZRK [air-defense missile launchers] produced by industry in Ukraine and used for re-arming is necessary in order to raise the reliability of missile air-defense coverage. This would make it possible to raise the mobility of the air-defense missile group and provide an opportunity to concentrate the efforts of the ZRV in the sectors where the main strike of an airborne enemy occurs.

The ability of the PVO system to withstand combat in the long run could be achieved through the combination of mobile systems of weaponry with the presence of several ZSP for each air-defense missile system, which would ensure the concentration of PVO efforts in the sectors of the enemy's main airborne strike.

It is necessary, when organizing the rear support for the PVO troops of Ukraine, to proceed from the principle of ensuring the maximum autonomy of groupings of troops in a rear-support regard. This principle lies at the foundation of the resolution of issues of the composition, standard organizational structure, technical equipping and stationing of rear-support units and institutions for operational and field rear support for the creation of reserves of matériel and their distribution, as well as the creation of a system of rear command-and-control.

The operational rear support for the troops should include a rear group that is intended for the direct support of PVO aviation, a rear-support group performing the mission of rear support in the interests of all PVO troops and rear manpower and equipment reserves.

The training of officers for the branches of troops and services must be accomplished at the corresponding higher-educational institutions of the Ministry of Defense. The training of graduates of the military schools for specific specialties and retraining for new equipment or improvement of professional training would be expediently conducted at the educational centers of the branches of the troops.

We are proposing to leave the existing system of training conscript servicemen and NCOs as before during the transitional period. The training of specialists that require lengthy training is accomplished in training units. The remaining servicemen should be trained in training subunits of the combat units.

A training center for the training of PVO specialists must be created, on the basis of one of the military air-defense missile schools, for the retraining of the officer corps for new combat hardware and higher posts, as well as the retraining of subunits and the crews of command posts of the branches of the troops.

The qualitative changes in the methods and principles of waging air defense inevitably entail cutbacks in the number of personnel. It will be decreased by 15 percent, according to our calculations, by 1 Jan 95 in connection with the re-organizational measures that are underway.

The proposed basic provisions of a future conceptual framework for the structuring of air defense as part of the defensive system of Ukraine, in my opinion, will be the most economical and technically feasible. The protection of the country's airspace, in the event that it is realized, will be accomplished at a contemporary level.

BALTIC STATES

Estonia Fitting out Two Battalions in Võru 92UN1530B Tartu POSTIMEES in Estonian 21 Mar 92

[Article by ETA: "The Kuperjanov and Kalev Infantry Battalions Will Be Restored"]

[Text] Formation of Kuperjanov and Kalev infantry battalions has started in Võru. We shall train the men by autumn, ETA was told by Ants Laaneots, acting chief of the General Staff of the Defense Forces. The Kuperjanov battalion already has a commander - former chief of the Tartu Malev [Defense Alliance], Johannes Kert. The commander's position of the Kalev battalion is vacant.

Each man who wishes to join these troop units must notify his city or provincial defense department.

According to Laaneots, the contingent of enlisted men for both battalions is almost complete, there are also officers. Needed are infantry, armor, and engineer officers and volunteers for soldiers and non-commissioned officers.

Initially, both battalions are based in Võru. Later it is planned to leave the Kuperjanov battalion in southern Estonia, but to move the Kalevs to northern Estonia.

The men in both units will begin to serve under historic flags. The flags, which originated at the time of the War of Independence [1918-1920], will be restored to the Kuperjanov and Kalev battalions.

Witchhunt for Former KGB Collaborators

*92UM1142A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jun 92 First edition p 2*

[Article by Colonel M. Zivminsh: "Chekist Syndrome in Latvia, Parliament's Deputy Speaker Not Spared"]

[Text] The Latvian Parliament has examined—for the second time—a draft decree that would ban former official employees and military intelligence officers from employment in law enforcement agencies, the system of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Ministry of Defense, the MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], and, of course, the Security Service. The draft law was submitted for examination by Parliament on the ceaseless insistence of Andrejs Krastins, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council.

"The security of Latvia is being threatened," the document's author states as his major argument. He sees as most alarming the situation existing in the MVD Department of Information, wherein in his opinion resides the greatest concentration of former chekists. This is an allegation most deputies so far do not support. In the event the decree is passed (Krastins is trying for yet another—the third—submission for parliamentary vote), almost half the Department's workers will be forced to leave.

However, Krastins does have worthy competitors. One of them is the minister of the MVD himself—Ziedonis Cevers, whose purview includes the Department of Information. He spoke out in parliamentary hearings, doing his duty, coming to the defense of his creation, doing his best to convince the deputies that his colleagues are in a position to provide a "constant flow of information on the activities being carried out by intelligence services against the interests of Latvia."

That being the case, the honorable minister had very good reasons to bring up the subject of the activity of the Russian military organization in that geographic area. The intent to instill fear was clear. "The special units (*spetsialnyye chasti*) have been assigned the mission of assuring Moscow a steady supply of information obtained from operatives active in the state structures of the Latvian Republic, and to provide reports on the activities of joint enterprises, firms, and other enterprises involved in foreign trade." But there is more to it than that. Cevers makes the allegation that the principal mission of the intelligence services of the North-Western Group of Forces is "to establish an agent network composed of former KGB personnel presently employed

in legitimate commercial structures, and to create a network which would pursue for a definite period of time the task of creating armed partisan type detachments and secret caches of weapons."

A word spoken is past recalling. All the newspapers are writing about the disclosures made by the minister. I do not see fit just now to enter into detail relative to what was said by Cevers and other political figures in Latvia. According to what a knowledgeable worker told me on this subject, much of that is simply nonsense. However, the "nonsense" does have a purpose. Hotly being debated in Parliament is an item of major importance: Who will assume authority over the Latvian intelligence services?

Is the above as simple as it seems? That appears to be the case. The republic's MVD has a formidable rival: the Security Service, which is subordinated directly to the chairman of the republic's Supreme Council, in reality to his deputy, who is Andrejs Krastins. In any event, it is he who runs this Service.

Krastins categorically denies that he is engaged in a struggle against rivals; he points out that the statute on the Security Service contains not a single word concerning intelligence or counterintelligence; that the Service was not established with that purpose in mind. In the newspaper JURMALA's reporting on security he is quoted as saying behind the walls of Parliament that "The hands that control the intelligence and counterintelligence services are probably the hands that will win in the Sejm elections." That is the way it is.

The fact that the present Security Service lays claim to intelligence and counterintelligence functions was recently affirmed by the Service's chief, Colonel Juris Vetstiras, at a session of the parliamentary fraction of the People's Front. He stated quite openly at that time that intelligence and counterintelligence constitute a major function of the Security Service.

Meanwhile, the "anti-chekist campaign" is gaining momentum in the country. The press has already reported that, according to information provided by persons working in the Passport Department, Aloizs Vaznis, former minister of the republic MVD, has provided state power structures with information on "600 falsified passports" allegedly used by the KGB of the Latvian SSR "to conceal the true data on its agents." In addition, at a recent conference of Home Guard commanders of the Kurzemskaya area, it was suggested that they present the Government with a demand for the immediate confiscation of sporting guns in the possession of KGB personnel.

As could be expected, the Latvian Citizens' Committee lost no time reacting to the events. It started to register the names of former workers and agents of the KGB. The names on the list would be revealed in the newspaper PILSONIS, which is published by the committee. The intention became a reality. Last week PILSONIS (which incidentally translates into Russian as "CITIZEN")

started to print the names, dates of birth, and even the addresses of former KGB personnel. So now there is a list of persons at whom stones can be cast, so to speak.

It is extremely difficult to predict what may occur as a result of this particular campaign, the "chekist syndrome," as it is referred to in the republic. However, what is known now is that the initiator of the campaign himself—Deputy Parliamentary Speaker Andrejs Krastins, will not emerge from this unscathed. According to information provided in the editorial article of the Latvian Home Guard's newspaper ATMODA ATPUTAI, the initiator of the "anti-chekist" decree did himself become, in the first half of the 1980s, nothing less than an agent for the 2nd Counterrevolutionary Department of the KGB, working under the cover name of "Varis." In addition, according to the newspaper DIENA, the KGB assisted Krastins to become a member of the College of Attorneys.

And so, the struggle for possession of the intelligence services is in full swing.

CAUCASIAN STATES

Transcaucasus MD Deputy Commander on Ossetian Situation

*92UM1135A Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA
in Russian 7 May 92 p 2*

[Interview with Lieutenant-General Sufiyan Uzepovich Beppayev, deputy commander of the Transcaucasus MD by SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA Correspondent Boris Tsetskhadze: "No One Has the Right To Threaten Georgia..."]

[Text]

[Tsetskhadze] Mr. General, repeatedly over the conflict in the Tskhinvali Region you have said that not only the Georgian side must be blamed...

[Beppayev] Under the former regime in Georgia, and you certainly remember this well, very flagrant political mistakes were made in terms of the so-called South Ossetia. This involved unfeigned methods of force, the introduction of a state of emergency, and the arrest of a number of the Ossetian leaders. All of this, I feel, was the thing that started the military actions and as a result of these both sides suffered equally. At the same time no one was concerned with talks and the "diktat" was observed by both sides, but this was apparent significantly more strongly on the Georgian side. From the very first day after the overthrow of the Gamsakhurdia regime, the new leadership of Georgia has endeavored to establish a negotiating process with Tskhinvali. For this purpose, the first leaders of Georgia and South Ossetia met, endeavoring to find a path of political resolution to the conflict. However, more often there was no response to the numerous Georgian initiatives and proposals. In truth, as is now asserted by the Ossetian side, the process

is now under way of elaborating counterproposals. However, simultaneously the Confederation of Caucasian Mountain Peoples has intensified its activities.

[Tsetskhadze] Yes, at present they are talking about establishing a unified army of the Confederation...

[Beppayev] The appearance of such an army is an absolute joke. No serious leader who has been given the power of his people would participate in the activities of this Confederation. Moreover, it has no real power at all. As for the establishing of joint armed forces for the mountain peoples of the Caucasus, this is a utopian plan, since they do not have the means to provide the logistic base for this army. Their formations could most probably be involved in diversionary activities, but the establishing of an army is a completely baseless dream. All the more unrealistic are the plans to introduce into Tskhinvali the troops from this still non-existent army. As we have learned from our sources, no Caucasian government will finance this crazy and extremely dangerous project. But I am amazed by something else: why, under what right does this Confederation intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign Georgia? We consider that the resolution of this old conflict in the Tskhinvali Region is an internal matter for the Republic of Georgia, and no one has the right to dictate terms, let alone threaten the brandishing of arms.

[Tsetskhadze] Do you meet often with the Georgian military leaders? What is the range of questions discussed jointly by you?

[Beppayev] At present there are no major problems being settled. We basically meet in order to hold consultations. I must not conceal the fact that we are often asked professional advice which, if this is considered useful, is adopted and if not, discarded. In a word, ordinary professional meetings and consultations are under way. I feel that they are bringing mutual good. We have problems which are of mutual interest. We intend to collaborate most closely with the new military structures of Georgia. Of course, officially this will happen only after the signing of the Russo-Georgian treaty. But contacts are being established even now. There is already a definite plan for interaction. I will say more: regardless of the fact that Georgia officially is not a member of the CIS, instructions have reached us in the district from the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Mar Shaposhnikov, on the greatest possible assistance and help to the Georgian side in the question of creating our own armed forces. For example, our colleagues have an acute need for an advisory staff. We are happy to help them in this.

[Tsetskhadze] Is it possible to view the withdrawal of the CIS forces from the hot spots of the Transcaucasus as the first step toward a complete withdrawal of the troops?

[Beppayev] Our recent steps are not linked to the general withdrawal of the troops, since the Internal Troops of the Russian MVD have basically been withdrawn from the

hot spots of the Transcaucasus, while the armed formations of the district still are there, but naturally are not involved in combat operations. We feel that the mission of imposing order in another state cannot be entrusted either to the army or particularly to the internal troops.

As for the questions of the complete withdrawal of troops from Georgia, it is still too early to speak about this, since lively talks are being held on this question from three sides: from the CIS Joint Armed Forces by the First Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Col Gen P. Grachev, from the Transcaucasus MD, by the district Commander, Lt Gen V. Patrikeyev and from the Georgian side by the Leader of the Georgian National Guard, Tengiz Kitovani. Even now the basic priorities have been set. For now the troops of Russia and the CIS will be stationed on republic territory, but they will not intervene in its internal affairs, in carrying out tasks related to the defense and guarding of the state frontiers. An understanding has also been reached on such a complex question as the question of transferring military installations to Georgia. We have reached the unanimous opinion that those facilities which are to be freed without fail will be turned over to the Georgian side and here by a transfer from balance sheet to balance sheet. We expect that these talks will conclude at the end of May.

Armenian Armed Forces Profiled

92UM1134A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, under the rubric: "National Armies: The View From Within": "Andranik, Bagramyan, Babadzhanyan... Strokes to the Portrait of the Armed Forces of Armenia"]

[Text] "They will not defend their Homeland on contract," Ashot Petrosyan, commander of the Armenian Armed Forces' first regiment, abruptly told me at the beginning of our interview when our conversation touched on the best way to man the army.

"Maybe that would be the best way to recruit the officer cadres," he began to reflect after having calmed down a bit. "But the times are such right now that we do not have a choice. An officer arrives in Armenia, is placed on the rolls at the Ministry of Defense, is approved for assignment through an order, and is immediately offered a position. We don't have time to haggle. For example, in our regiment, as they say, officers hit the ground running..."

The regiment (and it is an airborne-assault [desantno-shturmovoy] regiment) is just being formed but, based upon it, you can already imagine what other units in the Armenian Armed Forces will look like. They will perhaps be largely similar to units of the former Soviet Army already, because the officers who are involved with their formation attended a Soviet military school. From one of them—a Ministry of Defense associate—I

heard, in particular, that there was quite a bit that was bad in the USSR but not the army. In a word, the authorized organizational structure, as it was explained to me, will remain as before, just like command and control and the mode of army life.

And still changes are being planned, even if they are small ones. So, an assistant commander (a major) has been introduced to a regiment's staff. Warrant officers command platoons. Lt Col Ashot Petrosyan thinks that this will not only permit augmenting the lack of officers but will also promote strengthening military discipline. Incidentally, as they showed me, a pretty good training-educational process has been set up in the regiment. I did not manage to meet an untidily dressed soldier, sergeant, or officer or one who did not greet a senior by his military rank. The first weapons firings have been conducted in the unit and the soldiers and sergeants were quite happy with them.

The form of dress also has its own "complexion". It was obtained from CIS Unified Armed Forces depots and its cut is standard, but... If the field uniform is khaki-colored and the boots and striped vest are like what airborne officers had before, the beret is black. A depiction of the national flag and a symbol of the ages—whirling bright yellow petals are on the beret. This symbol was placed and is being placed on tombstones in Armenia. In the regiment, they think: since a soldier is always being subjected to danger, this symbol is appropriate for an Armenian airborne trooper.

In about two to three months, they propose introducing a single symbol on the uniform of Armenian servicemen, a mandatory element of which will become the national coat of arms—an eagle and a lion, holding a shield. Along with that, they also envision a symbol that reflects the designation and traditions of the unit in which a soldier serves. They will explain to the regiment's new recruits, whom we are discussing, the majority of whom took the oath on 24 May, that they are serving in the Armenian Armed Forces 1st Regiment and this is a responsibility and an honor.

"While copying the Soviet Army," noted Lt Col Ashot Petrosyan, "we are completely discarding the Communist ideology. And, of course, there will be no place in the army for political parties..."

The former political worker and military political academy graduate has completely broken off with the Communist ideology. The portraits and pictures that are in his office attest to the regimental commander's new passions. In the center is an image of Christ, to the left—a portrait of Armenian National Hero, General of the Russian Army Ozanyan Andranik, who distinguished himself in battles against Turkey, and on the right is the state flag and coat of arms.

Yerevan does not yet have a complete package of defense documents. But the 9 December 1991 Law "On Military Obligation" is in effect in the republic. It specifically provides for the duration of compulsory service—18

months. The Regulations on Performance of Military Duty by Officers, that was approved by the republic government on 30 March, corresponds to the letter of the law. This essentially is the well-known in the Soviet Army "sotyy prikaz" [100th Order] that has been reworked. The Regulation regulates service and defines the rights and duties of officers.

It has been established that the officer corps is manned by graduates of military educational institutions who have received officer ranks and by reserve officers, both conscripted for active duty in the event of need (for a period of up to three years) and those who enlist voluntarily, by warrant officers, primarily those who have a higher education and who have passed examinations through a middle military school program without attending lectures, and by women-volunteers with higher educations.

The officer corps is divided into junior, senior, and highest (from major-general to colonel-general, exclusively). This is an interesting fact. The highest military rank is the rank of major-general for officers of chemical, railroad, motor vehicle and road troops, the military topographic service, the material and material-technical supply services, and the finance service. The following maximum ages for service have been established: junior officers—up to 40 years of age, majors and lieutenant colonels—up to 45, colonels—up to 50 and, generals—up to 60 years of age. When necessary, the term of service may be extended for another five years.

The regulation regulates other rights and duties of officers. By way of illustration, it stipulates the right for a longer leave. It has been envisioned that officers with from 10-20 years of service will relax for 35 days, from 20-25 years—40 days, and more calendar years—45 days annually. A leave of that duration is also envisioned for those officers who are involved in flying duties, who serve in the border troops, and who perform alert duty (combat service) under especially difficult conditions.

The legally reinforced guarantees do not totally eliminate problems in the social sphere. The officers who have arrived in the republic for now do not know how they, for example, will be provided with housing. The salary issue has been resolved but they get 1,000 rubles per month less than their colleagues in Russia. Indeed, the officers with whom we managed to speak are not discouraged by this, their spirits are high—"We came here to defend our country which is in distress and that is the main thing, and the problems of everyday life will work themselves out."

The officers are arriving from various regions of the former Union. Captain Karen Markaryan has been assigned chief of staff of the 1st airborne-assault regiment. A native of Yerevan, he continuously served outside the republic. He arrived from Leningrad Military District where he recently was a deputy battalion commander. While introducing himself, Lt Col Remik Mardaryan said that he himself was still a guest in the

regiment. He has received an assignment but this was his first day at the unit. Mardaryan served as a political worker in the Soviet Army, then as assistant regimental commander for personnel—in the Transbaykal Military District. Now he has been assigned as deputy regimental commander.

The army is being formed at an accelerated rate. On 28 May, subunits of many of the branches of the armed forces were present at a parade in Yerevan on a national holiday. The Ministry of Defense, which Vazgen Sarkisyan, a writer and journalist in the recent past, heads, has been established and is functioning. His ministry deputies and directorate heads are military men who have been through the reputable school of the Soviet Army. Deputy Chief of the General Staff Major-General Mkrtichan Abramyan has over 25 years of service behind him. He served in the communications troops, is well acquainted with the command and control system and, therefore, he received, as they say, an appropriate post. The army's organizational development concept has been developed by military experts. It will consist of division-sized and smaller units of the ground forces, air force units, and air defense.

It is understandable that the military would like to obtain a bit more military equipment. They are calculating the quota. This quota, experts of the Russian Center to Ensure Realization of the Arms Reduction Treaties explained, is being determined using the "generalized indicator" which is being calculated while considering the area, population, and length of borders. For Armenia, it equals 2.8 and that means that the republic is claiming 568 tanks, 560 armored personnel vehicles, and 368 pieces of artillery. And just what is 568 tanks? That is nearly six tank regiments or two tank divisions. And if you add to that another two motorized-rifle divisions, a pair of artillery brigades, and several special purpose units? Isn't that a lot for a republic with a population of 3,000,000?

Recently, here they are increasingly inclined toward the thought that they need to structure defense with emphasis on collective security. The attitude toward Russia is also changing after the signing of the Treaty on Collective Security in Tashkent. It seems that, in Yerevan, they have understood that it is quite a bit better to have Russia as a reliable ally than as an enemy. Fundamental agreements were achieved on a number of issues, including military issues, during the Russian delegation's visit to Armenia (General of the Army Pavel Grachev was a member of the delegation). Specifically, Russia's 7th Army will be gradually withdrawn from Armenia. An agreement has also not been excluded on the temporary presence of Russian troops on Armenian territory. The Armenians think that participation in a system of collective security will permit them to structure the armed forces with the least expenditures.

Today a national army is not just units that have been formed. Border troops subunits with self-defense detachments are deployed along the border with Azerbaijan.

We can consider all of these subunits to be part of the army being created. Vazgen Sarkisyan has repeatedly stated publicly that Armenia already has its own army and it is on the border with Azerbaijan.

In Armenia, they talk about the high spirit of Armenian self-defense fighters: "They are prepared to fight and to give their lives for the republic." But obviously it can also be a question of the advantage of officer training. The seizure on 8 May of Shushi and some other heavily reinforced areas that were held by the Azerbaijanis prior to that time demonstrated that the Armenian subunits operated with a surprising degree of tactical skill. Experts think that officers of the former Soviet Army of the Armenian nationality and possibly from the Armenian Ministry of Defense structures led their operations.

Armenia, one can say, is in a state of war. The press strikes the eye with references to exchanges of fire in border areas and about new victims. But I did not have the opportunity to hear that the army is being created to conduct the ongoing war from the officers, soldiers, and self-defense fighters. At the same time, I had the opportunity to hear in conversations: they say, if they unleash a full-scale war against us, Armenians will prove themselves. Later, they pronounced the names Ozanyan Andranik, Ivan Bagramyan, Amazasp Babadzhanyan... They name other marshals and generals of the Armenian nationality who proved themselves, as we all know, in various wars.

From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA "Dossier"

The Ministry of Defense is experiencing difficulties right now in officer cadres, especially in shortage specialties. But the influx of returning officers from the Commonwealth countries is increasing. As of 1 January 1992, 0.5 percent Armenians were serving in the Unified Armed Forces among officers but the strength of their Diaspora is in fourth place after Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. In military educational institutions, 0.7 percent of students and cadets are of the Armenian nationality.

CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

Niyazov on Turkmenistan-Russia Joint Forces

92UM1137A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 25 May 92 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Meeting of S.A. Niyazov with Servicemen"]

[Text] Ashgabat, 23 May (Turkmen Press). Today at a meeting with servicemen, the President of Turkmenistan S.A. Niyazov announced a fundamentally new solution

to the fate of the armed forces stationed on the territory of Turkmenistan. The SVT, or Joint Forces in Turkmenistan, is the name to be given to the armed forces stationed in Turkmenistan, according to the bilateral agreement with Russia. The presidents of the two states have agreed to sign this at the beginning of June.

In speaking to the commanders of the military subunits, S.A. Niyazov stressed that the question of the armed forces had been repeatedly reviewed at the meetings of the CIS heads of states. A large number of agreements and treaties has been signed. But up to now they are only of a declarative nature and no one is carrying them out. At the last meeting in Tashkent, Turkmenistan refused to sign a treaty on collective security not because it did not agree with its articles. First of all, we must clearly settle the questions relating to the support of an army, pointed out S.A. Niyazov. It makes no sense for Turkmenistan to take under its jurisdiction, to establish its own army and be concerned with the sharing of military equipment. We propose not to separate but rather join our efforts in maintaining the troops with Russia. After the signing of the agreement, all the military formations will have the status of Joint Forces of Turkmenistan and Russia. The financing and logistic support will be provided by proportional participation of each side.

Turkmenistan is to provide the land, it is to supply the facilities with electricity, gas, water and also is to solve social problems. The servicemen can keep the citizenship of their country and at the same time have all the rights of a citizen of Turkmenistan. Command will be exercised by the Russian and Turkmen ministries of defense. The SVT will not be involved in carrying out internal matters in the republic. They are to be provided solely for defending the security of Turkmenistan and Russia. The National Guards which is presently being organized will help in maintaining internal law and order.

The main thing, S.A. Niyazov pointed out, is that the servicemen in Turkmenistan lack for nothing in defending the interests of Turkmenistan and Russia. The signing of similar agreements with the other CIS nations is possible.

The servicemen asked the President questions concerning the oaths, the legal status of the officers, improving the discipline of the soldiers called up from the republic territory, the training of military personnel and service promotions.

The settling of many of the servicemen's problems, the President replied, will be achieved after the signing of the agreement with Russia. The Government of Turkmenistan will do everything possible for improving the social situation of the servicemen.

Turkmenistan Decree On Length of Military Service

92UM1136A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 May 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Turkmenistan On Establishing the Length of Regular Military Service]

[Text] In accord with the Constitutional Law of Turkmenistan on Independence and the Bases of the State Organization of Turkmenistan, I Decree:

1. the length of regular military service upon induction to be set as follows:

- for seamen and warrant officers of the ships, vessels and combat support units of the Navy—2 years;
- for soldiers, seamen, sergeants and warrant officers with a higher education—1 year;
- for the remaining soldiers, seamen, sergeants and warrant officers—1 year and 6 months.

2. The action of the current Decree is to extend to servicemen in regular service inducted in the spring of 1992.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan
Ashgabat, 25 May 1992.

Turkmen Border Troops Deputy Appointed

92UM1136C Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 May 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Turkmenistan on Appointing Comrade A. Ovedzhev as the First Deputy Commander of the Central Asian Border District]

[Text] Major-General Allashukur Avedzhev is to be appointed the first deputy commander of the Central Asian Border District, having been released from the duties as chairman of the National Security Committee of Turkmenistan.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan
Ashgabat, 25 May 1992.

Turkmen National Security Committee Chairman Appointed

92UM1136B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 26 May 92 p 1

[Decree of the President of Turkmenistan on Comrade S. Seidov]

[Text] Comrade Saparmurat Seidov is to be appointed the chairman of the National Security Committee of Turkmenistan, having been released from the duties of the first deputy chairman of this same committee.

[Signed] S. Niyazov, president of Turkmenistan
Ashgabat, 25 May 1992.

(Biographic data on Comrade S. Seidov will be published in the following issue of the newspaper.)

Letter Urges Uzbek Students to Continue Studies

92UM1151A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jun First edition p 3

[Appeal from Lieutenant-General R. Akhmedov to military students under the rubric "Direct Line": "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and ITAR-TASS Transmitted the Following Yesterday From Tashkent"]

[Text] The Minister of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan directed this appeal to Uzbek cadets: Only one thing is demanded of you right now: Study."

Lieutenant-General R. Akhmedov said the following in an appeal to Uzbek cadets studying at military educational institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent States: "I am addressing you in connection with a recent, drastic increase in the number of letters and appeals requesting transfers to study at military educational institutions in your native republic.

"We thoroughly understand your motivation. As you know, however, officer training in the Republic of Uzbekistan is provided only in the areas of specialization of three higher military schools (combined-arms, tank and motor-vehicle).

"In view of the maximum number of cadets these schools can handle and their areas of specialization, it will be impossible in the immediate future for them to accommodate all Uzbek cadets studying outside the republic. Under Article 5 of the Agreement on the Principles for Manning the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed 15 May 1992, the Commonwealth member-states recognize the need to grant cadets and students the right to continue and complete their training at no cost to them at the military educational institutions at which they were enrolled prior to the signing of this Agreement.

"Right now your main duty is to be conscientious in your studies and in military discipline and to acquire the knowledge and skills which will be essential for building and developing the armed forces of a sovereign Uzbekistan. Upon graduating from the military educational institutions, you will be able to return to the homeland and serve the people."

MOLDOVA**Law on Social, Legal Protection for Moldovan Military**

925D0439A Chisinau MOLDOVA SUVERANA in Moldovan 9 Apr 92 p 3

[Law on Social and Legal Protection for Military Men and Their Families and for Citizens on Military Training]

[Text] The present law lays down norms for providing social and legal protection for the military of the Armed

Forces of the Republic of Moldova and their families and for citizens on military training [presumably conscripts], including reserves on active duty and citizens on compulsory military service at Defense Ministry training centers.

Regular and reserve officers of the Soviet Army who acquired Moldovan citizenship and are on its Armed Forces payroll will qualify for the rights and freedoms envisaged in the present law.

Decisionmakers found guilty of violating the legislation on social and legal protection for military men and their families and for citizens on military training will be prosecuted in compliance with the law.

Chapter I: Ensuring Political Rights and Freedoms

Art. 1—Political rights and freedoms

Military men and citizens on military training are entitled to participate in referendums, elections, and other political activities; they are also entitled to all the other civic political rights and freedoms envisaged by law. Military men may not belong to any party or other social-political organization.

Military men serving under contract [presumably career army], regardless of their rank and position, are entitled to be candidates for elected posts in the state apparatus. They will communicate the fact to their direct commander (superior) and will be exempted from their duties for the duration of the electoral campaign without being relieved from their position and will receive a salary in accordance with their military rank. Should a military man be elected to an active post in the state apparatus, he will resign from the Armed Forces. After the expiration of his term in office he may be rehired in the military service in accordance with the law on military duty and service for citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

Art. 2—Religious rights

Military men and citizens under military training are entitled to hold any faith and to practice religious rituals outside duty hours.

Chapter II: Ensuring Social Rights

Art 3—Ensuring the inviolability of the person

Military men and citizens on military training will be guaranteed the inviolability of their person, which consists of special state-provided protection of their personal rights and dignity.

Military men and citizens on military training may be arrested for common law offenses or other reasons in compliance with the laws of penal procedure; arrests for

disciplinary violations will be carried out in accordance with the disciplinary regulations of the Armed Forces.

Art. 4—The right to work

The time spent by military men and citizens on military training in the Armed Forces will be included in the overall, special, uninterrupted length of service. During their service they are not allowed to work second jobs. The state will guarantee jobs (normally according to their specialty) for retired military men of the Armed Forces, who will not be entitled to a pension for length of service, personnel cuts, health, or family reasons.

Art. 5—The right to rest

The five-day work week will be practiced in the Armed Forces. The working hours will be regulated by the daily schedule, which can be changed only by the commanding officer (chief) who approved it. Commanding officers (chiefs) are obligated to give military men and citizens on military training compensatory time off for rest for carrying out service duties outside the regular schedule.

During their regular service under contract military men will be obligatorily given a paid annual leave of at least 30 days.

Upon the decision of the unit commander (chief), military men may be given additional paid leave as an incentive, and leave for family reasons.

The manner of granting leave to military men will be established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government.

Expenses incurred by military men for travel to and from the place of holiday will be reimbursed to them by the Defense Ministry.

Art. 6—Health care rights

Military men and citizens on military training are entitled to free qualified medical care at Defense Ministry medical facilities. In case of need, upon the decision of military medical boards, military men and citizens on military training incapacitated by maiming, traumas, or wounds suffered on military duty may be treated at civil (private, cooperative, or state) medical facilities at the expense of the Defense Ministry.

Military men serving under contract are entitled to discounted vouchers to sanatoriums, rest homes, boarding houses, and tourist resorts in the republic.

The rights (perks) envisaged above will also be extended to regular troops who served under contract and were put on reserve duty or retired for length of service, age, or health reasons.

The manner of providing medical care and convalescence for military men will be established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government.

The expenses incurred for travel to and from the place of treatment will be reimbursed to the military men by the Defense Ministry.

Art. 7—The right to education

Citizens may study at military schools free of cost, on the basis of a contract signed between them and the Defense Ministry.

Military men serving under contract are entitled to enroll in evening or extramural studies at schools. The commanding officer (chief) is obligated to grant the military person in question, at his request, short paid leave for taking entry or final examinations.

Military men who served under contract for 10 years or more are entitled to study at the school of their choice at the expense of the Defense Ministry.

Reservists who enroll in evening or extramural studies are exempted from active duty, at their written request, for the duration of entry examination and after enrollment during examination sessions.

Citizens scheduled to be called up for military service (compulsory duty) who are students of universities, specialty colleges, vocational, and general schools, in both day and evening classes, are allowed to postpone their recruitment until graduation by the respective school.

Art. 8—The right to state insurance

Military men and citizens on military training are subject to [presumably qualify for] compulsory state insurance in case of loss of life or loss of working capability while exercising their service duties, for an amount equal to the sum of cash support means for 10 years, payable out of the military budget account.

The manner and conditions of payment of the insurance money are established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government.

Art. 9—The right to material provision

Military men will be completely provided for by the state with pay, food rations, and equipment out of the military budget account.

1. Pay

The level of military pay is established by the Defense Ministry in relation to military rank and length of service. The minimum position pay of military men serving under contract may not be lower than three minimum wages decreed in the republic. Military wages will be indexed in accordance with the law on indexing the cash incomes of the population.

Reservists on active duty will continue to receive the average wages for their principal job, as well as a cash remuneration from the Defense Ministry.

2. Food rations and equipment

Military men will receive food rations and equipment free of cost in accordance with the norms established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government. At the same time, upon written request, military men serving under contract are entitled to receive a compensation in money, products, or raw materials instead of food rations and equipment.

3. Housing

Military men in term service, reservists on active duty, and citizens on compulsory military training will be unconditionally housed out of garrison funds at the place of service. Service apartments must meet the standards established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government.

Military men serving under contract are entitled to receive from the Defense Ministry housing for themselves and family members living with them from the moment of being hired in the military apparatus to the expiration of their term in service in accordance with the contract signed. In such cases, officers will qualify for housing for one year of contract service, sergeants for three years, and troops for five years of uninterrupted military service.

Should housing not be available for military men and their families, the Defense Ministry is obligated to pay their rent.

For length of military service of 15 years or more under contract the Defense Ministry is obligated to assign military men housing in compliance with the standards envisaged by law, which they can claim as private property.

After 15 years of uninterrupted military service under contract, upon the request of the military man, the Defense Ministry may award him a money compensation in exchange for his apartment, as well as a land allocation for building a single home at a place of his choice and in accordance with the law. At the same time, military men are entitled to a long-term loan from the Defense Ministry. The local body of self-administration is obligated to assist the military man with receiving the land and building a single home on the site of his choice.

Should a military man be released from service for loss of working capability in the discharge of his duties, the Defense Ministry is obligated to allocate him housing upon request in compliance with the provisions of the law, or to pay him a money compensation in exchange for the housing space due to him, regardless of how long he served in the Armed Forces.

The manner of providing housing to military men will be established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government.

4. Pensions

Military pensions will be awarded in keeping with the law on military pensions.

Upon being transferred to the reserves or retired for length of service, age, or health reasons military men

who served under contract will receive a one-time money allocation equal to the sum of their cash means of support for one year.

5. Other types of provision

Military men serving under contract are entitled to plots of land, allocations, one-time payments, money compensations, and provisions made by the government for citizens of the Republic of Moldova on a general basis.

Military men serving in the Defense Ministry apparatus and chiefs of staff and commanders of military units will have telephones installed in their apartments within six months, and other military categories within three years of the date of being allocated housing.

Chapter III: Social Protection for Military Families

Art. 10—The right to social protection

Members of military families to whom the provisions of the present law extend are: wife (husband), parents, and children in the military person's care.

Military family members are entitled to all the political and social rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. The hardships and privations specific to military life that the families of military men serving under contract must endure will be compensated by the state by means of special privileges.

Art. 11—Health care

Family members of military men serving under contract will be entitled to free qualified medical care at military medical facilities of the Defense Ministry and discounted vouchers to spas, rest homes, boarding houses, and tourist resorts in the Republic of Moldova, at the expense of the Defense Ministry.

The manner of providing medical care and spa and resort accommodations for family members of military men serving under contract will be established by the Defense Ministry and approved by the government.

Expenses incurred for travel to and from the place of treatment by family members of military men serving under contract will be borne from the Defense Ministry account.

Employed family members of military men serving under contract will be given leave at their work place by the management of the enterprise, institution, or organization to coincide with that of the military man so that they can have their holiday together. In addition, once a year the Defense Ministry will pay the cost of their travel to and from the place of holiday.

Art. 12—Education

Upon the request of military men serving under contract, children of preschool and school age will be obligatorily enrolled in state schools for preschoolers and in general schools.

Children of military men who lost their lives in the discharge of their duties will be obligatorily enrolled in facilities for preschoolers, boarding schools, and similar institutes of education at the expense of the state; after passing entry examinations to universities and specialized schools they will be enrolled on a preferential basis and study free of cost.

Art. 13—Compensation rights

In the case of the violent death of a military man while serving in the army under contract, his family will receive from the Defense Ministry a one-time payment equal to the sum of the military man's cash support revenues for 10 years and housing in compliance with the standards established by law, regardless of the time served by the military man in the Armed Forces. In such cases the family will also receive a pension for loss of breadwinner, in compliance with the law.

Art. 14—Employment rights

Family members of military men serving under contract are entitled to preferential job placement if the military man is transferred to a new work place, and to retraining if the enterprise or institution that employed them is cutting personnel or closing down.

The overall length of service of family members of military men serving under contract will include the time spent in localities to which they traveled on duty with the military man and where they were unable to find jobs in their field.

Art. 15—Other types of social protection

Should a military man serving under contract change his work place for job-related reasons or at his request granted by the command, he and his family are entitled to have their household and personal possessions moved at the expense of the Defense Ministry.

The government and the Defense Ministry, as well as local self-administration bodies and organizations may pass additional measures for the social protection of military families.

[Signed] Mircea Snegur, president of the Republic of Moldova
Chisinau, 17 Mar 1992

DEFENSE INDUSTRY

TsNPO 'Vympel' Becomes Closed Corporation

92UM1145C Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian No 20, 11-18 Mar 92 p 5

[Article by Natalya Kalinichenko: "CIS Republics Establish the Big-Mac of Missile-Building Industry"]

[Text] In accordance with an international treaty between Russia, Ukraine and Byelarus, the constituent documents of the Vympel International Joint-Stock Corporation (MAK) are to be signed on 19 May.

The corporation will include only enterprises of the Vympel Central Scientific-Production Association (TsNPO), which is responsible for the entire complex of jobs from designing to producing space defense missile equipment on the territory of the former USSR, and which has found itself threatened with shut-down following the USSR's disintegration.

The corporation is being established in the form of a closed joint-stock company with charter capital in an amount of 3,220,000,000 rubles [R], created by the Russian State Property Committee (60 percent), the Ukrainian State Property Fund (34 percent) and the Committee for Control of State Property under the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Byelarus (5 percent).

In compliance with Resolution No 52-2 of the Committee for Operational Control of the USSR National Economy dated 22 November 1991, the Vympel TsNPO became the successor to the USSR Ministry of Radio Industry as regards implementing programs to create and operate ISV-48 and RP-412 radio-engineering systems and defensive equipment. Following the disintegration of the USSR, the main scientific and technical potential of the TsNPO was found to be concentrated on Russian territory, while the main production capacities were in Ukraine and Byelarus.

According to a report from representatives of the organizing committee of the Vympel MAK, selection of the joint-stock form of organization made it possible to preserve unity in the system for managing work in strategic programs. According to a report from Nikolay Mikhaylov, general director of the present Vympel TsNPO, every founder of the corporation will contribute the fixed and working capital of enterprises under the jurisdiction of the corresponding state (the enterprises of the corporation continue to be legal entities) as its share.

Russia's share of the corporation's charter fund is estimated at R1,930,000,000, Ukraine's share is R1,115,000,000, and Byelarus is contributing something around R175 million. According to calculations of the TsNPO the profit of the corporation, which is oriented predominately on orders from the defense ministries of these countries, will attain R470 million in 1992, while centralized capital investments will reach R127 million.

According to a report from Mikhail Kalinin, the deputy chief of the Main Administration for the Privatization of Industry and the Military-Industrial Complex of the Russian State Property Committee, partial privatization of the enterprises included within the corporation is probable in the future. According to the constituent documents the corporation is to draft the plans for privatizing the enterprises or independent subunits.

In the opinion of experts from TVERDYY ZNAK, the nominal value of MAK shares, set at R1,000, is evidence of the intention of the founders to distribute the shares, over a certain amount of time, among as large a number of shareholders possible, so as not to permit effective control by them.

Despite the fact that Russia was selected as the country of local registration, in drawing up the constituent documents the organizers arrived at a compromise that accounts for Ukrainian and Byelarusian legislation.

Mikhail Kalinin communicated to a TVERDYY ZNAK correspondent that the most serious problems arose in regard to property appraisal due to differences in procedures. As a result a decision was made to estimate the contributions to the corporation's charter fund—exclusively property contributions—on the basis of residual balance value. Because of the absence of the appropriate procedures, the intellectual contribution to the corporation was not accounted for.

Experts from TVERDYY ZNAK note that organization of the Vympel corporation creates a serious precedent for coordinating the economic legislation of the three CIS republics.

Tarasuk of Conversion Subcommittee Interviewed

92UM1145B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA in Russian 29 May 92 p 1

[Interview with Yuriy Fedorovich Tarasuk, chairman of the Conversion Subcommittee of the Russian Supreme Soviet by Adel Kalinichenko; Moscow, St. Petersburg; date of interview not given: "A Fitting Session for Tens of Millions: It's Hard to Sew Civilian Clothes Out of a Uniform"]

[Text] The process of conversion is in fact similar to sewing civilian clothing out of a military uniform. First it has to be undone. This is what everyone working on conversion is doing now. Sewing old clothing from the old material is the second stage. The tailors are in place. And perhaps foremost among them is Yuriy Fedorovich Tarasuk, chairman of the Conversion Subcommittee of the Russian Supreme Soviet:

[Tarasuk] Our subcommittee has been working on legislative support to conversion for a long time. And to our great satisfaction, we were able to adopt a law on conversion in late March. For the first time in the history of our country and other countries, a law regulates mutual relations between the state and enterprises

undergoing conversion. Conversion is leading to serious social consequences everywhere. When military purchases are reduced by even 3-5 percent, something close to a crisis arises. But the reduction now occurring in our country is 88 percent! I am referring to military purchases in the first quarter of this year. The state is our main wholesale customer. And correspondingly, the state is obligated to compensate the enterprises for money they don't receive, and inform them as to what its future reductions in purchases would be over 2 years, so that the enterprise could orient itself appropriately in this situation.

In America such a law underwent nine hearings, but it never was adopted. In the USA, all military industry is in private hands, and military production is more flexible: Enterprises produce not military equipment alone, but all kinds of things—from pots and pans to private airplanes for the recreational flyer. Things are easier for them. But in our country.... Were the law to be enacted at least by the 28th of December, before the new year, a catastrophically large reduction would not occur. But once this happens, the state must automatically take responsibility for compensating enterprises for the money they fail to make. As for the reduction, it is occurring for a number of reasons. Primary among them is the reexamination of who our friends and enemies are. Our former adversaries are becoming friends. It is time to beat our swords into plowshares.

[Kalinichenko] How quickly can that be done?

[Tarasyuk] The universality with which our industry has been militarized makes it impossible to work quickly. Everything from military plants to factories sewing mittens has been invaded by defense industry through and through. And our problem is that we are unable to terminate financing of defense industry.

Yes, we have more tanks than all other countries put together, but when we reduced military production by seven and a half times as of the second of January, a collapse occurred. Defense industry directly employs tens of millions of people. From 8,000 to 10,000 children's day care centers were attached to the richest defense enterprises. Schools and housing were dependent upon defense industry. Entire cities such as Severodvinsk and hundreds of others lived solely off of the defense complex. This is why we are obligated to continue producing tanks and other unneeded armament, so that the lives of millions of people would not be ruined, and so that schools, day care centers and cities inhabited by people could stay alive.

Second, if we allow only 2 or 3 months to beat these swords into plowshares, the resulting product would be primitive: spoons, pots, tin cups—things that are produced in wartime. But if we support the largest enterprises with subsidies and tax advantages over a period of 3 years, we could then count on civilian products of greater complexity: civilian airplanes, for example, in place of military ones.

[Kalinichenko] Are assets allocated by the state for conversion being spent on technical progress, or are they being spent on day-to-day needs?

[Tarasyuk] For the moment they are being spent on day-to-day needs. The conversion assets that had been allocated in the first quarter were spent almost entirely on unemployment benefits. And now the amount being invested is by far larger. Conversion is ravaging the state today. It is therefore no accident that we are paying an exorbitant added value tax, which is essentially a sales tax. That is, this tax spirals upward by a factor of 10 in the course of an article's manufacture. But as a result of this highway-robbery tax, the state does have some money, which it spends to support defense enterprises in view of the impossibility of the situation.

But there is hope. Now that defense enterprises have come to understand the irreversibility of this process, they have stirred into motion, and they have started making and introducing various developments more intensively. All of this is difficult for the moment. If for example we are unable to solve the problem of mutual debts and nonpayments within 2 weeks' time, all major defense enterprises will grind to a halt. But I think that we will keep this from happening.

Ukraine to Develop Civilian Version of 'Zenit' Missile System

92UM1118B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Correspondent Sergey Ilchenko, Dnepropetrovsk: "They Have Divided the Country. Now Let's Divide Outer Space"]

[Text] Dnepropetrovsk Missile Building Association, Yuzhnyy Machine Building Plant and Yuzhnaya Design Bureau received a Ukrainian government special assignment for the development and manufacture of the third stage of the "Zenit" space missile complex.

"Zenit" is considered to be one of the most effective space systems in the world and the degree of its automation generally does not have any equals. Two stages, the production of which had already been set up in the Dnieper area in the 1980's, are sufficient for the combat use of this complex. The order for the third stage, intended to place various objects into orbit, was at one time transferred to a Moscow KB [design bureau]. However, today contacts between rocket builders-colleagues in all probability have been cut off to the extent that the Ukrainian side considers it more reasonable to spend millions on the manufacture of its own design.

"Zenit" will more than pay for itself with the successful realization of the civilian project. Judging by already existing agreements, the countries of Asia will become the most promising clients of this "space carriage for hire" and it will be launched from its own launch pad at Baykonur. Although the circle of possible partners may be much broader. It is an eloquent coincidence—

immediately after Ukrainian Prime Minister V. Fokin personally visited YuMZ [Yuzhnny Machine Building Plant] PO [Production Association] and issued the assignment for the third stage, L. Kuchma, the general director of this association, flew to the United States as part of President L. Kravchuk's official delegation.

'Kamov', 'Group Vector' to Jointly Develop New Combat Helicopter

92UM1123A Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian 6 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondents Viktor Belikov and Viktor Litovkin: "Russia and USA in Joint Combat Helicopter Effort"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The famous Russian helicopter firm of N. Kamov has signed a contract with the American company of Group Vector for joint production and sales of the new Ka-50 rotary-wing aircraft.

This is the first business contract of this kind concluded by aircraft makers of the two countries. This craft constitutes a new generation of ground-attack helicopter, which is designed to engage tanks and other armored vehicles and provide direct combat support of ground forces. Chief executive designer V. Mikheyev, speaking this past winter at an international conference held in Great Britain, announced his collective's involvement with the helicopter and listed the craft's principal technical characteristics.

The Ka-50 is so impressive that it has been assigned the NATO code name of "Hokum." A distinguishing feature is its carrying of only one person, while its domestic brothers-in-arms and foreign counterparts carry a crew of two men. Piloting of the craft and control of the powerful weapons are linked with a heavy complement of electronics, which range from a laser sight to a system that permits flying at minimum altitudes by following terrain relief.

The cockpit, accorded complete armor protection, is now provided with an ejection seat. Two domestic turbojet engines propel the craft - via so-called coaxial main rotors - to speeds in excess of 300 kilometers per hour and endow it with a high order of maneuverability. The helicopter's size renders it transportable by the Il-76. The Ka-50 has won such early acclaim that it has appeared in a feature film. Expectations are that by the end of the year it will be adopted by the Russian Air Force and by Army aviation units.

Representatives of the Kamov firm choose not to disclose any details on their agreement with the American company, but it is safe to assume that the Hokum will be fitted with weapons systems, radio communication gear, and navigation equipment made in the West. The West is more familiar with the Ka-50's potential customers and can position it for more successful competition in the foreign aviation marketplace.

Creation of Military-Industrial Corporation in St Petersburg

92UM1145A Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA* in Russian 6 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Yelena Kolokoltseva: "Privatization of Defense Industry: A Military-Industrial Corporation Is Established in St. Petersburg"]

[Text] While the highest echelons of power are actively debating the paths and methods of privatization, defense industry is actively undergoing denationalization.

The recently formed St. Petersburg Military-Industrial Corporation (SPb VPK) can serve as an example of such introduction of state structures into market relations. Its founders included the city's defense enterprises—among them the Impuls Scientific-Production Association, the Pozitron Scientific-Production Association, the plant imeni Kalinin and others, as well as stock-exchange unions and joint-stock companies oriented on defense industry. The founders of the firm also include Baltic joint-stock companies and the reasonably well known Military-Industrial Investment Company (VPIK), which was brought into being under the canopy of the Ministry of Defense around a year ago.

The charter fund of the Military-Industrial Corporation is small for the moment, being around 500 million rubles. The company's shares will be distributed by two means—part of them through the Leningrad Stock Exchange and brokerages of the VPIK at market prices, and another part at nominal cost among colleagues of the enterprises and interested persons. The assets accrued will be invested in the form of short- and medium-term investments in projects promising a fast return. The immediate plans of the corporation include investments into food processing technology, into reactivation of old oil wells, and so on. But in the words of its founders, the strategic goal of the corporation is to prevent the total disintegration of defense sectors possessing a high scientific and technical potential, and to subsequently enter the international market. A truly noble goal. The fact that a number of production operations of Soviet defense industry can not only become the means of obtaining hard currency but also ensure reequipment of Russian industry in general cannot be doubted. Moreover there is nothing criminal about transition of Soviet companies to privatization initially by way of establishing a joint-stock company. Moreover this path has been used quite successfully in both Western Europe and Latin America. On the one condition, however, that privatization through establishment of joint-stock companies remains but one and not the sole means of introducing state structures into the market, and that all of this proceeds under government surveillance, rather than in an uncontrolled manner, or more accurately, under good control but not by central economic departments.

Financial Problems at Krasnoyarsk Missile Plant

92UF0469A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 9 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Vitaliy Pyrkh: "We Built Missiles, and Covered the Yenisey, But Now the Pride of the Country's Defense Industry—Siberia's Krasmash Plant, Is Living a Life of 'Economic Absurdity'"]

[Text] Never before in the history of this famous Krasnoyarsk plant—the pride of the country's defense industry—had it experienced as difficult a period as now.

"We have already been working half a year without a contract with our client, the Ministry of Defense," said V. Gupalov, general director of Krasmash. "We are working, but we have no idea who is going to pay us."

And this is at a plant that began conversion back in 1988 at its own initiative, without waiting for direction from above. Even before, Krasnoyarsk workers manufactured more than just missiles. Who, for example, is not familiar with the Biryusa refrigerator? Just last year over 7,000 units were produced. In order to modernize and expand their production, a contract for construction of compressors at the Krasnoyarsk plant was signed with the Japanese. A decision was made to also build a shop producing freezers with the assistance of foreign firms.

But is Krasmash really famous only for refrigerators? As I walked through the shops of the enormous plant, I was astounded by the extent to which production has been transformed in just a few months! Not every specialized plant in the country is able to keep up with the Siberians in production of medical equipment. They have initiated production of a machine unit for quick preparation of sterile flushing solutions, an endoscopic unit used to repair the hip joint, and a device for surgical treatment of lumbar scoliosis. And what about the kneading machine, and the meat and meat product processing systems? This is not to mention the fact that when they switched to peaceful rails, Krasnoyarsk workers began production of growth furnaces in which to grow silicon monocrystals capable of ensuring a leap forward in the country's electronics industry.

In short, you can't tell right away whether this is a peacetime or military plant. Last year the proportion of defense production dropped here to 30 percent of the total production volume (back in 1986 it exceeded 70). The plant workers probably have the moral right to completely halt production of military products this year. Why should such production go on, if it is not being paid for? Nonetheless, the machine builders continue to assure the government that such production cannot be stopped, since later on even God himself would be unable to get it started up again. The government agrees, but in the same instant it trips the enterprise up.

For example the government froze the currency account of Krasmash, the contents of which were earned honestly, by the way, without any violations. Rather than

selling part of the currency and paying the workers, Krasmash had to take out loans. This alone, in the words of the enterprise's chief economist, A. Gagarin, resulted in losses in the millions.

Today, pennies have to be counted everywhere and in all things. The cost of caring for a child at a day care center has jumped from 800 rubles to R18,000, and the plant supports 27 such centers. Maintenance of plant housing requires deduction of R67 million. And then there are also the plant vocational-technical school, hospital and Pioneer camps. Does it really make any sense to pay for all of this with loans?

I toured the former "military" shop, where meat processing systems are being manufactured today in place of missiles, and I was amazed. When one such system was delivered to a local meat-packing plant, local specialists were dumbstruck. There was no way they could believe that all of this had been built not "beyond the hills," but right here next door. Still, systems ready for shipment are just standing here. Beautiful, made from stainless steel, carefully packaged. There are no customers. Our "merchants" prefer to travel abroad for such goods—they are more prestigious, and you could get wealthy off of them. But the fact that such equipment requires investment of a million dollars, while the Krasnoyarsk analogue costs several million rubles, is not taken into account.

No, the collective of Krasmash no longer hopes for help from the Russian government. They forgot about this defense plant in their haste there. This is why Krasnoyarsk workers organized a concern in place of the former production association: Together, they just can't stay afloat any longer. But even the concern needs currency, it needs some sort of advantages, so that conversion wouldn't transform into an ordinary economic diversion, as the plant workers validly lament.

Prospects for Russian Defense Industry Examined

92UM1152A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian

17 Jun 92 First edition p 2

[Article by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dolgikh and Captain 3d Rank and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Yu. Gladkevich: "The Defense Complex of Russia: A Temporary Indisposition?"]

[Text] Such a posing of the question at present in no way seem far-fetched. In any event, many agreed with this at a seminar held for the leaders of the senior management level of the defense enterprises on "Economics, Conversion and Problems of National Security of the Fatherland." In actuality, what awaits the defense complex of Russia?

The Soviet military-industrial supergiant which was so organically incorporated into the world arms race process, at present has ceased to exist as a single whole. Scores and hundreds of enterprises, scientific and design facilities working for the defense needs of the USSR have

now become the property of the "near overseas," that is, the CIS countries and of other states which are not CIS members. This breaking up of the organism developed in the Union for defense purposes has been carried out, if it can be so said, by the method of random selection. Hence, the structure of the defense industry inherited by Russia is far from an optimum one and actually is detrimental.

In the first place, much of what is essential, and without which the defense of the state cannot be ensured or only ensured with difficulty, has remained on the other side of the Russian frontier. Secondly, Russia at present is burdened down with the presence of certain defense industries and facilities which, like it or not, we must get rid of...

It is impossible to conceive of the nature and degree of indisposition of the Russian defense complex if one does not take into account the overall state of affairs in the nation's economy. And this, as is known, is not brilliant.

Against this background, the fate of the enterprises in the Russian defense complex appears tragic. Some 1,125 scientific research institutes, design bureaus, production associations and enterprises in the Russian defense industry have actually been put on starvation diets. In comparison with last year, the allocations have been reduced by 60 percent and the centralized supply of raw materials and preassembled articles, as they say, is a matter of ancient history. The previously existing horizontal ties have been disrupted while the establishing of such ties on the new principles of collaboration is virtually impossible due to the absence of the means to life according to the laws of the market, the political complexities of cooperating with partners in the presently independent states of the former Union, and the difficulties of operating many defense enterprises in "hot spots."

As a result, the losses of production during the current year will reach, according to certain forecasts, to over 50 billion rubles. More than 900 enterprises will be operating at a loss. The number of unemployed thrown out the gate of the defense enterprises by the end of the year can reach 1.5 million persons (at present the Russian defense industry employs a total of some 5.5 million persons).

In speaking to the leaders of the defense enterprises, the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, Mar Avn Ye. Shaposhnikov, pointed out that at present we are reaping the fruit of unwise experimentation in the conversion area and this has caused great harm to the Russian defense industry. One can only agree with this. A number of foreign and domestic scientists has repeatedly pointed out that the optimum degree of conversion is 5-8 percent of the composition of the entire defense industry (precisely such a figure has been adopted in the U.S.). But we have decided to "convert" all at once up to 30 percent of the enterprises, that is, conversion has assumed the nature of a landslide.

Many Russian newspapers and magazines have described the "willy-nilly conversion." For the sake of fairness, let us point out that at times the defense enterprises have achieved certain successes here. For example, the Tula Shtamp [Die] Machine Building Plant two years ago was deprived of military orders and at a price of extraordinary effort all the same was able to convert to producing peacetime products. Without any "outside" investments, it nevertheless was able to replace the equipment and at present is turning out products which are in high demand such as samovars, gas stoves, chandeliers and fire extinguishers... The largest artillery plant in the Kama River Area is ready to convert to producing oil field pumps which are in acute shortage. These pumps had been produced as a monopoly at the Baku Plant which was well known in all the oil fields. The aviation repair plant in Nizhniy Tagil which used to repair MIGs, has begun to rebuild the Yak-18 aircraft which have served their lives but which can be operated in sports and private aviation...

In the opinion of certain experts, the production of military equipment at the defense enterprises could give greater advantage to our nation for on the world market, the demand for our military products still exists.

An example of this is the recent talks in Moscow with the President of South Africa F. De Klerk, during which the guest was interested in the possibility of purchasing our combat aviation equipment, lasers and other science-intensive products.

So possibly it is worth taking a look around and seeking out potential purchasers for the products of our defense industry? Perhaps the decision for this will be taken on the highest level and the corresponding order issued to the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and to the foreign trade organizations?

It is obvious that at present our government in essence does not have a well-planned conversion program. But could it have this? Russia for the first time over the last more than 70 years has become an independent state. There is still much that it must define, including what sort of defense industry it needs. But how can this be done if we still have not worked out a position on the fundamental questions such as on the system of Russia's national interests and a concept of national security? If a military doctrine has not been formulated, there is no clear notion of the system of military threats.

In truth, at present fundamental discussions are under way in the competent circles on the questions of the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces, including their optimization in accord with the present realities, both domestic and foreign political (an example of this is the recent scientific conference at the General Staff Academy on "Military Security of Russia"). But discussions are not yet decisions...

The Russian First Deputy Minister of Defense, Andrey Kokoshin, in speaking to the leaders of the defense enterprises at the seminar, assured them that during the

next six-eight weeks the politicians and military specialists will reach an understanding on the essence of Russia's national interests, they will formulate its military doctrine and this in turn will make it possible to determine the fate of each defense plant, scientific research institute and design bureau. This was reaffirmed by the leaders of the Russian Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Defense in the course of a trip to Tula. The information is promising. All the same, as it seems to us, we do not have a reserve of time to provide the nation with a clear concept of conversion and to take its implementation under dependable governmental control.

Certainly it is not the job of journalists to give recommendation to politicians and specialists. But many scientists, including at the World Economy Institute, as well as the representatives of the defense industry feel that extraordinary measures are required. For Russia, it is extremely important to keep the existing scientific and technical potential in order, and with the appearance of favorable conditions, the defense industry is to manufacture the combat equipment and weapons which are essential to the Russian Army and meet the most modern demands. We must not allow the irretrievable loss of industrial and technological potential or the degradation and disqualification of most experienced personnel.

No matter how much one would wish to lift from the state the concern for the defense complex and shift to the enterprises themselves the burden of entering the market and surviving in it, this is an impossible path. All the more as the defense plants have ended up with empty pockets precisely due to the fault of the state structures. So state protection is indispensable for both those who as before will work for national defense as well as those from whom such a task can be lifted. It would be hard to say just what such protection would consist of. Possibly in encouraging investments being channeled into structural reorganization, the rearming of the defense enterprises, excluding [from taxation] the profits going for such investments, for a system of taxation and easy crediting for these purposes...

Of course, Russia is unable to support everything that it has inherited from the Union military-industrial complex. But if the nation wants to maintain the defense complex, we feel, it is essential to make every effort and concentrate the available means on the most important areas, on supporting the strongest scientific, design and production collectives. To all of those who do not fit within the framework of the new defense system, it is time once and for all to state frankly that they are completely free to choose their further fate. But it is impossible to abandon, as Andrey Kokoshin stated in the course of the trip to Tula, the enterprises which are converting without any state support. There must be consistent work to provide their collectives with the right to privatize the enterprises and to organizing mixed-ownership enterprises where the controlling batch of shares would be in the hands of the state. Finally, it is essential to draw up and publish a list of the "public"

enterprises the collectives of which could calmly, feeling themselves securely socially protected, carry out their job which may not be profitable but extremely important and essential for the nation.

In this work the state can be aided by nonstate structures which are capable of investing funds into defense. Chiefly these would be domestic commercial banks, exchanges, private stock capital and various investment companies. For example, the Military Industrial Investment Company (VPIK). This is headed by V. Doguzhiyev, a person well known in the industrial and financial circles of Russia. The VPIK has already invested a good deal of money into the development of promising types of production and is prepared to do this in the future.

In a word, there are opportunities for the state management of the process of the structural reorganization and optimization of the Russian defense complex. Much depends upon how these will be carried out. And above all, will the inferiority complex in the Russian defense complex take hold, or will it, in going through a stage of temporary indisposition, recover. And the need for this recovery goes beyond the mere internal Russian. The Russian defense complex is also essential for supporting the system of collective security of the states in the former Union and for righting the geopolitical equilibrium in the world which was upset by the collapse of the USSR.

DOCTRINAL ISSUES

Five-Branch Structure to be Preserved

92UM1107B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 13 May 92 p 1

[Article by Aleksey Zyuchenko: "Russia to Have Own Strategic Missile Forces"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Viktor Barykin, first deputy chief of the General Staff, speaking in yesterday's parliamentary hearings on defense legislation, stated that, for the transitional period between now and the year 2000, the structure of the Russian Armed Forces will remain identical to that of the former Union, consisting of five branches. Thus, the Russian Army will include Strategic Missile Forces along with similar forces of the CIS, at least until the end of the century. The program of construction of the Russian Armed Forces proposed by the General Staff - including this provision - was submitted to President Yeltsin and approved by him on 6 May.

As of 1 May, the strength of the Armed Forces presently under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation amounts to 2.8 million men. Reductions in the Army will continue in stages; strength by the end of 1995 will fall to 2.1 million men, and then to 1.5 million by the year 2000. The nationwide programs of reductions in

manpower and weapons will cost the Russian treasury 1.5 trillion rubles, or 220 billion rubles a year, by the year 2000.

Relative to the prospects of Russia's creating her own PVO [Air Defense Forces], Viktor Barynkin stated that there undoubtedly will be gaps in radar coverage in the airspace over the former Union in the event these troops are split up, but the experience of the last few years has taught us that we may "rely on our neighbor, but Kravchuk may let us down."

New Russian Doctrine: Threat Perception

*92UM1107A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 May 92 p 2*

[Article by Valentin Larionov under the "Polemika" rubric: "Whence a Military Threat?: More on Russian Military Doctrine"; first two paragraphs are NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA introduction]

[Text] Boris Yeltsin announced the other day that the writing of a Russian military doctrine will be completed in the near future.

The article below, dealing with this topic, was written in response to Daniil Proektor's "A Threat from all Directions?" (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, No 68, 8 April 1992). Since there obviously is more to be said in this area, the editors of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA intend to continue this discussion.

From the entire spectrum of existing problems, the writer of the referenced article selected one that is probably most sensitive and basic: Who is our enemy? Whence can we expect Russian security to be threatened? How are we to counter this threat, and what kind of army are we to possess with respect to size, makeup, and expenditures? These considerations are valid, of course, in thinking of a future whereby attempts to prevent or neutralize a military threat would be unsuccessful, with a war of some scale of magnitude becoming a reality.

To prevent a situation such as the one wisely depicted in Puskhin's fable of "expecting the enemy to arrive from the South, but look! there he is, coming from the East," Professor Proektor suggests that we simply "dispense with the burden of preparing for waging war against all developed democracies." According to him, the principal threat has shifted, residing now "within the CIS and Russia."

In a word, if there is an enemy, we ourselves may be he. Hence the need for a suitable military doctrine (the topic to be discussed below) and for the priorities to be pursued in constructing an army.

But hold on there! Could this be another case of erroneous military thinking that is so much a part of us Russians? The esteemed professor himself makes mention of this. Our country has a history of a period of

extreme readiness for waging a nuclear war; of quite a protracted propaganda effort against the "communism containment doctrine," a time when we uselessly impoverished the country for the sake of promoting doubtful values of revolutionary movements existing in Third World countries; and of speculative forecasts of the consequences associated with losing the Cold War.

The above considerations point to the fact that a detailed study of our history would produce cases where our military construction was to some extent based on a real threat. However, a major role in the planning and execution of our military and political measures was often played by considerations of a speculative nature. This is where our civilian and military ideologists worked so hard, without fear of committing excesses. They indeed did hone their skills in their shaping of our ideas as to what the enemy would be like.

And, incidentally, this expertly crafted model of the enemy served as a justification for the excessive expenditures for defense; for malfeasance on the part of the leaders of the military-industrial complex; failure of the communistic plans for improving the people's welfare; the supersecrecy; arbitrariness of the KGB; ideological censorship of works of art and literature; and of a great many other things.

All the above things no longer exist. It seems that we are now eradicating the mental picture of the enemy we used to hold. However, does this mean that there no longer is any external threat to Russia's security and integrity, that we must turn inwardly the focus of the military and defensive structures? In other words, are we to assess all dangers only in terms of ourselves? I think not.

First, it is necessary to possess a defense against an external threat so that Russia will be treated as an independent and sovereign state. Short of that, we will not be able to consolidate our statehood. This in the final analysis constitutes a factor in maintaining strategic stability. Any democratic country that has dealings with Russia will accept that. Security at present is an item of mutual interest.

Second, who can disagree with D. Proektor's contention that the danger of a large-scale war has lessened considerably. If anything, the time has finally arrived when Russian military policy has been relieved of the burden of preparing to wage a war against the Western and Eastern democracies. However, expenditures for achieving technological improvements in weapons (NIOKR) [scientific research and experimental design work] in all countries are not decreasing, even in an environment of diminishing expenditures for arms purchases, combat training, etc. Weapons will become ever more complex and smarter. The human being will continue to be phased out of handling of weapons, with his functions turned over to computers.

The above conditions are associated with deterioration in the assurance of control of weapons. There will be a

need for systems permitting mutual technological control, for the purpose of preventing a war which could be caused by technological miscalculation or accident. This means that it is essential to have early warning systems [sistemy rannego preduprezhdeniya] that could prevent the occurrence of dangerous incidents on the earth, in the air, at sea, and in space. There is a need for technical monitoring of agreements made relative to arms limitations and reductions. Finally, civil defense forces should be in a constant state of readiness, with their capability not limited to a national level.

The forces mentioned above as suitable for their associated missions are not suitable for preventing and quelling conflicts arising within the country. That, so to speak, is a horse of a different color.

Finally, we must provide for external threats that may spring up on the borders of Russia in the event low-key interethnic disputes assume international proportions. With internationalization of such events, Russia must possess the capability to keep these disputes within definite bounds.

An internal threat - the principle object of D. Proektor's attention - obviously constitutes an item requiring another forecasting technique, other forces, and another method of reacting. The specific nature of this threat cannot be determined with any degree of success. One thing however is clear: To counter threats in the nature of interethnic conflicts occurring within the Russian Federation, including the threat of disintegration of the Armed Forces, disagreements related to redrawing of borders, and others, there will be a requirement for special troops to quell or localize the conflicts. They would be organized, armed, and trained as rapid deployment forces. We previously accomplished this type of mission by employing airborne troops, which, incidentally, enjoyed easy availability of enlistees due to youths' liking for the individual approach to training that kind of soldier.

However, field forces and generally less mobile troops are completely unsuitable for accomplishing the above-mentioned missions. Also completely unsuitable are mastodons such as a homogeneous tank army, which is an instrument for carrying out strategic offensive operations in great depth.

The above is of no small importance for determining the organizational structure of an army, which is intimately linked with forecasting the nature of a future threat and of military activities.

Thus, the making of major decisions - the kind of army we need, the particular organization, the specific makeup - must be accomplished only after we arrive at a clear mental picture of the particular military threats the state may encounter. This in its entirety must be determined and then written down in explicit terms in the military doctrine. That is why it is impossible to agree with the writer of the discursive article relative to the

doubtful role of the doctrine and its replacement by alternating "strategic concepts."

This is the place to emphasize that a doctrine is a state's military construction algorithm constituting a set of directives which take into account all factors: The official theoretical views of the nature of war; possible threat situations; armed forces construction plans; and methods of employing the armed forces. Short of this, it is not possible to effect military construction. The doctrine is clearly in tune with a particular phase associated with the capabilities of a country and her armed forces in a particular period of time. The doctrine can ordinarily be modified or may undergo substantial correction, but it does not develop in the manner of military science. The doctrine is more subjective than objective, even though it may be based on precepts of military science.

Strategy is guided by long-standing laws of war, with these laws assumed to embody repeatability of military phenomena associated with definite actions. A strategy is multidimensional and democratic; it allows for differences in opinion and motives, something not permissible when a doctrine takes effect.

I have engaged in this terminological exercise to assist the efforts of Russian parliamentarians and associates of the developing Russian Ministry of Defense in this - the formative phase of military doctrine, and for the additional purpose of preventing delusions in reasoning on the part of military theoreticians who may share the views expressed by Professor D. Proektor.

Zolotov on New Russian Military Doctrine

92UM1108A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by Reserve Captain 1st Rank, Doctor of Military Sciences, and Professor Aleksandr Zolotov: "Just What Kind of Army Does Russia Need?"]

[Text] Unfortunately you will not be able to restore the collapsed state that was put together grain by grain over the course of centuries and that withstood the blows of two revolutions and two world wars. But I am certain that after many years the Union will once again be reborn at a qualitatively new spiral of development. As a matter of fact, the peoples do not need sovereignty. Sovereignty is needed by politicians who thirst for power. The peoples need friendship, unity, certainty in tomorrow and equal rights (not nearly the notorious equality that suggests the uniformity and sameness of everything, but there are no identical peoples [narody] or people [lyudi] in the world). It is on these aforementioned four threads that the unified peoples surrounding Russia will be based, but it will occur when they overcome the ideology of idolatry within themselves and when the interests of politicians begin to coincide with the interests of the peoples. But for now? But for now we need to be urgently concerned about Russia's defense capability.

Russia's Military Doctrine and the Goals and Tasks of its Armed Forces

Russia does not have and cannot have either political or military interests outside its own territory. Consequently, we need to consider Russia's purely defensive direction as the main principle of its military doctrine. And that means that it does not have and cannot ever have territorial claims against anyone, does not preventively see anyone as its enemy, and will not be the first to use any type of weapons whatsoever against anyone.

Hence it follows that prevention of a surprise attack (aggression) against Russia and the defense of its peoples and territory from any aggressors must become the main goals for the existence of Russia's Armed Forces [VSR] and the future organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces.

The Russian Armed Forces Must be Structured Based on What Principle?

Does Russia need strategic military parity?

For many decades, the Union Armed Forces were structured based upon the irrationally expensive and false principle of strategic military parity—an approximate balance of power of the opposing sides in both the nuclear and conventional potential. Why is this principle false? Well, because it assumes only the external, ostentatious aspect of the organizational development of the Armed Forces. And that is also a deception. The main thing consists not in the presence of an accumulated combat potential but in the capability of the forces to carry out in a timely manner its needed portion for the solution of assigned tasks.

Let us recall history. Tsushima, for example. From the analysis of the numerical correlation of forces of the sides in the Tsushima Naval Battle, it is obvious that the Russian squadron did not lag behind the Japanese fleet in the number of battleships (approximate parity) and the Russian squadron even exceeded the Japanese fleet in the number of the most powerful guns (254 and 306 mm caliber). However, the ships of our squadron could fire 134 projectiles per minute with 800 kilograms of explosives, but the Japanese could carry out 360 firings per minute with 10 tonnes of much more powerful explosives. In so doing, one tonne of explosives per minute reached Japanese targets and nearly four tonnes of explosives reached our naval targets. There's parity for you!

And in the Great Patriotic War, in the final analysis we won with a number, having lost three times more people than our enemy.

In the Afghan War, our internationalists-soldiers were professionals armed with modern types of weapons, were not able to defeat the Dushmani-amateurs. Iraq, having primarily our weapons in its inventory, suffers a crushing defeat by the coalition countries. Our PVO [Air Defense] system, which has first-class combat aircraft with which we captivate the world's air shows, commits

error after error in peacetime. Having an enormous number of tanks, we can't put more than a fourth of them into battle. Our navy, without pressure from anyone, is incapable of maintaining more than half of its combat ships in a combat-ready state and at times even loses them in peacetime along with people. There's parity for you! Right now some of the politicians and military leaders have begun to understand the entire disaster of the parity principle of organizational development of the Armed Forces. But only from the point of view of its high cost.

Just What Is Defensive Sufficiency?

But there is another principle of organizational development of the Armed Forces. That is defensive sufficiency. They are only talking about it for now. And few people are delving into the essence of the concept. At best, they are attempting to drive it under the parity of reduced potential. And this is doubly dangerous because one can easily step over the boundary of genuine sufficiency. Why? Well, because we measure using a criterion that is totally insensitive to the concept of "sufficiency." Recall the famous Shevardnadze statement: "We decided to have reasonable sufficiency at the 30 percent level" (you needed to understand that both sides intend to reduce their potential by 70 percent from the existing level). But is that good or bad? A little or a lot? And how much should it be? But no one knows. And they can't know. Because it is impossible to measure using that criterion.

Defensive sufficiency—is that balance when the realized portion of our own potential is on one scale and what is required to carry out missions is on the other scale. That's what's called genuine sufficiency for defense. If the aforementioned balance does not exist, there is no sufficiency. All the more so reasonable. Because there cannot be an unreasonable balance.

That approach first of all is being imposed and, in my view, it can only lie at the foundation of the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces. Because defensive sufficiency depends not only on the presence of combat potential in a country but on the capability of the Armed Forces to carry them out. I assert that the army's capability to realize its potential must become the main criterion for its professionalization. Everything else—will come later.

Combat Capability and Combat Readiness of Forces

The combat capability of forces—is the first condition necessary for the realization of the potential. Their combat readiness is the second and main condition.

It goes beyond its very readiness (as we think so far) and at the same time depends on the development and fine-tuning of such infrastructure elements as men and equipment of combat (operational) support of strike forces and on their command and control.

Can we consider our submarine at sea to be ready for combat if the opposing side has established tracking of it

using antisubmarine warfare systems in peacetime? It is thought, yes. But I assert that this is impossible to do because its effectiveness will be extremely low.

It turns out that the combat readiness of the Armed Forces is nothing other than their capability to realize their combat potential under any conditions and under any circumstances.

Consequently, besides the time to shift forces from state to state, combat readiness must be assessed by yet two other criteria: by the level of realization of potential and by the level of the resolution of the task. The latter must become the primary criterion.

The level of resolution of all tasks facing the Russian Armed Forces is close to one and will characterize defensive sufficiency and, consequently, Russia's combat capability.

As we see, a country's combat capability depends not only on the presence of strike forces but also on the development of the military infrastructure. However, at one time while striving at any cost for the most rapid attainment of strategic military parity with the United States and its allies, we spent the overwhelming portion of the appropriations allocated for defense on an expensive strike subsystem, while being little concerned about development of the infrastructure.

Two primary problems face those officials who will substantiate the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces on the principle of genuine defensive sufficiency: How to calculate the quantitative values of the realized and required potential of existing units in a timely manner? How to balance the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces between our own forces and infrastructure? (Today we are incalculably and rashly breaking down both the one and the other).

Russian Military Science and the VPK [Military-Industrial Complex]

The resolution of the two problems mentioned above must be assigned to Russian military science. And what are we doing with it today? Instead of organizing and directing its activities in needed directions, our military leadership is systematically and methodically destroying it. In the last three years, the number of military scholars with the highest qualifications has been reduced by more than a factor of four. The most experienced scholars-officers are being released into the reserve at their most productive working age—45-60 years of age. Subsidies for military science have been reduced by nearly an order of magnitude, moreover: they are even attempting to shift it to cost-accounting (?!). The salaries of military scholars (bearing in mind civilian scholars who work in military science) are hardly commensurate with the salaries of caretakers and they are 3-5 times lower than for a city transport vehicle driver. It seems that the command authorities of all levels and the country's leadership are not very worried about the state of affairs

with military science. And today, in the period of Armed Forces reduction and conversion, the struggle in the sphere of military-technical thought is becoming the main thing.

Today, they can cast rebukes at me that, they say, it is military science that stood at the sources of the organizational development of aircraft-carrying ships. That is not quite so because military science did that under pressure of the commander-in-chief for whom these ships were hardly needed. But the command authorities of the highest level were in absolute dependence on military industry, the hierarchy of which played a leading role in the Union (they were academicians, heroes of socialist labor, and members of the Party Central Committee and Politburo). It is military industry, having crushed under itself the Ministry of Defense leadership and having created jointly with it the single Military-Industrial Complex (VPK), that manipulated trillions and built not what the needs of practice dictated but that which it wanted and could, but with the mandatory condition—so that everything developed was as expensive as possible. It was necessary to "master" these trillions (otherwise, you won't get any in the future). A mass of expensive lead models of weaponry and military equipment (even types of petroleum, oil, and lubricant materials) appeared in the Armed Forces with a miserly number of units in series production. That is precisely why the people's resources were expended at an order of magnitude greater than was needed to attain today's potential realization level. Isn't that a crime? So who won the "aircraft carrier" war? The military? No. The Military-Industrial Complex won. It could not have been otherwise. Who lost? The people. The State.

Hence a legitimate question follows: but who must be involved with the organizational development of the Russian Armed Forces? Should it really be the new military-industrial complex or the one transformed from the union military-industrial complex? The answer is simple: of course not!

While proceeding from the experience of the past, we must create a new principle of appropriations for organizational development and maintenance of the Russian Armed Forces. Some of the resources for the development of military science must come through the Russian Scientific-Technical Committee. In financial issues, it is becoming somewhat free from the guardianship of the Ministry of Defense and depends on it only for part of the orders in accordance with which it develops recommendations for the organizational development, maintenance, and combat employment of the Russian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense which, while using the recommendations of military science, receives the primary share of appropriations for organizational development and maintenance of the army from the state, orders the required weaponry and military equipment from the defense industry. And if the order is accomplished in accordance with the assigned requirement, the Ministry of Defense pays its costs and, if not, payment

does not occur and the corresponding defense industry enterprise goes broke. Everything is being turned upside down.

The future military doctrine and concept of the Russian Armed Forces and the bases of the organizational development of the Russian Army were the main issues on the agenda of a four-day scientific practical conference—"Russia's Military Security"—that occurred at the General Staff Academy. Leaders of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the CIS Unified Armed Forces, the chief of the general staffs, and representatives of the military-industrial complex participated in the conference's work.

While delivering the concluding remarks, Russian Minister of Defense General of the Army Pavel Grachev noted that the military doctrine must be submitted to the President of Russia by 1 July 1992 and the concept for the Russian Armed Forces—by 1 September 1992. They plan to complete the reform of the Russian Army in 6-8 years.

Absence of Planning for Nuclear Weapons in New Strategy

92UM1148A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Sergey Karaganov: "Russia and Nuclear Weapons: Boris Yeltsin's Forthcoming U.S. Visit Brings Military Security Problem to Forefront"]

[Text] After a long period of confusion and intense behind-the-scenes fighting that deepened by several levels the overall crisis of the country and its elite, it seems as if military policy is beginning to establish itself on a rational foundation. The crisis will continue to hinder implementation of the most reasonable ideas. But at least they now exist. The transfers and new appointments occurring in the military establishment and the decision itself to begin development of a Russian army permit the hope that these ideas will be implemented.

The direction of development of general-purpose forces is revealing itself rather definitely in the ongoing debate. Ultimately, they must be relatively small, highly mobile, and equipped with high-precision weapons and the means of their delivery. There is an obvious departure from reliance upon enormous ground forces tied to a particular potential theater of military operations, traditional to Russia and the USSR and long out of touch with strategic necessity.

Such flexible forces must be prepared to avert and neutralize challenges to the territorial integrity and independence of Russia from any direction, without however being oriented against some particular adversary. Clearly they must be multipurpose, and identically capable of conducting both defensive and offensive operations. Moreover their numerical strength and configuration must make offensive operations of a strategic nature possible as well. Otherwise we will once again begin to frighten neighbors and create artificial enemies.

Things are more complex when it comes to nuclear forces. Their role is practically undetermined. What we obviously have before us is either an embarrassing silence regarding the nuclear factor in the national strategy, or a return to the liberal visions through rose-colored glasses of the early Gorbachev era, though now in fundamentally different conditions, in which proposals for ultraradical strategic arms reductions appear even less serious.

In the times of confrontation, the lack of clarity of nuclear policy was both active and passive. It was believed that in many ways uncertainty strengthened the adversary. Today there is no obvious adversary, and we will hope that one will not appear. But at the same time the debate around nuclear weapons has shifted to another plane, and it is an object of disagreement in the CIS, as a result of which the main threat is becoming not the accidental unleashing of a war in response to escalation of confrontation between nuclear powers (the probability of premeditated use was negligible even before), but the proliferation of nuclear weapons and loss of control over them should they fall into the hands of states not possessing a developed monitoring system (for example Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus), or collapse of countries possessing such a system (Russia for example).

Given such uncertainty, the fuzziness of nuclear policy is becoming more passive than active. Positions need to be determined. Understandably, at the same time there can be no discussion of establishing a system of rigid postulates, which would almost inevitably come into conflict with rapidly changing reality. Policy may be modified, but it is something we must have.

Nuclear weapon policy must be a firmly entrenched part of overall state strategy. And not only because the gap between different elements of state strategy, which existed in the USSR and is growing even larger in Russia (of course, for other reasons), is extremely harmful. While they do wield unimaginable military might, nuclear weapons are more a political instrument, and a part of policy. Chiefly because their use is so repugnant.

Determining the place of nuclear weapons in state policy is not a simple matter, and we have almost no traditions to look to in resolving such an issue. One of the methods of determining their place is to analyze the challenges to which state policy must respond. We will name these challenges below, and attempt to analyze the role nuclear weapons may play (or not play) in neutralizing them.

The threat of armed—and all the more so nuclear—attack from the West, which was traditionally said to be serious, is close to, if not equal to zero. Such a threat, if it does exist, can be restrained by a quantity of weapons much smaller than that possessed by the other side.

My own investigations of declassified documents of the American leadership from the early 1950s reveal quite clearly that the threat of a few nuclear attacks against population centers on the adversary's territory are

enough to restrain him. This will not be the "unacceptable loss" of traditional nuclear ideology. But such a loss would be unacceptable to democratic societies, because it would inevitably lead to establishment of a dictatorship and breakdown of the traditional values of the society itself.

Understanding this, as early as from the very beginning of the 1950s the American leadership had to reject, time after time and with increasing firmness, any proposals that could lead to nuclear war. The threat of using nuclear weapons was made on several occasions, but each time it was more and more of a bluff.

It is rather clear besides, that leaders operating within the framework of today's Western political systems cannot make the decision to launch a nuclear strike for political, moral, ethical and organizational reasons. The phenomenon of "self-deterrence" is clearly operating. Finally, "self-deterrence" is also rooted in the understanding that any war, even the most limited, can lead to ecological consequences that would politically sweep away any leadership. We can therefore assume that armaments can be reduced practically without limit and still deter a residual threat, though naturally this excludes antiballistic missile systems. Their deployment is the limit to the reductions.

Is it valid to conclude, then, that the Western factor permits the deepest, including unilateral, reductions of nuclear arms? The discussion above suggests that the answer is yes. But I will not risk a categorically positive answer.

If I believed that our country's modernization would proceed in relative tranquillity, I would give such a categorical answer. But unfortunately, such development is not to be expected. Even if, one would hope, we manage to avoid rebirth of National Socialism or disintegration, it is almost inevitable that we will have periods of backward movement and unpleasant excesses.

The old strategic culture has become obsolete in the West. Will the temptation to capitalize on superiority to exert brutal pressure not arise? All of this can lead to the resumption of confrontational thinking, and it will strengthen the positions of reactionary and militaristic forces even more in our country, as had occurred in the past.

Have our new and old civilian and military leaders matured enough to understand that any pressure is only a bluff? Will they become frightened? Will they begin to make mistakes out of a lack of confidence? Enmity and mistakes come from nuclear weakness to a no lesser degree, if not a greater one, than from nuclear superiority.

Nor do I think that Russia is interested in eliminating one other little-known but significant function of nuclear weapons that may come into play either in the event of the reduction of armaments to the absolute minimum or in the event of their grossly uneven reduction. I would call this function "civilizing self-deterrence."

The visible presence of the nuclear factor in the political arena did more than to directly promote the prevention and deterrence of many crises at their lower rungs of escalation. This factor influenced the evolution of the ruling elites of nuclear states—latent, but rather substantially. Radical views and officials whose policies might have led to nuclear confrontation were gradually leached out of them.

The world is experiencing revolutionary times. This is hardly the time to weaken the factor of "civilizing self-deterrence," which is of course incapable of averting the coming to power of dangerous radicals on its own, but which increases the obstacles along their path. This can pertain not only to Russia and contiguous states, but also to some other countries.

Irritation with our confusion, incompetency and corruption, and apprehensions that they are making any modernization impossible, is growing in the outside world.

Russia's obvious weakness and the possibility for disregarding the nuclear factor can strengthen the positions of those who would want to return to a policy of isolation, of "shutting in" "Europe's sick man," in the event of further crises. This is a position that is fully logical for many of our Western neighbors, but one not in keeping with the national interests of Russia and the interests of its modernization and its economic and social rebirth. Even relative "shutting in" means that our country will be predestined to decay and decomposition. We do not have sufficient internal reserves for the first spiral of modernization.

The motives encouraging cooperation with the CIS and Russia and avoidance of conflicts will weaken. Reasonable people, who understand that deepening deterioration and conflicts on the territory of the former USSR ultimately threaten the survival of European civilization even in the absence of the nuclear weapon factor, will not be swayed, but their urgings to consider long-term interests will be drowned out even more by the choir of voices of politicians and experts absorbed in their own more-visible and more easily solvable problems.

Challenges from the south, about which some of our military and civilian specialists talk a great deal, albeit unclearly, could hardly acquire such a massive and obvious nature that their neutralization would require reliance upon nuclear weapons. Such a need could arise only if one of our southern neighbors attempts to become a nuclear power. If this does not happen—we would hope it wouldn't, then nuclear weapons can serve only as a background factor in Russia's policy regarding Southern Asia and the Near and Middle East, but in no way can they serve as a real instrument of deterrence of aggressive actions. One of the paradoxes of nuclear policy in the last quarter of a century is the practically complete impossibility of utilizing the nuclear threat against nonnuclear states, even aggressive ones. The sole

known exception to this rule is Washington's threat to use nuclear weapons to deter Iraq's potential use of bacteriological weapons. But this exception only confirms the rule. In terms of their destructive possibilities and from a moral and political point of view, bacteriological weapons are practically equivalent to nuclear weapons. Thus challenges from the southern direction create almost no need for nuclear deterrence in Russia. Presence of a large arsenal would hardly help to avert proliferation of nuclear weapons. The reverse is more likely: It is believed that maintenance of these arsenals "legalizes" the desire to acquire one's own nuclear potential.

Things are more complex when it comes to the Chinese factor. Relations with this country are currently friendly. There are no clear causes for alarm. But we cannot help seeing the abrupt changes that are occurring in the situations of both powers. Russia makes up more than half of the former USSR in terms of population and economic potential. Its economy will remain in a state of crisis for at least a few more years. On the other hand China's economy is developing quite dynamically. The country's "capitalization" and its entry into a period of acute social upheavals are rather probable. Such development of events on the backdrop of relative overpopulation will objectively promote the advent of expansionistic tendencies in policy. Clearly such tendencies must be averted primarily by political methods, by establishing friendly relations with China and by organizing a strategic alliance with the West from Vancouver to Vladivostok (or Tokyo). But it may turn out that political methods alone might not be enough to avert expansionism. Clearly Russia cannot allow itself to maintain conventional forces of sufficient strength to restrain a challenge of this sort. Political reliance upon superior nuclear forces can become extremely useful in this situation, if not the only alternative.

The uncontrollability of a significant part of military strategic space, formed on the territory of the former USSR and degrading into a geostrategic hole threatened by conflict, periodically surfaces in political discussion of the possible use of nuclear weapons for the purposes of deterrence, for prevention of such conflicts, and even for political pressure. From what I know, such ideas are brought up rather frequently in Ukraine, though of course not within the country's leadership or by responsible politicians.

I think that such ideas are lunacy of the worst kind. But the fact that they even arise indicates that a danger exists: The new political elite are inexperienced, and they are easily carried away by nationalistic sentiments. In such a political environment nuclear weapons become even more dangerous, and additional arguments in favor of their deepest possible reduction and elimination are created.

Finally, there exists a most substantial argument in favor of the fastest possible elimination of nuclear weapons—

the possibility of disintegration of the Russian Federation, and then its armed forces, and of the unified system for controlling nuclear weapons. In this situation an uncontrollable threat to the existence of all mankind would be created. This argument is being used with increasing frequency in the West, and sometimes even in our country, to justify appeals for the fastest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons. The argument is of course a substantial one, and it alone can balance off all others. But it cannot be laid at the basis of policy, at least because elimination of armaments would take several years, even with considerable foreign financing, and the threat of Russia's disintegration will peak sometime in these several years. Therefore the sole means of averting this deadly—no exaggeration—threat is to prevent political disintegration by all possible means. This must be the main goal of Russia's own state policy, and equally so it should be the main goal of the policy of the outside world in relation to Russia and the CIS.

The picture of interests and challenges which I have attempted to draw is ambiguous. But I feel that it provides a possibility for reaching rather definite conclusions. Russia is interested in the fastest possible elimination of tactical nuclear weapons both because of their military and political unacceptability and due to the danger that they may fall into irresponsible hands under unstable conditions.

We also need to continue the process of reducing strategic arms, and of ratifying and implementing of agreements already reached. But I feel that for political reasons Russia must not be interested in hastening the process of their reduction. We would hardly be interested in fast initiation of a new round of strategic arms reduction talks, since we would participate in the negotiations with practically no trump cards. Even the most benevolent partner will have the possibility for dictating terms completely, and this will unavoidably evoke confrontation, resistance and a worsening of political relations. As a rule, clearly unequal treaties do not withstand the test of time.

At the same time reductions are possible and necessary. But it would be better to conduct them by means of parallel unilateral actions coordinated within the framework of a dialogue on reinforcement of strategic stability and creation of relations of partnership in the realm of strategy. Furthering the practice of taking systems off alert status or reducing the degree of their combat readiness is an extremely productive means of demonstrating political trust.

I foresee that my thesis—that it would be preferable for Russia to maintain its political reliance on nuclear weapons—could be interpreted in Ukraine or in Kazakhstan in the following manner: Aha, the Russians see a benefit in nuclear weapons, but they demand that we give them up. Let me answer this right away. Yes, nuclear weapons add to the status of the country and of the part of its leadership involved in the realm of military strategy—a few dozen persons.

But we need to know the costs of this status. Russia possesses a nuclear potential by right of its internationally recognized position of nuclear successor to the USSR. If other countries attempt to take control of the nuclear weapons, they will place themselves in the position of outcasts. Nuclear matters will be discussed with them, but no one will help or cooperate with them in a wide range of political or economic issues. Russia is destined to be the potential adversary of nuclear countries. Do the other CIS countries want such a thing?

A relatively large nuclear potential provides a certain sensation of security. An extremely weak potential—which is all that it can be in other CIS countries, will add to the sensation of vulnerability. The experience of the nuclear race shows that the politically and psychologically most disadvantageous situation would be occupied not by a nonnuclear power vis-a-vis a nuclear one, but by a weak nuclear power opposed by a superior one. No one will put nuclear weapons into play, but they will still have to be feared. Russia possesses a system for monitoring the nuclear complex that probably costs hundreds upon hundreds of billions. New nuclear powers would also have to make similar expenditures.

But what opponents will invariably say is this: What are we to do if reactionary forces come to power in Russia? "Zhirinovskiy's argument" is heard extremely often, especially in Ukraine.

This would be a tragedy both for Russia and for everyone else. But there is one thing we can be sure of—a multi-layered complex of systems and people who would hardly allow a catastrophe to occur will separate the Zhirinovskiy's from the nuclear trigger in Russia. In other CIS countries, meanwhile, there will be no such complexes standing between the Zhirinovskiy's (and they are no less probably there) and nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

General Staff Conference on Russian Military Doctrine

92UM1107C Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI
in Russian 2 Jun 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Army"]

[Text] The future military doctrine and concept of Russia's Armed Forces and the principles to be applied to construction of the Russian Army were the major topics occupying the agenda governing a four-day workshop entitled "Russia's Military Security" held in the General Staff Academy.

In the concluding remarks, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russia's minister of defense, stated that the military doctrine is to be submitted to the President of Russia by 1 July of this year; the concept of Russia's Armed Forces, by 1 September. Plans call for a three-phase reform of the Russian Army to be completed in a period of 6 to 8 years. The first phase will involve the creation of the structure of the Russian Ministry of

Defense, with determination of its magnitude, mission responsibilities, and legal basis of operation. The second phase, which will require 2 or 3 years to accomplish, will consist of the final withdrawal of troops under the jurisdiction of Russia from the territories of the former socialist countries, and a change to a combination system of manpower acquisition. It is planned to reduce the strength of Russia's Armed Forces to approximately 2.1 million men by the year 1995. The third phase, depending upon the situation existing at that time, should be one of complete withdrawal of Russian troops from all states of the former USSR and of effectuation of measures resulting in a reduction to 1.5 million men.

Pavel Grachev stated that, for the transitional period, the Strategic Nuclear Forces are to be placed under the High Command of the CIS Unified Armed Forces.

MILITARY CONFLICT, FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Hungary Sends Military Attaché to Ukraine

92UM1149A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
30 May 92 p 1

[Report from Ukraine Ministry of Defense Press Service under the rubric "Military Contacts Are Expanding": "A Military Attaché From Hungary Will Be Created"]

[Text] Lieutenant Colonel of the Armed Forces of Hungary Lajos Ergas completed the special department of the Kiev Higher Air-Defense Missile Engineering School twenty-five years ago. And here he is in Kiev again. The purpose of the visit of the future assistant military attaché this time is quite serious and crucial—to prepare the ground for the siting of a military attaché from his country.

Despite the fact that the Hungarian Republic was the first state whose embassy was opened in independent Ukraine, they have not yet created the military attaché, as opposed to the embassies of the unified Germany and the French Republic. Its opening is not far off today.

Conversion of GDR Munitions Factory

92UM1114A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by Colonel S. Pashayev: "MVK Needs Shells for Peaceful Cooperation"]

[Text] This cozy small town, sunk in the green of summer, least of all resembles one of the military arsenals of the former GDR. For many years, a factory located on its outskirts specialized in the production of small-arms ammunition—first for the Wehrmacht and later for the National People's Army.

No, they no longer make ammunition here. Figuratively speaking, the assembly line has been reversed. In one work shift, the factory's reconfigured shops recycle up to

1.5 million shells of various caliber and hundreds of antitank rocket-powered projectiles. And not only German-made ones. When we arrived, stacks of wooden boxes with Soviet markings were awaiting their turn to be recycled. At the work positions where "zincs" are uncovered with shells for the "Kalashnikov," a deposit of yellowed labels with the names of those who back in 1951 supervised their packing—Voloskov, Kondratyev, Tishkov...

These shops are an important but, of course, not the only direction of the conversion being implemented here. The former munitions factory in Koenigswarta puts on the German market products besides separated shells—copper, brass, aluminum, zinc, and quite good industrial products. For example, small tractor-loaders. The economical Japanese diesel engine, with which the Hitrac 1760 assembled here is equipped, gives this company a machine that is not only powerful and maneuverable, but also powers more than 40 mounted attachments that can be added at the customer's request.

Another direction is medical equipment. The factory's highly skilled specialists quickly assimilated production of this equipment. Already after a few months, various supports, holders, dollies, and special sanitary engineering products were coming off the assembly line. But we instinctively lingered in the section where they assemble wheelchairs. They are light, easily adjusted in height to the weight of the person, fold up in minutes, and are packed in convenient travel cases with a shoulder strap. Remembering the problems with wheelchairs in the CIS, we could not help but ask the supervisor of the export division escorting us, Mr. Kurt Schmidt, how many of these wheelchairs the enterprise can produce in, say, a month. Up to 10,000, he explained. And then he added, if there is a demand. Yes, this is one of the most critical problems today for the MVK—the Koenigswarta GmbH machinery factory.

Having survived the crisis and collapse of the GDR defense industry, the MVK was forced to make fundamental reforms. The starting point was to include the state plant as a limited-liability enterprise in a joint-stock company, whose stock was later acquired by Americans. A step that is not patriotic in our traditional understanding, but dictated by realities. General Atomics, having its own interests in the eastern lands of Germany, granted its own technologies to the newly born Saxon firm.

Obviously, it was not possible to preserve the previous make-up of the collective—the laws of the market dictated a regime of maximum economy. Instead of the 1200 employees, 700 people now work here; 150 of the 450 management workers remained; and 20 of the 100 technical control specialists remained. But, as one of the managers of the MVK, Mr. Wodo Pfugner, proudly explained to us, they managed to make the cuts as "softly" as possible. The ones who left the factory were primarily those who either had pension rights or planned to try their hand at another field. Parallel to this, some of

the small production facilities and servicing subdivisions, for example, electricians, were set apart as independent mini-companies that cooperate with the MVK under contracts.

What is the result? The main result is that the MVK, unlike most similar enterprises of the GDR, did not break up. The people were provided jobs. The sales volume last year was 55 million German marks. The plan goal this year is 65 million. All this is very difficult, since there are quite a number of objective reasons which impede development of production. It is no secret, say, that the material conditions for those Germans living on the territory of the former GDR differs considerably from those opportunities which their fellow countrymen in the western regions of the country have. This is automatically reflected in demand. And the MVK has more than enough competitors who have production facilities set up and whose financial reserves are more powerful and resilient.

There would seem to be a solution—set up and restore ties with traditional partners in the East. After all, there is virtually an inexhaustible demand for the above-mentioned products in those sovereign states of the former USSR. There is one hitch—in terms of currency, all these newly born countries are practically insolvent. Convertibility of the ruble is no panacea either, which we have been caring about recently—our prices are simply not comparable to world prices. For example, gasoline in Germany costs 1.5 marks per liter—just over 100 rubles when converted to our currency. How much would a German wheelchair cost a disabled person?

We could try to create some kind of subsidiary infrastructures or branches of the MVK in the CIS, but the company does not have the money for this right now. But such ideas are being discussed here. For example, in terms of creating small assembly shops at places where the units of the Western Group of Forces being withdrawn are stationed, where family members of servicemen will most likely end up unemployed.

So, perhaps only one direction in establishing mutually beneficial contacts has any real prospects today. Those stocks of shells which the enterprise at Koenigswarta will have to process are coming to an end. Meanwhile, the Western Group of Forces being withdrawn from Germany is transporting thousands of tonnes of its own munitions across several borders. They are being transported, in the end, to be destroyed, this is inevitable. The Russians will have to decide where, how, at what industrial base, and with what consequences (remember how barbarically we separated the medium- and short-range missiles) to accomplish this extensive and costly action. One cannot help but ask: Would it not be more advantageous, considering the pluses and minuses, to cooperate with the Germans? They are interested in getting the work, have the necessary goods for us, and have been able to put elimination of munitions on the assembly

line. Moreover, they have passed over many of the technological and ecological reefs which we inevitably will have to encounter.

After returning from Koenigswarta, we became interested in what the patron of the MVK—General Atomics—specializes? The sphere of interests of this powerful transnational company involves recycling of nuclear waste. It has serious breakthroughs and achievements in this field. We thought: Can it really begin with shells for the Kalashnikov assault rifle in order in the future to join efforts in eliminating the most inhumane weapon in the history of world civilization?

SECURITY SERVICES

Yeltsin Signs Decree on Russian Border Troops

92UM1143A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
16 Jun 92 First edition p 3

[Article by unidentified KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent under the "Direct Line" rubric: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, ITAR-TASS, and RIA Correspondents' Yesterday's Dispatch from Moscow: Russian Federation Border Troop Decree Official"]

[Text] On 12 June, Russia's Independence Day, Boris Yeltsin signed a decree which creates the Border Troops of the Russian Federation. The decree establishes a unified system of security and protection for state borders and the maritime economic zone as a function of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, with the Border Troops to be part of the Committee for State Border Security and troops subordinated to the latter. The commander of the Russian Federation Border Troops is assigned the additional responsibility of serving as deputy minister of security.

The Ministry of Security is to assume authority over all border troops presently stationed on the territory of the Russian Federation and over border troops currently under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation budget is to provide funding for general, social, personnel, and pension applications for servicemen and their dependents. The existing benefits,

payment schedules, pay and allowances, and salaries of military personnel, laborers, and white collar workers are to apply.

The President is to instruct the Government of Russia to prepare a recommendation relative to the extent of the Russian Federation's financial support of the Intergovernmental Committee on Commonwealth Border Protection and Border Troops for review by a session of the Council of Heads of CIS Member Countries.

This decree assumed the force of law as of the time of its signing.

First Graduating Class From Estonian Border Troop College

92UM1121A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jun 92 First Edition p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak, under the rubric: "From Tallinn": "The First Graduation Has Taken Place at the Estonian Border College, 60 Officers Have Been Trained, But Nearly 2,000 Are Needed"]

[Text] The Border Troops College is located in a building of the former nautical school. It is the first of a system of colleges that is being created right now in Estonia. Border service, police, rescue service, fire service and civil defense, internal troops (to guard prisons), and defensive forces colleges will enter this system. A military academy will coordinate this entire system. The former Tallinn Higher Military-Political Construction School, which has been disbanded, is being prepared for the transfer of its buildings to the military academy.

The Border College was one of the first to be created—in January 1992. Cadets study three mandatory languages at the college—English, German, and Swedish, the ethics and esthetics of the border service, and the psychology of the personality. Cadets range from 18 to 50 years of age and scholarships range from 200-1,500 rubles. There are also seamen at the college—16 of them.

The first graduation is 60 people and the Estonian Border Service needs a total of 1,750 officers. According to Estonian officials, three years will be needed for the complete formation of the Estonian Border Troops officer corps.

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